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Synopsis 
 
This thesis is centrally concerned with the ‘democratic debate’ and assessing the 
prospects for democratic transition in contemporary China. The first part of the thesis 
(including Chapters 1 and 2) reviews the (primarily) Western academic literature on 
democracy and democratisation. It is argued that while this literature is useful-up to a 
point-in understanding how the debate of democratisation is unfolding in China, and 
the processes that are generating political reforms and other changes that are 
conducive to democracy, it has wholly neglected the specificity of the Chinese case. 
The third chapter of the thesis duly embarks on a discussion of both the history of 
debate and discussion in China historically, arguing that this debate and discussion 
has to be understood in the context of Chinese history and culture specifically. This 
chapter identifies two strands of thought about democracy among academic 
commentators in China: first those who foresee a swift transition to democracy and 
the ‘gradualists’, who are primarily concerned with how problems of attendant 
social and political instability will impact on the prospects for democratisation. The 
second half of the thesis assesses the impact of Chinese economic reforms since the 
late 1970s, along with contemporary globalization and China’s growing integration 
into the global economy on the trajectory of political change in China. It explores 
important political changes within the regime, the emerging civil society forces, 
focusing specifically on changing state-society relations evidenced in growing village 
autonomy, changes in press media, and in other areas. 
 
The thesis combines the technique of discourse analysis (‘reading’ and analysing the 
changing discourse among state and civil society actors, including official political 
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documents and speeches; and media -television and newspapers- and NGO sources) 
with an assessment of institutional changes within the party (elite), changes in power 
structures (the limited diffusion of power to civil society through electoral reform and 
changes in media operation and control), and changing state-society relations.   
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0.1 What's (Believed to Be) Happening in China? 
  
A few years ago, when a woman at my work place got to know that I came from 
China, she raised her left eyebrow and asked, 'What's China's capital? Is it Japan?' 
From the expression on her face, I realized that she was not making a joke. In 2008, 
Beijing successfully hosted the 29th Olympic Games, and about 30 million British 
audiences watched the game livingly broadcasted by BBC. I guess that kind of 
questions would not be asked again.  
 
Indeed, with China's economy experiencing an average annual Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth rate in excess of 10% for the past 30 years, it has become the 
third largest economy in the world.  People’s impression of China as a red 
communist state has been changing along with China's economic growth and opening 
up. China's accession to the World Trade Organisation in December 2001 has 
accelerated the opening of the Chinese economy and improved the competitiveness of 
its industries. With a market of over one billion consumers, China has also become 
one of the most attractive markets in the world. Foreign direct investment has 
increased rapidly after the Reform and Opening up. Some commentators have 
described this phenomenon as 'China rising.'1 
 
Alongside market liberalization and economic prosperity, the politics in China are 
undergoing changes, and some of the changes are significant. After three decades of 
market liberalization reform and opening to the outside world, in Chinese people’s 
                                                 
1
  See, for example, China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities, by C. Fred 
Bergsten, Charles Freeman, Nicholas R. Lardy and Derek J. Mitchell,2008, ISBN 
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daily vocabulary, or those published in the newspapers and appearing in official 
documents or government reports, we find popularization of words such as ‘fazhi 
(rule of law)’, ‘renquan (human rights)’, ‘yifazhiguo (govern the state according 
to the law)’, ‘zhengzhiwenming (political civilization)’, ‘yirenweiben (people as 
the bases of governance)’, ‘baohusichang (protection of private property)’, 
‘hexieshehui (harmonious society)’ , ‘gongminshehui (civil society)’  and 
‘minzhu (democracy)’. For instance, in the Political Report to the Seventeenth 
Party’s Congress of Chinese Communist Party, the word ‘minzhu (democracy)’ 
appeared over 60 times. All these ideas and values are those found to be more popular 
in the western liberal democratic world. Meanwhile, anti-democratic ideas or actions 
have lost their popularity. What can be traced in the recent years in China’s politics is 
the decentralization of powers from the party-state in different ways. Particularly, 
different ways of distribution of power and influence among a range of actors other 
than just state (government),  
 
0.1.1 Grassroots democratic practice 
 
Autonomy and self-governance has become the lifestyle of Chinese citizens. On 8th of 
January, 1980, villagers of He Zhai, in Guang Xi Province, took part in an election of 
their own Villagers’  Committee, which gave birth to the first self-governing 
organization. Seven years later, after fierce arguments, the Trial of Organic Law of 
Villagers’ Committee was finally drafted; another ten years later, it was heavily 
amended and became a real law. ‘Sea election’ is another creative invention by 
                                                                                                                                            
978-0-88132-417-4, Peterson Institute for International Economics 
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villagers. The first such practice was found in Pin An Village of Lishu County in Ji 
Lin Province in 1991. A principle of ‘no drawn frame, no set tone (bu hua 
kuangkuang, bu ding diaozi)’ was agreed and all the candidates were nominated by 
villagers. (It used to be the authority that made the list of the candidates and villagers 
had to vote from the prearranged list). This is described as ‘picking up a needle from 
the sea’ and that’s what this way of election is named after. Of course, soon it was 
copied and advanced in the practice by villagers from other places.  
 
The City Residents Committee is the counter part of the Villagers Committee as the 
grassroots autonomous organizations in the cities. In a very long time, the members of 
the City Residents Committee were appointed by the government. In June 1999, the 
first trial election took place in Shen He District of Shen Yang City in which the 
residents practised their own right to choose the members of the committee. Since 
then, this new form of democratic practice has become the focus of the media and the 
public. For example, the experiment of direct election in Wu Ming of Guang Xi 
Province in 2001, the Cha’  e election (margined election) in Jiu Dao Wan 
community in Beijing in 2002, and the incidents during the direct election in Yan 
Tian District of Shen Zhen in 2005, were reported extensively by media. Until the end 
of 2007, all the residents committees in Ning Bo City of Zhe Jiang Province have 
successfully practiced this direct election.  
 
However, it is undeniable that, whether in the cities or in the rural areas, the 
grassroots democratic self-governance has not reached its ideal state. For instance, the 
long lasting clans influence, administrative intervention, and bribery in the election to 
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buy votes, have thrown a shadow upon this new form of autonomy and 
self-governance. Also there are other doubts about peasants’ capability to practice 
democracy as they are assumed to be under educated and dull, and the competence of 
the city residents committee to handle the clashing interest both inside and outside the 
community. These keep posing as challenges to the grassroots self-governing practice. 
Despite these challenges, many commentators have noticed this bottom-up 
democratic path which they believe will provide more opportunities and a wider 
platform for more advanced democratic practice or even political transformation2.  
 
0.1.2 Separation of powers  
 
Separation of powers in the state organs, the enhancement of the role of People’s 
Congress as the legislature, and the rule by law has changed into the idea of the rule 
of law. The regime of China has been undergoing a series of changes. For example, 
the centralization of power has been regarded as one of the reasons for China’s 
inefficient bureaucracy. Since the beginning of the Reform in the late 1970s, the 
leaders of the Communist Party have been trying to carry out the separation of powers, 
including the separation of the Party and the government, and the separation of 
government and the enterprises. Constitutionally, the National People’s Congress is 
the highest legislature of China3. However, during the Cultural Revolution, the whole 
legislature system was almost paralysed. One of the major tasks in the Reform era is 
                                                 
2
  As elaborated in Chapter 5 
3
 Article 57, Section 1, Chapter 3 of Constitutiom of People’s Republic of China, 
Adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress and promulgated 
for implementation by the Proclamation of the National People’s Congress on 
December 4, 1982, 1457 
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to re-establish People’s Congress at all levels.  The Electoral Law of 19794, and the 
New Constitution of 19825, established the groundwork for the reform of the People’
s Congress which includes empowerment of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, setting up the rules that the delegates to the people’s congress 
below the county-level should be directly elected by the voters, and for those local 
people’s congress above the county-level should have standing committees. Another 
two functions and powers of the People’s Congress were also supported by 
Legislation Law in 20006, and Supervision Law in 20067 respectively.  
 
The Reform era saw the progressive empowerment of the people’s congress as the 
legislature. It all started in July 1979, when seven laws were ratified by the National 
People’s Congress including the Criminal Law8. As of 2008, there are 229 laws in 
effect, and the quantity of other local rules and regulations is over 7,000, which 
altogether formed a modernized legal system. From the state of ‘lawless’ to the 
state of ‘rule of law’, in this process, the people’s congresses have played an 
                                                 
4
 The Electoral Law of the People’s Republic of China on the National People’s 
Congress and Local People’s Congresses, was enacted in 1953, revised in 1979, 
44364, 
5
 Constitutiom of People’s Republic of China, Adopted at the Fifth Session of the 
Fifth National People’s Congress and promulgated for implementation by the 
Proclamation of the National People’s Congress on December 4, 1982, 1457 
6
 The Law on Legislation of the People’s Republic of China, 2000, 26942 
7
 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Supervision of the Standing 
Committees of People’s Congresses at Various Levels, 2006, 78894 
8
 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1979, 556; the other six laws are, 
Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, 558; Organic Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Local People’s Congresses and Local People’s 
Governments at Various Levels, 44365; The Electoral Law of the People’s Republic 
of China on the National People’s Congress and Local People’s Congresses, 44364; 
Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorates of People’s Republic of China, 44457; 
Organic Law of the People’s Courts of People’s Republic of China, 44379; Law of 
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irreplaceable and contributive role.  
 
Another more substantial change in the role of people’s congresses as the legislature 
is that it is no longer a ‘voting machine’ in the procedure or ‘rubber stamp’. For 
instance, in 1986, when discussing on the amended draft of ‘Zhian Guanli Chufa 
Tiaoli’ (Regulations of the PRC on Administrative Penalties for Public Security), 
severe disputes over lawmaking happened for the first time amongst the deputies in 
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. The law was finally 
ratified after several reconsiderations and discussions. The delegates to all levels of 
the people’s congress are more concerned about the protection of the rights of 
citizens. For example, in 1998, the draft of the Amendament to the Highway Law was 
twice rejected by the Standing Committee of the NPC based on the concern that the 
fuel tax would become a burden to the peasants (the Amendament was finally 
approved in October 1999)9. It is said to be the ice-breaking act in the lawmaking 
history of NPC. In Chapter 4 of this thesis, the reform of the legislature organ will be 
explored more in detail.  
 
0.1.3 Checks and balances 
 
Chinese people are now more able to vote periodically to choose and remove political 
leaders at the higher levels (the town level, county level and even the district level); 
they are more actively involved with politics, joining NGOs or other movements, for 
                                                                                                                                            
the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, 559. 
9
 Highway Law of the People’ Republic of China, 1997, 18138, Highway Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (99 amendament), 23554 
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example, and they are more actively engaged in lobbing activities and they are more 
capable of influencing the decision-making process.  
 
In 1998, the township mayor of Bu Yun Town in Sui Ning City, Si Chuan Province 
was voted directly by all the residents in Bu Yun Town. However, it was actually 
contradictory to the legal regulation that the township mayors should be voted by the 
people’s congresses at the same level. Later this experimental election was called off. 
But the exploration was not suspended. Another new way was invented and named 
‘Gong Tui Gong Xuan’ (recommended by the public, chosen by the public). In 
general, the candidates are chosen through three ways; self-recommendation, public 
recommendation and nomination by the authority (usually from the Party). After the 
procedures of assessment, giving speeches and asking and answering questions, the 
list of candidates is finalized and then the elections are held according to the statutory 
rules.   
 
After 2002, ‘Gong Tui Gong Xuan’ reaches to the higher level of county and 
district. In 2003, the first county mayor elected through ‘Gong Tui Gong Xuan’ was 
appointed in Pei County of Jiang Su Province. In 2004, Bai Xia and Yu Hua Tai 
Districts of Nan Jing City also practiced the ‘Gong Tui Gong Xuan’ principle in the 
elections of the district mayors.  
 
An official accountability system has gradually come into being. Especially after the 
2003 SARS epidemic, the central government started the first ‘accountability storm’ 
in a national scale after the foundation of PRC. Since then, more officials are being 
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held to account. For instance, in recent years, the officials in charge of the coal mines 
which had a gas explosion in Shan Xi province were reported in the news and were 
either dismissed or accepted blame and resigned.  
 
The Administrative Procedure Law in 1989 was considered as a law for people to 
lodge a complaint against the officials. 10 Indeed, after its ratification, the cases of 
‘people accusing the officials’ increased rapidly, about 27-40% of the time the 
people wins the case11. In the public decision making process, people have more 
opportunities to express their wills through different ways and the price hearing 
system is one of the most important ways.  
 
0. 2 How Can We Understand This Change? Who Are In The 
Debate? 
 
There has been plenty of research that explores and analyses all the social, political 
and economical changes that are taking place in contemporary China12. There have 
also been long lasting debates over this subject, especially on the implications of the 
                                                 
10
 Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, 4274, 
11
  Minxin Pei, ‘Citizens v. Mandarins: Administrative Litigation in China,’ China 
Quarterly (December 1997): 832-62, cited in Andrew J. Nathan, ‘Authoritarian 
Resilience’, Journal of Democracy 14.1 (2003) p.15 
12
 For example, China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities, by C. Fred Bergsten, 
Charles Freeman, Nicholas R. Lardy and Derek J. Mitchell, 2008, ISBN 
978-0-88132-417-4, Peterson Institute for International Economics; Henry S.Rowen, 
‘When Will the Chinese People Be Free?’, Journal of Democracy 18.3 (2007) 
38-52; Dali L. Yang, ‘China’s Long March to Freedom’, Journal of Democracy 
18.3 (2007) p.61; Minxin Pei, How Will China Democratize?, Journal of Democracy 
18.3 (2007) 53-57; Mickel Oksenberg, ‘Confronting a Classic Dilemma’, Journal of 
Democracy 9.1 (1998) 27-34; B. He, Dilemmas of Pluralist Development and 
Democratization in China, Democratization, 3, 3, 1996; etc.  
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change and the prediction of what will be happening in China in the future, both 
inside and outside of China. Of course, one of the most intriguing predictions for the 
future of China is a (liberal) democratic state with free market policies. In the second 
chapter of this thesis, different academic groups within the debates are reviewed 
critically.  
 
0.2.1 Modernization School  
 
Basically, there are two large loosely formed groups who disagree with one another. 
The first one is called modernization school. They believe in the connectedness 
between economic development and political freedom. Modernization as a discipline 
began with Lipset’s seminal article in 195913. In his essay, modernity was regarded as 
universal experience, which would lead to similar societies and states.  
 
Democracy is the outcome of modernization and capitalism. Modernization is also 
predictive: democracy appears in those societies that are able to ‘replicate the 
original transition14 ’ to capitalism and become enmeshed in global economic 
structures.15 
 
For the modernization school, economic development can bring about democracy 
                                                 
13
  Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Legitimacy’, American Political Science Review 53, 1, 
March 1959, pp. 69-105 
14
  I. Roxborough, Theories of Underevelopment, 1979 Atlantic Highland, NJ: 
Humanities Press 
15
  Jean Grugel, Democratization: A Critical Introduction, 2002, p47, Publisher, 
Palgrave Macmillan 
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through a number of factors. It improves the education level of the citizens who can 
appreciate democratic values. It increases the income of the mass of the population. 
Because poverty, incomes gaps and mal-development could lead disadvantaged 
groups to seek redress through non-democratic means, or to support anti-democratic 
(nationalist, populist, communist) parties in the electoral process16. With economic 
security, the populace would develop a longer time perspective and more complex 
and gradualist views of politics. Economic development increases the size of the 
middle class who moderate conflict as they would choose moderate and democratic 
parties not the radical ones. It would also create unbearable pressure for an 
authoritarian structure. It also increases people’s wealth and their liberties. Hence 
leads to the emergence of a large number of voluntary, autonomous social 
organizations. These autonomous organizations seek to increase political participation, 
place a check upon government, enhance political skills, and generate and diffuse new 
opinions. Economic development is therefore instrumental in the emergence of civil 
society. 17 
 
In the Chinese case, during the last three decades, China’s openness to the world and 
the move away from the command economy has resulted in continuous nationwide 
economic growth. The theorists in the modernization school thus believe 
democratization will become inevitable as the political consequences of the economy, 
the communication revolution, and the emergence of a more diverse society and an 
urban middle class. Individuals will gain more independence, resources and power 
                                                 
16
  John D. Nagle and Alison Mahr, Democracy and Democratization, 1999, p.55, 
London: Sage 
17
  Based on discussion in Diamond, pp. 475-485, which is in turn based principally 
on Lipset; cited in Graeme Gill, The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil 
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vis-à-vis the state which necessitates the adoption of democracy and the rule of law. 
The representatives of this school are Henry S. Rowen18, Dali L. Yang19, Minxin Pei20 
and others. They tried to draw out the implications for democracy in a range of recent 
reforms, including the decentralization of power within the Party21, the strengthening 
of People’s Congresses at all levels of the hierarchy, especially the National People’
s Congress, the rule of law, the rise of a civil society, and the democratic grassroots 
elections at the village-level. 
 
Some observers also pointed out that as literacy, urbanization, and mass-media 
exposure rise, modernizing societies experience characteristic shifts in values. They 
assert that economic performance has become the legitimacy of rule22, therefore, the 
CCP, facing the risks of economic stagnation and political disaffection, will have to 
hold on to economic liberalization, which lays the groundwork for democratization. 
 
The market economy which has been introduced to take the place of the central 
planned and command economic system has fuelled China’s growth in the last 3 
decades. Along with the erosion of ideology belief, Chinese Communist Party has 
become Communist only in name.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Society and the Transition Process, 2000, p.3-5 
18
 Henry S.Rowen, ‘When Will the Chinese People Be Free?’ , Journal of 
Democracy 18.3 (2007) 38-52 
19
 Dali L. Yang, ‘China’s Long March to Freedom’, Journal of Democracy 18.3 
(2007) p.61 
20
 Minxin Pei, How Will China Democratize?, Journal of Democracy 18.3 (2007) 
53-57 
21
  Mickel Oksenberg, ‘Confronting a Classic Dilemma’, Journal of Democracy 9.1 
(1998) 27-34 
22
  B. He, Dilemmas of Pluralist Development and Democratization in China, 
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Liberalization does not automatically spawn democratization, however, once 
liberalization is initiated, there is always pressure for the regime to expand it. During 
this process, liberalizing moves may become radicalized and transformed into forces 
for democratization23. (This process is contingent upon individual circumstances.) 
The modernizationists tend to see in China the same economic and sociological 
processes that have led to democracy elsewhere in East and Southeast Asia24. Here, 
some theorists raised the question of the sequence of economic and political when 
they explore into the democratization process in Asia. 
 
Recent development in East Asia reopened the debate on the sequencing question. 
Combining ‘democracy’ and ‘developmentalism’ into the model of ‘democratic 
developmental state’, became especially influential in the early 1990s. This school 
asserted that the development-oriented, growth-promoting authoritarian regimes 
might be good for democracy in the long run.  
 
To sum up, as most of these theorists agree, democratization will come to China 
sooner or later, of which the most possible form of Chinese democratization would be: 
a democratization initiated ‘from above’25; a process which might be difficult, 
protracted, complicated, and inconclusive.26 The actual transition will undoubtedly be 
                                                                                                                                            
Democratization, 3, 3, 1996 
23
  Based on discussion by Graeme Gill, The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, 
Civil Society and the Transition Process, 2000, pp.48-9 
24
  Mickel Oksenberg, ‘Confronting a Classic Dilemma’, Journal of Democracy 9.1 
(1998) 28 
25
  Suisheng Zhao, ‘Three Scenarios’, Journal of Democracy 9.1 (1998) p.58  
26
  Suisheng Zhao, ‘Three Scenarios’, Journal of Democracy 9.1 (1998) p.58 
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a politically contingent process.27 China’s leaders are likely to find introducing 
democracy at lower levels of the system and firmly committing themselves to the 
attainment of full democracy over a protracted period to be an increasingly attractive 
option. 28 
 
0.2.2 The Sceptics 
 
The methodology of the modernization school has long been criticized. Firstly, it 
creates a model that claims that all societies can replicate this transition which 
actually occurred at a particular moment in space and time; secondly, modernization 
takes the experience of the West, especially the leading capitalist democracies, as 
universal rules whilst ignores the development of the East, it is overly structural, it is 
a purely political economy approach which ignores local cultural and socio-political 
legacies of nations and regions29; and last but not least, modernization theory never 
has been able to demonstrate a clear cause and effect relationship between economy 
and democracy30.  
 
In the sceptics’ camp, however, there has been criticism towards the over-determined 
nature of modernization theory. The sceptics see the authoritarian regime of China has 
been strengthened rather than weakened by the Reform, as the economic growth 
                                                 
27
  Dali L. Yang, ‘China’s Long March to Freedom’, Journal of Democracy 18.3 
(2007) p.61 
28
  Michel Oksenberg, ‘Confronting a Classic Dilemma’, Journal of Democracy 9.1 
(1998) p.33 
29
  John D. Nagle and Alison Mahr, Democracy and Democratization, 1999, p.227 
30
  Paul G. Lewis, , ‘Theories of Democratization and Patterns of Regime Change in 
Eastern Europe’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 13(1), 1997, 
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provides more resource for the elite to hold on to the control of the hierarchy31. In 
China’s case, there are some specific points that are made by the sceptics.  
 
The economic development itself is very uneven amongst different areas. It is very 
problematic using economic development as a yardstick for the probability of 
democratization. China has a vast rural peasant population, and there are significant 
area disparities between east coastal and west inland, for example. The modernization 
school see the implications of the Reform as pro-democratic, while the sceptics see 
them as strengthening the authoritarian regime, which is anti-democratic in nature32. 
Therefore, they concluded with the rise of a corrupt ‘soft’ authoritarianism like that 
found in Suharto’s Indonesia or Park Chung Hee’s South Korea other than towards 
democracy.  
 
Some of the sceptics started to attribute the regime ’ s resilience to its 
institutionalization during the Reform years. One of the most influential China experts, 
Andrew Nathan published an essay in 2003 in which he examined the CCP regime’s 
institutionalization thoroughly. Nathan asserted that the regime, unlike other 
communist regimes in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, which fell apart in the 
third wave of democratization, has been able to reconsolidate itself 33 . The 
                                                                                                                                            
p.13 
31
 See, for example, Andrew J. Nathan, ‘Authoritarian Resilience’, Journal of 
Democracy 14.1 (2003) 6-17 
32
  Mickel Oksenberg, ‘Confronting a Classic Dilemma’, Journal of Democracy 9.1 
(1998) 27-34 
33
  Here, Andrew J. Nathan adapted a concept from democratic consolidation theory; 
the CCP has once again made itself the only game in town and is in the process of 
carrying out a successful transfer of power. See, Andrew J. Nathan, ‘Authoritarian 
Resilience’, Journal of Democracy 14.1 (2003) 6-17, notes 
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increasingly norm-bound nature of CCP’s succession politics, the increase in 
meritocratic as opposed to factional considerations in the promotion of political elites, 
the differentiation and functional specialization of institutions within the regime, and 
CCP’s legitimacy being strengthened by the establishment of institutions for political 
participation are the factors for the resilience of CCP regime as discovered by Nathan. 
Thus he concludes that China has made a transition instead from totalitarianism to a 
classic authoritarian regime, and one that appears increasingly stable34.  
 
As opposed to the first camp of modernization theorists, the sceptics claim that there 
is no direct link between liberalization and democratization. For instance, Pei says 
there is a critical distinction between liberalization and democratization35. Grugel, 
agreed with Pei, when she claims that there are some political changes that followed 
the opening up of economy, but the Reform in the political domain, rather than 
initiation of a controlled democratic transition, has only been the rationalization of the 
state and the improvement of bureaucratic efficiency36. The economic liberalization is 
not leading to greater openness with the ruling party or a greater receptiveness to civil 
society demands; in other words, economic liberalization is not bringing political 
democratization.  
 
The sceptics are suspicious about the myth of the success of the Asian Model, which 
                                                 
34
 Here, a totalitarian regime can be understood as a regime that control all aspects of 
its citizen’s lives, and there is no public sphere, for example, Maoist China, as 
opposed to a democratic state, where citizen enjoy their democratic rights, 
authoritarian regime is a regime in transition which resembles a totalitarian regime, 
however, the control of the state over the lives of its citizens are much looser.  
35
  Minxin Pei, How Will China Democratize?, Journal of Democracy 18.3 (2007) 
53-57 
36
  Jean Grugel, Democratization: A Critical Introduction, 2002, p224 
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was regarded by the modernization school as bringing both democracy and economic 
prosperity. The reason for the Asian countries resistance of liberal democracy found 
by the sceptic, lies in the power of the culture. Bell et al. argues that it is the 
persistence of ‘Asian Values’ that has allowed the region to resist full liberal 
democracy, or even democracy at all, in some cases; it is developing its own 
culturally specific form of political model, which is a model aiming at economic 
growth, mixed with some of the principles of democracy and authoritarianism. 
‘Illiberal democracy37’ is the term they used to label this model.  
 
0.3 The Incremental Model 
 
What has been missing so far in the debate is the voice of Chinese domestic scholars 
who grew up in China and have actually experienced (all or partially, depending on 
their ages) the changes brought by the Reform of the last three decades. What these 
people have in common is that they are not trained in the background of a western 
political science discipline. Democracy and democratization as a literature did not 
originate from China and thus their understanding of these terms is not exactly the 
same as those in the West. It is therefore necessary to follow a historical approach to 
trace how democracy and democratization is perceived /constructed in China. From 
this historical perspective, one can better understand what the core issues are both in 
the practice of Chinese liberals and the debate amongst the Chinese academy. 
Meanwhile, in the analysis, cultural factors will be considered and discussed in a way 
that is not overlooked or exaggerated. The history of the introduction of democracy 
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  Daniel A.Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya and David Jones (eds), 
Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia, 1995; 
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into China will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. In this part of the 
introduction, I will introduce some mainstream democratic ideas and thoughts in 
contemporary China and position my work amongst the incrementalists.  
 
The historical discourse of democracy can be divided into three eras: the first 
introductory era starts from the middle 19th Century and ends right before the 
beginning of New Cultural Movement (1915-1922), when ideas of liberal democracy 
was the mainstream; the second era starts with the New Cultural Movement and ends 
after the foundation of PRC, during which time socialist democracy took the place of 
liberal democracy as mainstream  and became the ideology of Chinese Communist 
Party, which later founded PRC as a party-state; the third era starts from the Beijing 
Spring Democratic Movement (in 1977) and till now, which is a very complicated 
period filled with divergent debates and fierce discussions over the ideas of 
democracy and democratization between different groups of Chinese intellectuals.  
 
Democracy was firstly introduced to China in late Qing Dynasty, around the middle 
19th century. Many Chinese people, especially the intellectuals, started to think about 
the reason why China, which used to be the great Middle Kingdom, had become so 
weak and backward compared to the Western states. Some of them made a conclusion 
that it was the feudal autocratic monarchy based on Confucianism that was too 
incompetent to build a strong and united China; it has lost its legitimacy of rule and 
thus should be replaced by a more advanced and legitimate democratic polity. 
Revolutionaries, led by Sun Zhongshan, inspired by this idea, successfully founded a 
new Republic of China in 1912 (Xinhai Revolution), which was built upon the 
principles of national independence and democracy.  
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However, the government of the time was in fact controlled by warlords, and the 
democratic constitution was not carried out. The democratization of China was 
actually a failure. Chinese people were still facing the task of national independence 
and state salvation, especially after Japanese troops invaded China later in 1931. 
Under this circumstance, the New Cultural Movement (1915-1922, culminated in the 
May Fourth Movement in 1919 with students and intellectuals protests against the 
warlord government) marked a turning point in the discourse of democratization38.  
 
The New Culture Movement (xin wenhua yundong) was inaugurated by the creation 
of Xin Qingnian (the New Youth journal), established in 1915 by Chen Duxiu, one of 
the intellectual leaders of the Movement. In an essay published in January 1919 to 
celebrated the third anniversary of the journal, Chen Duxiu gave democracy and 
science the nicknames ‘Mr Democracy’ (de xiansheng) and ‘Mr Science’ (sai 
xiansheng), and proclaimed that ‘only these two gentlemen can save China from the 
political, moral, academic, and intellectual darkness in which it finds itself’.39 
Democracy thus became a symbol of the May Fourth era. It is in this movement that 
Chinese intellectuals turned away from Western liberal democracy and started to 
show their enthusiasm in Marxism. In the May Fourth discourse of democracy, firstly 
there was a trend from democracy to populism, then from populistic democracy to the 
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 Edward X. Gu, ‘Who was Mr Democracy? The May Fourth Discourse of Populist 
Democracy and the Radicalization of Chinese Intellectuals (1915-1922)’, Modern 
Asian Studies, Vol. 35, No .3 (Jul., 2001), p.621 
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  Chen Duxiu, ‘Xin qingnian zuian zhi dabianshu’ (New Youth’s reply to 
charges against the magazin), Xin Qingnian, Vol. 6, No. 1 (15 Jan. 1919), pp. 10-11; 
cited by Edward X. Gu, ‘Who was Mr Democracy? The May Fourth Discourse of 
Populist Democracy and the Radicalization of Chinese Intellectuals (1915-1922)’, 
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dictatorship of workers and peasants, in a word, as one theorist pointed out, 
eventually some May Fourth radicals became converted to the revolutionary 
Marxism-Leninism40. The radicalization of the intellectuals in the New Culture 
Movement brought the Chinese communist movement which resulted in a drastic 
change in society that fuelled the birth of the Communist Party of China.  
 
PRC was founded in 1949 after the Second World War and the Civil War. The 
socialist party-state, with Mao Zedong as the supreme leader, was in nature a 
totalitarian regime41. Between the period of 1949 to 1976 (when Mao Zedong died), 
the belief of Chinese people in the ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism was 
deeply rooted during numerous political mobilizations and mass movements initiated 
by Mao and CCP.  
 
After the disastrous Cultural Revolution (started in 1966 by Mao and ended with his 
death in 1976), the new top leader of the so-called second generation, Deng together 
with other leaders in CCP found it urgent for a reform in the laggard planned 
economy system. The reform was mainly in the economic domain, which includes the 
introduction of a market economy and opening up to the outside world in order to 
attract new technology and foreign investment. The series of reform programmes 
started in 1978. The information from the outside world and communications with the 
international society gave Chinese intellectuals new inspirations since the New 
Culture Movement earlier in the century, the reform changed the old state-society 
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  Edward X. Gu, ‘Who was Mr Democracy? The May Fourth Discourse of 
Populist Democracy and the Radicalization of Chinese Intellectuals (1915-1922)’, 
Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 35, No .3 (Jul., 2001), p.621 
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  Here, no difference is made between the Party regime and the Party-state in this 
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relations, people had more civil liberty than before, which caused some scholars to 
rethink and redefine the China state-society relations. Also, after years of economic 
reforms focusing on development and modernization without political 
democratization, many problems such as corruption, inequality and environmental 
degradation have triggered a debate within the literati on the prospects of 
democratization as a solution to China’s crisis. Generally speaking, after 1976, 
especially after the start of the Reform, there have been four groups of intellectuals 
taking part in this debate42: the dissidents; the liberal economists; the New Left (or the 
Conservatives); and the mainstream incrementalists.  
 
The dissidents are a loose group which consists of the leaders of Chinese Democracy 
Movement (Wei Jingsheng as one of the representatives) and some liberal journalists 
(He Qinglian43). Generally speaking, they disagree with the current authoritarian 
regime of CCP and believe that democracy is the answer to solve all the problems 
confronting China today. They also took part in the social movements as attempts to 
initiate a fully democratization, such as Beijing Spring liberalization movement which 
was considered to be inspired by the manifesto Fifth Modernization by Wei Jingsheng 
in 1978; students’ movements during 1986 which was cracked down by the CCP 
under the name of ‘ anti-bourgeoisie liberalization’ ; and the 1989 student 
demonstrations in Tiananmen Square which resulted in the 4th June Incident followed 
                                                                                                                                            
thesis, although theoretically, these are two different entities. 
42
  It is noticeable that the majority of these intellectuals are experts in economics. 
Because their start point of the research is to find solutions to the problems come 
along with economic reform, political democratization is one possible solution which 
is taken into consideration as a request for economic development.  
43
 She became well-known for disclosing the corruption of government officials and 
cadres of state-own enterprises, and she attributed the root of corruption to the 
authoritarian regime. Her books were banned and she fled to the US out of the fear of 
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by a strong international response. However, the limited scale and influence of these 
movements have not resulted in fundamental social or political changes in China’s 
state and society relations. Especially after 1989, many student leaders and dissident 
intellectuals fled overseas for safety. Their voices can hardly be heard by ordinary 
Chinese. The dissidents group represents the most radical and democratic ideas and 
thoughts in the debate.   
 
The liberal economists form the second group of scholars within the debate. The 
representatives of these economists are Mao Yushi, Zhang Shuguang, Sheng Hong, 
Tang Shouning and so on. Mao Yushi together with the others founded the Unirule 
Institute of Economics in Beijing, aiming for high quality research in economic theory 
and cutting-edge social-economic problems. What they have argued is that the market 
system cannot work properly with CCP’s one party rule. Sooner or later, economic 
stagnation will appear44. Based on liberalism, they ask for the protection of private 
property and political reforms towards democratization.  
 
The New Left, or Conservatives are a group of economists whose ideas and thoughts 
are closer to social democracy other than Marxism-Leninism45 as opposed to the 
                                                                                                                                            
prosecution by the authority.  
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 CCP’s one party rule is realized by control over all the departments of the society, 
distributing all resources and products according to its central planning, while the 
market oriented economic system asks for the fluent flow of resources and products. 
These two systems are incompatible in nature. During the Reform, the authority has 
given up some of its power to nurish the growth of market economy, but in the long 
term, it still holds on to some importment departments which will impede the 
maturing of the market economy.  
45
  See, for example, Zheng, Yongnian talked about the New Left in his book, 
Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity and International 
Relations, 1999; C.H.Kwan ’ s article, ‘ Zhongguo Jingji Xuejia Shili 
Fenbutu-Chaoyue Geige yu Baoshou de Kuangkuang’, (Distribution of forces of 
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liberals. One of the representatives is Hu Angang who works in the National 
Conditional Research Centre of Qinghua University. The others include Cui Zhiyuan, 
Wang Hui, Lang Xianping and so on.  
 
The fourth group is the largest of all in the debate. Therefore, they are called 
mainstream incrementalists. Their ideas about an incremental model of 
democratization are based upon critiques of the ideas of the dissidents. Firstly, the 
radical model of political democratization before the establishment of a market 
economy and growth of a considerable middle class is not realistic which has been 
proved by the failure of the previous democratization movements. Secondly, radical 
political reforms as implemented in the former Soviet Union have resulted in 
economic stagnation and chaos and unrest in the society which proved to be a not so 
perfect model. Thirdly, the Asian models of economic development and gradual 
democratic transition are regarded as a successful precedent. Their polity is a mixture 
of authoritarianism and democracy, which is determined by Confucian traditions and 
history. China shares these features with them therefore China should be taking the 
same path towards democratization. Last but not least, the only way to a democratic 
transition which the CCP and the elites would possibly agree on is this incremental 
model. Incremental means slow but progressively in this term; however, a few years 
of stagnation before a threshold is understandable and a sudden advancement towards 
democracy can also be expected after years of steady progress. The CCP has been 
taking the economic liberalization and started to implement democracy in grassroots 
such as the villages. Under the incrementalism, the process seems under the control of 
                                                                                                                                            
Chinese Economists-Go beyond the Frame of Reformer and Conservative), (13th, Dec, 
2002) who is a consulting fellow in RIETI (Research Institute of Economy, Trade and 
Industry), accessible by http://www.rieti.go.jp/users/kan-si-yu/cn/c021213.html  
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the elites. They still possess the power to cease or intervene, therefore, they will not 
feel too threatened to tough it out.  
 
This group consists of Chinese scholars and China specialists both inside and outside 
the system; they can be economists or political theorists. The thoughts of some 
domestic scholars can be influential as the authorities often consult them for advice. 
Some of the representatives include Yu Keping and his incremental democracy 
conception; He Zengke, with the role progressive political reforms plays in the 
democratic transition; Shao Daosheng, and internet-style democracy as an important 
part of incremental democracy; Chen Sixi, and the implementation of incremental 
model in the electoral institutions; Liu Yawei and the incremental democratic model 
at grassroots46; and Ji Weidong and the dynamics of incremental reforms47.  
 
There are also some economists such as Wu Jinlian, Fan Gang, Lin Yifu and so on 
who are not so interested in political reforms, they are advocates for Asian 
authoritarian style developmental path. They are influential experts who have been 
taking part in the establishment of the CCP’s economic developmental strategy. 
However, so far one of the most comprehensive researches on incremental model 
would be the work that has been done by Tang Liang whose major contribution is 
embodied in the book, Incremental Democracy: Chinese Politics in Transition 
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(Jianjin Minzhu: Biange Zhong de Zhongguo Zhengzhi) 48. To summarize all these 
people’s ideas and with a special emphasis upon Tang’s thoughts, an incremental 
model of China’s democratization should be, firstly, what we are exploring in China 
is a polity under transformation and change. A radical or swift model of China 
becoming a democracy overnight, as compared to an incremental one, has proved to 
be unrealistic in the past. It does not mean that it will not happen in the future. The 
feature with an incremental model is that the pace of transformation is indefinite. A 
few years of fast transformation or institutionalization can be expected, but there can 
also be backs and turns, or stagnation with the political reform for quite some time.  
 
Secondly, although the path to the transition can be long, the direction of the tendency 
is what we could expect. In the incremental model, the process has begun for about 
three decades, and when comparing the present with the past, one could find a lot of 
differences and some are fundamental. For instance, how much liberty and freedom 
Chinese people are enjoying at present as compared to the situation of 30 years ago. 
With the Chinese government, also, it is more willing to engage in human rights talks 
with other governments than it used to be.  
 
Thirdly, there are a few dynamics that are driving this incremental model, which 
includes the interaction between economics and politics, the impact of globalization, 
the transformation inside the Chinese Communist Party, and the development of civil 
society forces.  
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  Based on Tang Liang, Jianjin, Minzhu: Biange Zhong De Zhongguo Zhengzhi 
(Incremental Democracy: Chinese Politics in transition), 2004 
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Fourthly, there are also some obstacles to this incremental model. They are also the 
most important social and economic problems existing in China:  poverty, poor 
performance of state-owned enterprises, region discrepancy, crescent wealth gap 
between rich and poor, great number of laid-offs and educational problem and so on. 
It is also because of these problems, the transition to democracy follows the 
incremental path other than a swift path. For the incrementalists, democracy is not the 
solution for all these socio-economic problems deeply rooted in today’s China. One 
of the examples often cited nowadays is the former Soviet Union, in which case the 
adoption of multi-party free election has created a lot of problems and even brought 
crisis to the new regime.  
 
0.4 Structure of This Thesis 
 
In the first chapter of the thesis, the existing literature on democracy and 
democratization will be reviewed, which gives us ideas about how these two terms are 
constructed in the western political discipline. A historical approach is adopted here 
when explaining the evolution of the concept on democracy. The two original strands 
of democracy (direct democracy and liberal democracy) are identified. A 
constructivist view of democracy is adopted. The route of liberal or representative 
democracy becomes the only justified form of democracy since the 1940s is also 
explored. An explanation of how an elite-oriented democracy has gradually been 
replaced by a more participatory democracy is provided. The expansion of 
democratization studies in the 1990s as a result of the large-scale regime change in the 
former European communist states will be fully investigated together with 
Huntington’s well-known wave theory. With the literature, major representatives 
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coming from three different schools and their main claims will be introduced, 
including the modernization school, comparative historical sociology and transition 
literature. Critiques towards each of the schools will also be presented as they are 
either emphasizing too much the determinate nature of the structure in constructing 
their theory while neglecting the initiative of the agency or vice versa. Of course, their 
works are valuable in the sense of providing this thesis with a broader literature 
background.  
 
In the second chapter, the debate between modernization school and its critics over 
the question of whether China is going through a democratic transformation will be 
revisited. The argument of the modernization school is largely based on the economic 
development of China in the last three decades after the Reform initiated. From the 
historical experience of some other countries where the modernization of national 
economy facilitated the conditions for an all-around democratization such as a 
considerable well-educated middle class and a robust civil society, the 
modernizationists believe that the same story will happen in China. They have 
completed quite a lot comprehensive researches and found evidence to support their 
argument. The most cited ones are, the decentralization of power within the regime, 
where a quasi model of the division of powers can be found; the competitive 
democratic grassroots elections at the village-level and in recent years, took place in 
the higher administrative level; the emerging civil society forces such as the press 
media and so on. They also identified economic liberalization as laying the 
groundwork for democratization. And a model of ‘democratic developmental state’ 
is established from the experience of the other countries of East Asia. The sceptics 
toward the modernization theory are those who see the economic development as 
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strengthening the authoritarian regime and the regime has become more resilient. The 
‘Asian values’ are actually leading to an ‘illiberal democracy’49.  
 
However, what is missing in this big picture, from my view, is the Chinese culture 
context by which I think a methodology combined with language should be 
introduced. The context is important in two regards, firstly, the focuses of the debates 
in and out of China are quite different, because the ideas of democracy and 
democratization, after introduced to China from the West, have been reconstructed 
under a Chinese cultural background. In other words, Chinese scholars’ perception of 
these two terms are inevitable blended with their own experience and knowledge, 
which are formed in a Chinese context. Secondly, the scholars in China are those who 
actually participated in the social-economical processes that have taken place in 
recent years, their studies into this issue have been enriched by personal experience. 
Furthermore, their views of this issue could affect their practice. Through their 
activities, for example, publishing papers, teaching students, giving speeches and 
being invited by the authority to offer consultancies, their opinions about the change 
in China and where it is heading for, will more or less have an effect in the real world. 
In the third chapter, the historical perspective will be introduced and the vision of 
Chinese theorists in the debate will be presented and the incremental model which is a 
main stream opinion amongst Chinese scholars is discussed in more detail.  
 
In the following three chapters, three aspects of the incremental model will be 
explored respectively, the evolution within the regime (Chapter 4), how the Chinese 
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Communist Party has evolved during this time, and the empowerment of people’s 
congress system as the legislature (quasi separation of powers); the democratic 
practice at the grassroots level, how the village electoral system has been established 
to assure an autonomous self-governance; the press media as an emerging civil force 
and the study on People’s Daily, which shows the changes in the last 3 decades in the 
CCP’s most important and authoritative newspaper. In these three substantive 
chapters, large quantities of Chinese sources are cited to support the argument, 
including governmental documents, newspaper reports, periodicals and books, which 
are translated by me.     
 
The seventh chapter is the conclusion, which is not so much actually concluded due to 
the open-endedness of the incremental model. This is due to the changing nature of 
the object of this thesis. After three decades of consecutive economic reforms, the 
political openness and civil awareness have increased in China. It seems more like a 
hybrid polity with some remains of an old authoritarian regime, some new 
mechanisms that are manifested in the western liberal democracy, and a democratic 
system that is still far from fully established.  
 
0.5 Theoretical Approach 
 
The ontological question is about the reality, about the being. However, from a 
constructivist view, as opposed to objectivist’s claim that people can come to know 
external reality, the only reality is what we believe that is happening. All our claims 
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and arguments are based on what we are aware of, which has a limited nature. That’s 
what I have described in the first part of this chapter, what we believed to be 
happening in China are some social-political processes from which a trend of 
quasi-democratization can be identified.   
 
The epistemological question is how we can get to know the reality that is believed to 
be happening. The reality is about our knowledge of the world, and the observers, or 
the knower, are humans. There are different approaches (epistemological perspectives) 
for humans to get to know the reality, because of the human nature, all our knowledge 
about the reality comes with a cultural context. This explains why different schools 
from the background of democratization literature perceive the same reality quite 
differently, and even reversely. Language is an inseparable part of a culture. It is the 
tool for people to communicate and acquire information and thus construct their 
knowledge of the world. However, a language itself is developed in the context of a 
certain culture. In other words, in the case of how to explain the significant 
social-economical changes that took place in China in the last three decades, people 
from different cultural backgrounds will have developed their own epistemological 
perspectives.  
 
What we can find at the moment is the huge volume of researches and studies done by 
the western scholars. Their knowledge about China mainly comes from English 
language sources. Some of them do speak Chinese and may have had research done in 
China. However, their cultural background determines that their knowledge about the 
reality will be different from the knowledge of the Chinese theorists and scholars. It is 
not justified to claim that one person’s knowledge is superior to the other. However, 
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to bring a different approach from the same cultural context where all the changes are 
taking place will undoubtedly help to enrich the existing literature.  
 
Another important implication of this approach is that, although the original research 
of some of the scholars were done in China and did involved some sources from 
Chinese language manuscripts, the discussions and debates afterwards took place 
mainly under a English context or other languages. During this process, the 
knowledge has been constructed (in Chinese and other languages) and reconstructed 
(mainly in English or other languages rather than Chinese). There is a potential trend 
that due to language barriers; our knowledge about the object would be gradually 
driven away from the original cultural context. Therefore, to bring in a Chinese 
cultural perspective into the literature from time to time through investigating into the 
original Chinese sources is meaningful and necessary.  
 
The importance of the views of Chinese50 scholars can be demonstrated in another 
way, especially those of the main stream incrementalists. They are in the main stream 
which means their views are those held and believed by majority of the Chinese 
academe. Some of them are influential consultants for the Chinese government. They 
actively participated or are heavily involved in the public policy-making process of 
China. Their views are also accepted by high-ranked government officials and party 
leaders. It seems that, because their knowledge which comes from a certain cultural 
context will guide them in their activities, in other words, they will act in terms of 
their own knowledge which will make a change to the reality they believe. And the 
change they perceived will reconstruct their knowledge. Because these people believe 
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in the incremental democratization model and they will practice according to their 
belief, which will have an effect on the reality. However, whether it turns out that this 
incremental democratization model is accomplished or reconstructed in this long 
process (because their perception of the model is that it will take a very lengthy time), 
a democratized future of China is a possibility that is undeniable.   
 
0.6 Methodology 
 
While quantitative research methodology is most commonly adopted by natural 
scientists investigating into the physical world, other methodologies such as 
qualitative research are not invalid according to a social scientist. The object of the 
social scientist is the complex social relationships and interactions which are carried 
out by human beings. Also, as what social constructivists believe, the knowledge of 
the social scientists is constructed by their own experience and has a cultural context, 
which means, social scientists coming from different cultural backgrounds may likely 
to choose different observational methodologies.  
 
The object of the thesis is the relationships and interactions between Chinese state and 
society. However, it is not feasible to investigate into every sector of the state and 
society. In this thesis, the social relationships and interactions between different 
sectors of Chinese state are categorized into three parts, each in one chapter. The most 
important changes took place in the state-society relationships can be found in the 
evolution of the Chinese regime. Chinese Communist Party, the sole ruling party of 
Chinese regime, has undergone some transformations and the implications of these 
transformations are identified and analyzed mainly through collection and readings of 
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official documents and papers, media texts, and other secondary sources. The reforms 
in the National People’s Congress are examined as well. The direct election in village 
committees is one the most encouraging democratic practices in recent years; the 
materials are collected through secondary source and personal experiences. The 
change of the media from a propaganda tool for ideology to a more neutral and 
professional body is significant as an emerging civil force. I’ve had my field work 
done in China. I had my B.A. in Journalism and thus have a few contacts in the media 
industry. I’ve conducted a few meetings with my contacts, although mainly in an 
informal way. After the examination of the over-all trends in the press media, I have 
focused my attention on the case study of the People Daily, the most authoritative 
newspaper in China.  
 
My language skills as a native Chinese speaker have enabled me to access to Chinese 
language sources. One of the features of this thesis is where there is both English 
version and Chinese version of a document or a paper; I will read the Chinese version 
carefully and draw my conclusion based on the Chinese manuscript other than the 
English one. Also, I have read a large quantity of newspapers, periodicals and books 
written in Chinese before and during the writing up of this thesis. What I am trying to 
do is through this method and approach, a thesis under a Chinese cultural context will 
be produced and brought into the existing literature so as to fill in what I call a 
‘missing part’51. Original Chinese source materials are heavily used, and translated 
all by me, both in the literature review part of the thesis and the substantive chapters. 
The original thoughts come from a close reading and analysis of media texts, plus 
quantitative data I collected. I have not simply drawn on secondary literature, but 
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have conducted field work in China, in the later chapters, on rural reform and the 
media/civil society, the analysis in these chapters is based on primary research and 
not secondary sources, although I have necessarily drawn on some secondary sources.  
 
0.7 Adopting the Incremental Model 
 
Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, when a large number of former socialist states 
took a swift transition path to democratization, CCP (Chinese Communist Party) has 
chosen to initiate economic reforms to solve the social-economical problems they 
were facing at that moment. After Thirty years of consecutive reforms and opening-up 
to the outside world, the Chinese government is still claimed to be a Marxist-Leninist 
regime and PRC is still referred to as a socialist state, however, there have been some 
subtle but substantial changes taking place both within the regime itself and within the 
society. Most significantly at the following three levels: 
 
The first set of changes can be identified at the state level, which is within the regime 
itself, including CCP, the ruling party and the NPC, constitutionally recognized as the 
highest organ of state power52. CCP has evolved out of a former revolutionary party 
to a reformed party. One of the most recent and significant reforms is the enlarged 
party membership. The Party is now taking in new members from the middle class 
(including private entrepreneurs53, who were classified as the bourgeois as opposed to 
                                                                                                                                            
51
  It is elaborated in Chapter 2.  
52
 Article 57, Section 1, Chapter 3 of Constitutiom of People’s Republic of China, 
Adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress and promulgated 
for implementation by the Proclamation of the National People’s Congress on 
December 4, 1982, 1457 
53
 The term ‘private entrepreneurs’ is taken from Jiang Zemin’s Speech on the 
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proletariat). The NPC has become more assertive in exercising its power as a 
legislature, including law-making and supervising the works of local government and 
the court and the procuratorate.  
 
The second level where the changes are taking place is at the grassroots. The reforms 
have accelerated urbanization in China and boost the economic growth in some big 
cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, however, the majority of Chinese population still 
live in the numerous villages in China’s suburban and rural areas. The democratic 
practice created in the Village Committee election in the 1980s has given numerous 
Chinese citizens an opportunity to exercise their political rights which in turn helped 
to nurish their democratic consciousness.  
 
The third level is the growth of the civil society forces, especially the change in the 
press media. The authoritative Dangbaos (Party Newspaper) has suffered a huge 
decline in the circulation and numbers, while the new Shiminbaos (Civil Newspapers) 
has quickly become prevalent and enjoyed an increasing readership of various social 
levels. To attracte more readers, Dangbaos have started to provide more diversed 
content as Shiminbaos which gradually blurs the distinction between these two. 
Citizens of China enjoy more information and more transparency which enlarged their 
right to know.  
 
To sum up, changes are taking place at the state level, the grassroots level, and the 
society level. In this thesis, the changes of the three levels are explored in three case 
studies, embodied in Chapter 4, 5, and 6 respectively. The incremental model is 
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adopted here to explain the democratization process because of its applicability.  
 
Firstly, it is incremental, it is also pro-democratic. In Chapter 1, a lot of discussion is 
devoted to the two terms ‘democracy’and ‘democratization’. Although there is no 
such thing as a real democracy in this world, it still has its undeniable values as an 
ideal. Whether it is in direct form as in ancient Greece or in modern representative 
(liberal) form54, whether it needs ‘procedural minimum conditions’55 or it is just a 
‘Polyarchy’56, whether it should be ‘elite-oriented’57 or participatory, the ideal of 
democracy has inspired people in and out of China to think, to debate and to strive.  
 
Secondly, the aim of the incremental model is to explain the uniqueness of Chinese 
democratization. The uniqueness of the China case should not be underestimated or 
exaggerated. The terms of democracy and democratization have their historical, 
cultural and social contexts while a core of meaning and value should be ‘anchored’58, 
which means unchanged. That is why the literature review of this thesis introduced 
both the western and eastern (Chinese) scholar’s understandings about these two 
terms. The idea of democracy was originally created in the western world, and it was 
not introduced to China until the 19th Century. It is meaningful and helpful to trace 
back how this ‘democracy’ literature has grown in China historically.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
People’s Daily, 02-07-2001, translated by the author 
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 David Held, Models of Democracy, 1996, p.6 
55
 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, ‘What Democracy is…and is Not’, in 
Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds), The Global Resurgence of Democracy, 
1993, p.45;  
56
 R. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, 1989, 221 
57
 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, (New York: Harper, 
1975) orig.pub.1942 
58
 Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience, 2001, (Oxford: 
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Thirdly, the incremental model does not expel the possibility of a swift transition to 
democracy. To avoid being too structural as the analysis is presented at three levels, 
the thesis also concerns about the role of agencies in the democratization process, for 
example, the power struggle amongst some of the most influential political figures.    
 
Last but not least, it is not a model that is so loosely established to accommodate any 
possible changes, in which case, it can not be referred to as a model at all. It is a 
model that has been constructed on the ground of substantial analysis. It varifies the 
changes that have already taken place and it anticipates the tendencies and draws on 
some possible outcomes from those changes. For instance, the rules of democratic 
election were created by village peasants in the early 1980s, later, the rules became 
statute law and were carried out in all the village elections in China. It has shown the 
tendency of enlarging the democratic practice at the grassroots level. It also means, 
where the democratic elections were carried out and people’s political rights are 
guranteed it is impossible to reverse.  
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 46 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One 
Understanding Democracy and Democratisation: 
Reviewing the Literature 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Since the 70s of the last century, there have been profound economic reforms taking 
place in People’s Republic of China, which have caused fundamental transformation 
in all societal, political and cultural realms. There has also been considerable literature 
and research undertaken to explore and explain why these changes have happened, 
what consequences have come about or will come in the future. However, so far most 
of the researchers are taking on the approaches which were developed and advanced 
in Western social and political science, few has tried to take the Chinese perspective; 
that is, the way Chinese scholars perceive the changes in China. In Chinese 
scholarship, one of the related topics that has been discussed tremendously is the 
probability of democratization prospect for China. However, their discourse of 
democracy has its uniqueness which makes it distinctive from the conventional 
Western way due to the uniqueness of China’s historical and cultural development.  
 
This thesis tries to explain the recent social and political development in China in 
relation to the existing democratization literature which includes the debates over 
democracy and democratization in and out of China. Therefore, the literature to be 
reviewed refers to the Western literature on democracy and democratization, the 
literature on democracy and democratization in China, and the historical discourse of 
democracy and democratization in China.  
 
By examining the Western tradition, it provides the big picture of the historical 
development of the democratic concepts through which these concepts became 
predominant within the literature. The literature on Chinese democracy and 
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democratization is the offspring of this vast comparative democratization literature, 
which brought in perspectives as regional comparison, and historical and cultural 
factors. The discourse in China tells how democracy and democratization is 
constructed and reconstructed in China; it helps us to understand why some of the 
democratic ideas of the West were chosen and/or modified by the Chinese while 
others were not. And the ideas and values Chinese intellectuals have been inspired by 
are not necessarily those advocated by scholars from the West. The explanation can 
only be found in the divergent development of discourses in the West and in China. 
 
It would be impossible and inappropriate to dissuss any issues related to 
democratization without knowing what ‘democracy’ means. The first task in this 
chapter, therefore, is to trace the discourse of democracy and democratization in the 
West where these conceptions were originally from.  
 
The origin of democracy can be found in the ancient Greece in the 5th Century B.C. 
Since the born of this new form of government, it has undergone some important 
changes over the centuries. A modern version of democracy, which is also the most 
popular form of governing at the present, is based on the ideals of liberal democracy 
(representative democracy). Some theorist defined it through ‘minimum’ procedures 
which helped in a way as to identify a democracy through the specific requirements59. 
However, it is too narrow as it neglects the values of democracy. Democracy has its 
core meaning and its applicability should be adapted to historical, cultural and social 
contexts60.  
                                                 
59
 See, for example, Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 
(New York: Harper, 1975) orig.pub.1942 
60
 Based on Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience, 2001, 
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Democratization can be simply understood as a process through which demoracy is 
realized. Democratization studies expanded in the 1990s as a result of the large-scale 
regime change in the former European communist states. Three major schools with 
the literature can be identified, namely, the modernization school, comparative 
historical sociology and transition literature. Each school has its own critiques as they 
are either emphasizing too much the determinate nature of the structure in 
constructing their theory while neglecting the initiative of the agency or vice versa.  
 
1.1 On Democracy (Why Liberal Democracy) 
 
 
When confronted with the task of conceptualizing democracy, theorists diverge. 
Indeed, as Laurence Whitehead put it, this topic has already been examined from 
every conceivable angle for over 25 centuries61. Democracy can be understood as an 
ideology in so far as “it embodies a set of political ideas that detail the best possible 
form of social organization62”. Democracy can also be understood as a concept or a 
theory. Different schools formed their own preference of conception of and theories 
on democracy.  Some democrats define democracy as rights. Their stress is on the 
equality and rights of people. For instance, Beetham summarized the meaning of 
democracy as “a mode of decision-making about collectively binding rules and 
policies over which the people exercise control, and the most democratic arrangement 
                                                                                                                                            
(Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
61
  See e.g. John Dunn (ed.), Democracy: the Unfinished Journey: 508 B.C. to 
A.D.1993, 1992; quoted in Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and 
Experience, 2001, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.7 
62
  I. Mackensie, ‘Introduction: The Arena of Ideology’, in R. Ecleshall, V. 
Geoghegan, R. Jay, M. Kenny, I. Mackensie and R. Wilford, Political Ideologies, 
1994; cited in Jean Grugel, Democratization: A Critical Introduction, 2002, p12 
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is that where all members of the collectivity enjoy effective equal rights to take part in 
such decision-making directly – one, that is to say, which realised to the greatest 
conceivable degree the principles of popular control and equality in its existence.”
63The school of constructivists believe the constructedness in conceptualizing this 
term; therefore, for them, democracy would be better understood “not as a 
predetermined end-state, but as a long-term and somewhat open-ended outcome64”.  
 
The two strands of democratic theorizing are: direct (or participatory) democracy and 
liberal (or representative) democracy65. Direct democracy means citizens take part in 
the decision-making directly, the tradition of which can be traced back to the 
Athenian legacy of popular government at the time of city state, and the Renaissance 
republican time. This definition of democracy which meant the direct rule of the 
assembled people held the field until around the time of the American and French 
Revolutions66. Rousseau, a great thinker in the 18th century, argued for unmediated 
popular government, by which he meant that citizens should decide laws and make 
public policy without the mediation of political representatives67. 
 
However, by the 18th century the meaning of democracy was re-defined in accordance 
with the emergence of a specific form of political community-the modern nation-state. 
The latter is far larger in size of the polity and much more pluralistic; societies instead 
                                                 
63
  D. Beetham, ‘Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Democratization’, Political 
Studies, special issue, vol. 40, 1992, p40; quoted in Jean Grugel, Democratization: A 
Critical Introduction, 2002, p12 
64
 Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience, 2001, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press) p.3 
65
  David Held, Models of Democracy, 1996, p.6 
66
  Michael Moran, Geraint Parry, Democracy and Democratization, 1994, p.3 
67
  Albert Weale, Democracy, 1999, pp. 24-5, cited in Jean Grugel, Democratization: 
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of communities became the name of its social organizations. Liberal notions of 
representation, equality before the law, and accountability were eventually grafted 
onto democracy 68 . Another feasible type of democracy- liberal/representative 
democracy became the choice for new democrats, and since then, has become the 
dominating subject in democratic studies. Indeed, as one observer indicates, 
especially after 1945 democracy was successfully married to liberalism-liberal 
democracy was no longer seen as one strand of democracy, it was presented as the 
only version there was69. Therefore, the form of liberal democracy, the procedures of 
liberal democracy and the level of liberal democracy are becoming the frequently 
debated topics.  
 
One influential group in the debate ground their argument on the definition of a 
standard ‘minimum’ procedural democracy, which is said to have originated with 
Joseph Schumpeter.   
 
Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl sum up the seven ‘procedural minimum’ 
conditions for democracy suggested by Robert Dahl, and add two more of their own. 
These nine conditions are: control of government decisions about policy is 
constitutionally vested in public officials; elected officials are chosen in frequent and 
fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon; practically 
all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials; practically all adults have 
the right to run for elective offices in the government; citizens have a right to express 
themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly 
                                                                                                                                            
A Critical Introduction, 2002, p13 
68
  Jean Grugel, Democratization: A Critical Introduction, 2002, p14 
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defined; citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, 
alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law; citizens also have 
the right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including 
independent political parties and interest groups; popularly elected officials must be 
able to exercise their constitutional power without being subjected to over-riding 
(albeit informal) opposition from unelected officials; the polity must be 
self-governing; it must be able to act independently of constraints imposed by some 
other overarching political system.70  
 
This definition gives out a clear list of procedures which they believe could fulfil the 
demand of democracy, however, in Laurence Whitehead’s book, he criticized it as 
‘too precise’, ‘demanding’ and ‘insufficient’71. His arguments are: it is too 
precise as it does not recognize any democracy before universal adult suffrage, which 
means Switzerland was not a democracy before 1971 prior to when women were not 
allowed to vote and the United States became a democracy only after the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act; it is also insufficient as it stresses only the procedures while ignores the 
outcomes or democratic values.  
 
Whitehead recalled Sartori’s definition of democracy in which democratic values 
were regarded as indispensable. Sartori believes that a democratic system is 
established under deontological pressures. “What democracy is cannot be separated 
                                                                                                                                            
69
  Jean Grugel, Democratization: A Critical Introduction, 2002, p17 
70
  Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, ‘What Democracy is…and is Not’, 
in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds), The Global Resurgence of Democracy, 
1993, p.45; quoted in Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience, 
2001, (Oxford: Oxford University Press) p.10-11 
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 Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience, 2001, (Oxford: 
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from what democracy should be.” Without democratic ideals and its values, no 
democracy could said to exist. It is doubtless that the political system is sustained by 
imperatives and value goals. But he further states that a democracy needs imperatives 
and value goal more than any other political systems. Because “in a democracy the 
tension between fact and value reaches the highest point, since no other ideal is 
farther from the reality in which it has to operate. And this is why we need the name 
democracy”72. 
 
In Whitehead’s book, Democratization: Theory and Experience,73 he presented a 
‘floating but anchored’ conception of democracy which needs to be quoted. Some 
of his central arguments can be summarized as follows: a moderate constructivist 
approach is necessary when exploring the meaning of ‘democracy’, because “all 
round the world new political experiences continually test, bombard, and interrogate 
established labels and ways of theorizing about political reality”; there can be no 
single ‘cook book’ recipe for democracy applicable to all times and places, 
therefore, historical, cultural, and social contexts matter in the applicability of this 
term; since democracy is both a descriptive label and a desirable value, and since the 
precise outer boundaries of the concept are inherently debatable, there is bound to be 
disagreement over particular applications of the term; democracy is an ‘essentially 
contested’ concept, there can be both a core of meaning that is ‘anchored’ and a 
                                                                                                                                            
Oxford University Press), p.3 
72
  Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory, 1962, p.4; quoted in Laurence Whitehead, 
Democratization: Theory and Experience, 2001, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 
p.20, footnote.  
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 Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience, 2001, (Oxford: 
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margin of contestation that is ‘floating’74; in contemporary conditions there is a 
dominant conception of democracy which differs from earlier views, and which may 
itself mutate; whatever the prevalent hegemonic conception of democracy it is always 
provisional and subject to further challenge and development in the light of collective 
deliberation; this deliberative filter also serves to stabilize understanding of the term, 
it provides much of the ‘anchoring’. 75 
 
1.1.1 From Elite to Participatory Democracy: Empirical Democracy and Its Critique 
 
 Background of Elite-oriented Democratic theory:  
 
During the 1930s, facing the challenge posed by European fascism and Soviet 
communism, the Austrian political economist Joseph Schumpeter (1942) produced a 
new major conception which came to be known as an elite theory of democracy76. His 
work inspired later the empirical democratic theorists which group expanded after the 
onset of the Cold War. After 1945, as was quoted before, democracy married to 
liberalism, liberal democracy or representative democracy became the only form of 
                                                 
74
  Whitehead argues that difficulties arise from the claim that the term 
‘democracy’ has a clear core meaning that is universally applicable and that is 
essentially objective due to historical, cultural and social contexts. Yet this is not a 
claim that can be abandoned lightly. He sees those who aspire to the construction of a 
rigorous ‘theory’ of democratization will require a standardized unambiguous and 
empirically testable definition of what they would call the ‘dependent variable’. And 
in addition, there is a much wider range of analysts who, without embracing such 
strict criteria of objectivity, are nevertheless bound to hold out for a relatively stable 
and uniform definition of the term. Thus he claims there could hardly be reasoned 
dialogue about the international scope and significance of democratic aspirations in 
the absence of an agreed core of meaning and some shared assumptions about the 
evidence that would be needed to justify use of this term.  
75
  Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience, 2001, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), p.3; p.6-8 
76
  Nagle, 1992, cited in John D. Nagle and Alison Mahr, Democracy and 
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democracy, the meanings and the usages of this word has shifted. Democracy is 
regarded to imply a particular set of arrangements for government and the empirical 
‘reality’ of the West. Empirical democratic theorizing was bound up with the Cold 
War and with the need to justify liberal democracy.77  
 
This trend of empirical democracy coincided with the rise of behavioralism within 
political science in the 1950s and 1960s. According to Lijphart, democracy was a 
reality that existed in the ‘real world’. 78 
 
For many years after the end of the Second World War, Schumpeter’s realist or 
elite-oriented theory of democracy gained in acceptance as the standard by which 
democratic politics should be judged, given the still vivid challenges of 
anti-democratic alternatives79.  
 
The work of Joseph Schumpeter can be summarized as follows:  
 
He is pessimistic about democracy of his time. The times he lived in had seen many 
interwar democracies in Europe collapse and replaced by right-wing authoritarian or 
fascist regimes. The ideals of a citizen-based and grassroots democratic polity seemed 
to be an unfulfillable task; therefore he was inspired by the insights of classic elite 
theorists, especially from Michels, Pareto and Mosca.  
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Realistic democracy. Schumpeter criticizes classic democratic idealism as dangerous 
utopianism and viewed his elite-oriented democratic theory as a mark of political 
realism. His theory sought to recognize the weakness of the interwar democracies, and 
aimed to build and maintain what he regarded as a stable democracy; once established, 
the dangers of fascism and communism could be avoided.  
 
Elite-oriented democracy. His theory of a realistic democratic politics sought to 
recognize what he regarded as weakness of interwar democracies, and to reconstruct a 
short and more practical list of requisites for democratic politics: a minimalist role for 
the citizen, whilst a much more prominent role for political elites80. 
 
He stressed the importance of limiting popular expectations of the democratic system. 
Underlying Schumpeter’s approach was an assumption that the majority of the 
population could not be entrusted with the important task of decision-making81. 
 
High quality leadership in political parties. For a successful (that is, stable) 
democracy, Schumpeter stressed the need for a political leadership of ‘high quality’, 
for which it would be important to “increase their fitness by endowing them with 
traditions that embody experience, with a professional code and with a common fund 
of ideas”82. 
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  John D. Nagle and Alison Mahr, Democracy and Democratization, 1999, p.8 
81
  Jean Grugel, Democratization: A Critical Introduction, 2002, p18 
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  Eva, Etzioni-Halevy, Classes and Elites in Democracy and Democratization, 
1997, p.82; cited in John D. Nagle and Alison Mahr, Democracy and 
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These elites would require a high measure of autonomy, that there be a capable and 
independent bureaucracy, an opposition and civil society that accept the rules of the 
game, and a political culture of tolerance and compromise. Citizens should not put 
undue pressure on their elected representatives. Schumpeter suggested that such 
practices should be avoided both formally and informally – “also less formal attempts 
at restricting the freedom of action of members of parliament – the practice of 
bombarding them with letters and telegrams for instance – ought to come under the 
same ban”83 (Etzioni-Halevy, 1997: 84, cited in Nagle and Mahr, 1999:9).  
 
What inspired the empirical democratic theorists is how he saw democracy as a form 
of government and in particular as a mechanism for the election of leaders.  
 
For Schumpeter, the English system came closest to his realist theory, since it rested 
upon a wide and traditional elite consensus on rules of the political game.  
 
Long-time theorist of democracy, Robert Dahl, who started out very close on the 
Schumpeterian model84, then developed a rather different approach. According to him, 
the actually existing democracies cannot be regarded as the political ideal democracy. 
A ideal democracy is the ultimate goal and value which people strike for and the 
present Western ‘democracies’ fail to fulfil some conditions for democracy. In a 
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84
  Dahl still defines democratic regimes as those which provide ‘selection of top 
officials in free and fair elections, extensive freedom of expression, wide access to 
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that standards of democracy have risen; cited by John D. Nagle and Alison Mahr, 
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review of the ‘Time of Triumph’ for democracy (1995), he reminds us that even in 
the stable Western democracies, there were major shortcomings. He cited the cases of 
Switzerland and the United States, in which countries the universal suffrage was not 
realized after years of the installation of democracy; which, by today’s standards 
would disqualify a nation from democratic standing.85 He even suggested not using 
the word ‘democracy’; instead, he used the term ‘polyarchy’.  
 
Dahl defined the institution of polyarchy as: polyarchy rests on a combination of 
elected government and civil liberties, which should ensure that different groups in 
society have access to the political system. The main institutions are:  
• The election of government officials. 
• Free and fair elections. 
• An inclusive suffrage. 
• The right of all citizens to run for public office. 
• Freedom of expression. 
• Citizens have a right to source of information other than official ones. 
• Associational autonomy and the right to form independent associations or 
organizations, including political parties and interest groups. 86 
 
Empirical democracy has its other critiques: Firstly, it is too predictable. As 
Whitehead put it, ‘if theory-building means only the construction of tightly defined 
covering law type predictive theories, then this exercise has generated almost nothing 
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that can be ‘tested’ against.’87. He pointed out this fatal weakness of empirical 
theorizing. For instance, by the end of the 1980s, when comparative democratization 
studies were well advance, a dramatic regime transition and democratization took 
place in the former communist countries, most political scientists were caught by 
surprise as previously, ‘some eminent scholars had even explicitly predicted that this 
would not come about’.88 Another critique is that empirical democratic theorists 
stress overwhelmingly the practice of government. Thus, democratization, for them, is 
perceived as ‘essentially an exercise in creating institutions for government’; other 
factors which would actually place influence on the process of democratization, such 
as culture, society and the economy were, ‘by and large, ignored’89. I will go on to 
emphasise the importance of these social and cultural factor later in my thesis. 
 
1.1.2 Participatory democracy 
 
Due to the failure of democratization in interwar Europe and the renewed communist 
challenge of the Cold War, the world has seen the development of this new type of 
political study (more comparative, more realistic and more like a science) since 1945. 
Howard Wiarda notes that among the first generation of post-war comparative 
democratization theorists, most were committed to Western models of democracy, 
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along with a new and radically different approach to studying different political 
systems. 90 
 
However, by the 1960s, there has been rising scholars’  criticism toward the 
Schumpeterian model and the empirical theorizing. As some observers pointed out, 
based on the earlier criticism of the new and unaccountable ‘power elite’ growing 
within American democracy by C. Wright Mills91, left-liberal theorists like Peter 
Bachrach92, Jack Walker93 and Henry Kariel94 sought to retrieve the classic vision of 
a democratic politics, ‘in which the citizen had more access to political information, 
more access to political leaders, and more direct input into political processes, both in 
choices of candidates and in shaping policy making’95. 
 
The historical background of the rising demands for a more participatory democracy 
can be summarized as:  
 
• The rising standards of living and education during the post-war years, which, 
according to modernization theory, would raise citizens ’  political 
consciousness to demand more involvement and information in political 
process.  
• In 1968 the student and youth rebellion throughout Europe. 
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• Then in 1970s the new social movements around issues of war and peace, 
environment, women’s rights, gay rights and anti-imperialist solidarity, the 
emergence of environmentalist movement and then the Green parties. 96 
 
According to Pateman97, participatory theories of democracy challenge the myth that 
liberal democracy as the one ‘classical’ theory of democracy. The ‘New Left’ and 
student movement in the 60s and 70s in Europe offered a critique of the way 
‘actually existing democracies’ functioned, that the existence of voting rights and 
alternation in government do not, in themselves, guarantee the existence of 
democracy, while the importance be placed upon freedom and activism; focusing on 
the role of the state, state-society relations and the impact of economic development 
on citizenship98. However, the implementation of a genuine participatory democracy 
could be problematic since it is difficult to apply it to large communities such as the 
nation state.   
 
1.2 On democratization 
 
The democratization literature expanded quickly during the 90s, as the ‘democracy 
trend’ of 1980s when European communist regimes collapsed and turned into 
democratic regimes. The embracing of this most important democratic experiment 
since the end of the Second World War and the spread of democratization to a 
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post-communist Europe has for the first time given comparative politics a truly global 
task in its study of democratic political development99. 
 
Democratization can be defined as the processes whereby governments, states and 
societies attempt to move away from some form of authoritarianism towards some 
form of democracy100. 
 
This definition is a plain one; it gives people the general and ordinary idea of 
democratization as processes. However, as same as the concept democracy, there is 
more to explore and explain in conceptualizing democratization. 
 
Democratization process is best understood as ‘ complex’ , ‘ long-term’ , 
‘dynamic’ , ‘protracted’ and ‘open-endedness’ 101.  
 
• Complex opposed to simple. By the simple ‘two turnover test’102, three 
countries, Italy, Japan and South Africa, which are categorized as democracies 
for years, (democratic constitutions have been installed in Italy and Japan for 
forty years) have failed to comply with this definition. For this reason, this 
definition of democratization is ‘simultaneously too permissive for some 
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cases and too exacting for others’103. 
• Long-term opposed to short-term. It is necessary to identify a number of 
temporal patterns of long-term democratization, because the forces that drive 
democratization forward at one stage may not function in the same manner, or 
with the same intensity, at other stages. 104 
o  Quick democratization: a quick step change from authoritarian rule to 
full democracy. One illustrative instance would be the 
re-democratization of Uruguay after a decade of military regime.  
o Accumulative linear advance: a process of linear advance steadily 
sustained over a decade or a generation, for example, in response to a 
stable and compelling structure of external inducements, such as 
prospective membership of the European Union.  
o Sudden advance, then followed by long periods of stagnation or even 
reversal.  
o Or long periods of reluctant and partial reform, followed by a 
breakthrough, Mexico after the electoral defeat of the PRI is possibly 
in this camp.  
o  Decline or reversal, as in the case of Colombia and Sri Lanka.  
• Open-endedness opposed to fixed. Democracy itself is to be viewed as 
contextually variable and deontological, hence democratization is to be 
regarded as subject to interpretation and revision by the society. The power of 
citizenry to reconsider and modify their democratic practices in the light of 
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reflection and experience—this deliberative process determines the 
open-ended nature of democratization. 105 
• Protracted opposed to cut-and-dried one step shift. Some of the earlier 
literature portrayed democratization as ‘ the end of history ’ 106 , 
‘consolidation’107, and ‘the only game in town’108. However, an overview 
of the entire spectrum of available experience indicates that democratization 
processes are often more protracted and troubled than this language would 
suggest. 109 
 
1.2.1 Waves of democratization 
 
The literature on waves of democratization owe to political scientist Samuel P. 
Huntington, which, according to at least one observer, has become a conventional part 
of the story of democratization.110 
 
For Huntington, a wave of democratization is to be described in the following way:  
 
A wave of democratization is a group of transitions from non-democratic to 
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democratic regimes that occur within a specific period of time and that significantly 
outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time. A wave 
also involves liberalization or partial democratization in political systems that do not 
become fully democratic. Each of the first two waves of democratization was 
followed by a reverse wave in which some but not all of the countries that had 
previously made the transition to democracy reverted to non-democratic rule.111 
 
In his landmark book, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century, 1991, he illuminated three waves of democratization which was separated by 
two reverse waves:  
• The first wave started at about the year 1828 and the number of democratic 
governments grew gradually until 1930, lasted for about a century; during 
which period national democratic institutions were established in some 33 
countries. It was rooted in the American and French revolutions. 33 countries 
include the United States, Britain and some of it colonies, France, some of the 
smaller countries of Europe and a number of the independent states of South 
America. The liberal democracy expanded during this time but later was 
confronted with two totally different ideologies, Socialist democracy and 
Fascism; with latter posed the most substantive challenge and eventually 
brought the first wave to an end when the rising Fascist movement 
successfully seized power in Italy and Germany.  
• It also marked the beginning of the first reverse wave which lasted from 1926 
until 1942. Many of the previous democracies, especially those recent 
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established regimes (just before or after the First World War), failed and lost 
power to authoritarian regimes. These includes, Italy, Germany, Spain, 
Argentina, some of the fledgling democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, 
the Iberian Peninsula, Japan, and South America.  
• Right after the first reverse wave started the second wave of democratization 
which covered for the period of 1943 to about 1962. The physical defeat of the 
Axis powers in 1945 marked the end of the Second World War; many 
countries became new liberated democracies including a large number of 
former European colonies, and a range of countries in South America. 
However, most Eastern European countries, also liberated, were under the rule 
of authoritarian regimes during this wave.  
• The second reverse wave came along between 1958 until 1975, in South 
America and many of the former colonies particularly.  
• The third wave and the most recent one, started in 1974 when Portugal and 
Greece turned democratic, later, striking other countries such as Spain, Latin 
American countries and in the late 1980s and early 1990s, rolling through the 
former Communist states of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and 
Mongolia, and also influencing events in East and South-east Asia. 112 
 
Huntington adopted the metaphor of the ‘third wave’ to indicate that although 
people are more impressed by the recent influential democracy trend in the 1970s and 
1980s, it is not the first time when so many non-democratic regimes changed into 
democracies in a certain period of time. He also analysed the cause behind these 
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democratization waves. Different factors and forces can be verified for the first, 
second and the third waves.   
 
• For the first wave: capitalism and liberal democracy was at expansion, the 
global markets were coming into being, while the values and ideals of 
democracy were diffused during capitalist’s global expansion.  
• For the second wave: the defeat of Fascism by the Allies who were the leading 
democracies of the time, they were able to set up the global authority and 
influence the capitalist world, the influence of the West in decolonization, and 
the Cold War, which suggested the ideological triumph of liberal democracy 
within the capitalist ‘free’ world. 
• For the third wave: he argues for five key factors, the deepening legitimacy 
problems of authoritarian system; demands for raised living standards and 
education, especially on the part of the middle class; the liberalization of the 
Catholic Church; the changing policies of global organizations such as EU, 
and of actors such as Gorbachev and the shift in US policy towards endorsing 
an agenda of democratization and human rights; the snowballing effect of 
democratization. 113 
 
1.2.2 The Critique of wave theory:  
  
There has been some criticism towards Huntington’s theory; major arguments can be 
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summarized as follows:  
Empirically, this wave approach is problematic. The waves as he described are rather 
‘indistinct’ and ‘overlapping’. For instance, it is arguable that three countries, 
Portugal, Greece and Spain fell in the third wave but not the second wave. There is a 
time gap of 20 years between the beginning of democratization in Portugal and the 
end of democratization in West Germany. Also, at least one observer has argued that 
the democratization can not said to be fully installed in Germany until its reunification. 
The distinction between waves is quite ‘blurred’.  
Huntington’s understanding of democracy is too narrow. For example, he called Italy 
and Argentina democracies as early as in the first wave, but actually they only became 
so at the time of the First World War114.  
Thus, he exaggerated the effect of global democratization. The wave approach 
excessively emphasizes the global aspects of democratization which could be 
misleading. While at the same time he was not able to specify the causes of 
democracy or ‘ identify the mechanisms that bring democracy into being’ . 
Globalization, for example, is overstated. 115 
 
1.3 Literature on democratization 
 
After examining the influential wave theory, we need to bear in mind that there are 
significantly different ways of how this term is understood. There is a vast literature 
on democratization; it has been conceptualized as ‘a discourse, a demand, a set of 
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institutional changes, a form of elite domination, a political system dependent on 
popular control, an exercise in power politics and a demand for global solidarity’; it 
has also been analyzed from ‘the perspective of political theory, comparative politics, 
international relations, sociology, cultural studies and political economy’. 116 
 
To investigate democratization literature within political science, we may conclude 
that there are two big categories of theorizing:  
 
Structuralism: explanations that emphasize structure or context which includes social 
structure, economic structure, cultural context and historical context and so on. 
Modernization theorists and comparative historical sociologists belong to this school.  
 
Agency theory: explanations that emphasize agency or conduct, elite could be the 
agency, the state could be the agency. The transition literature is the most influential 
agency theory group in democratization literature.  
 
In the following chapter, Modernization, comparative historical sociology and 
transition literature will be introduced one by one.  
 
1.3.1 Modernization  
 
There have been a number of studies that have tried to explain the causality of 
democratization with different variables; some of the societal variables such as 
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‘modernization’, per capita income levels, the expansion of commercial society, the 
rise of a middle class, the emergence of organized labour117; some culturally specific 
variables such as ‘civic culture’118, belief in the legitimacy of polyarchy119, the 
rational and individualistic values embodied in European culture120, and the presence 
of Protestantism121, ethnic homogeneity, and so on.  
 
As one observer pointed out, during the Cold War era, democratization theorists, 
especially those doing the comparative studies, recognize that they were obsessed 
with the Western liberal democracy model as opposed to the communist political 
model. Hence the researchers tend to ignore the other perspectives and other paths, 
focusing on whether a regime belongs to the West camp or the Soviet bloc.  
 
Over this course, one specific approach became the most influential-the 
‘modernization’ school, which sought to find the causal nexus between economic 
development and democratization. Modernization theory was thus codified within 
democratization studies and draws on a mix of Weberian notions of the ‘modern’ 
                                                 
117
  Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience, 2001, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), p.65 
118
  Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations, 1965; cited in Graeme Gill, The Dynamics of 
Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process, 2000, p.2 
119
  Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition, 1971, Chapter 8; cited 
in Graeme Gill, The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the 
Transition Process, 2000, p.2 
120
  See the discussion in Huntington, pp.298-311; cited in Graeme Gill, The 
Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process, 2000, 
p.2 
121
  See the discussion in Kenneth A. Bollen, ‘Political Democracy and the Timing 
of Development’, American Sociological Review, 44, 4, 1969, pp.572-87; cited in 
Graeme Gill, The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the 
Transition Process, 2000, p.2 
 71 
 
 
state and the preoccupation of classical sociology with describing social transitions – 
from feudalism to capitalism, from traditional to modern, from ascription to 
achievement – which occurred in the 19th and 20th centuries122.  
 
The modernization approach was begun with Lipset’s seminal article in 1959123. He 
presumed modernity as universal experience, which would lead to similar societies 
and states. Democracy is the outcome of modernization of capitalism. Modernization 
is also predictive: democracy appears in those societies that are able to ‘replicate the 
original transition124 ’ to capitalism and become enmeshed in global economic 
structures.125 Later his basic finding, namely, there is a positive correlation between 
economic development and democracy, has been carried forward by numerous 
subsequent analyses.126   
 
Lipset’s notion of capitalism as the source of democracy was strengthened by the 
work of some development economists such as Walt Rostow in the 1960s. Rostow127 
(1960) identified a lineal path for economic development along defined ‘stages’, as 
they were termed, until capitalism was achieved: the traditional society; the 
pre-take-off society; take-off; the road to maturity; and the mass consumption 
                                                 
122
  Jean Grugel, Democratization: A Critical Introduction, 2002, p47 
123
  Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Legitimacy’, American Political Science Review 53, 1, 
March 1959, pp. 69-105 
124
  I. Roxborough, Theories of Development, 1979;  
125
  Jean Grugel, Democratization: A Critical Introduction, 2002, p47 
126
  Graeme Gill, The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the 
Transition Process, 2000, p.3 
127
  W.W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth, 1960; cited in Jean Grugel, 
Democratization: a Critical Introduction, 2002, p48 
 72 
 
 
society128. 
 
As Lipset’s research demonstrates, higher levels of economic development tend to be 
found in democratic countries other than non-democracies: ‘the more well-to-do a 
nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.’129 Other researchers 
such as Diamond have discovered that when the development of a nation’s economy 
rises, it does not indicate that the possibility of democracy would rise as well. They 
found the importance of a middle income range, defined in terms of per capita income 
expressed in American dollars 130 . The highest possibility of a democratization 
transition in an authoritarian regime exists in the countries that are within this middle 
income range. For the countries under this range, the possibility of democratization 
are lower and even the regime change is possible, it is unlikely to sustain a stable 
democracy. For the countries higher than the range, researchers have different 
opinions. For instance, Diamond, citing Dahl’s argument131, shows that there is an 
upper threshold which is above the middle range, and beyond this threshold the 
probability of a democratic regime is so high that economic development has no 
effect. On the other hand, Przeworksi and Limongi132 argue that above such a 
threshold, the probability of regime change is low, since not only the democratic but 
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also the authoritarian regimes can sustain themselves.  
 
However, the basic founding remains unchallenged; for countries that are below this 
upper threshold or middle range, economic development increases the possibility of 
democratization. 133 
 
A number of aspects of the process of economic development have been identified to 
explain the emergence of democracies. 
 
• Economic development can improve the education level of citizenry. The 
better educated citizenry would be more likely to accept democratic values 
and thus become more tolerant, moderate, restrained and rational.  
• Economic development increases the income to the mass of the population. 
Because poverty, incomes gaps and mal-development could lead 
disadvantaged groups to seek redress through non-democratic means, or to 
support anti-democratic (nationalist, populist, communist) parties in the 
electoral process134. With economic security, the populace would develop 
longer time perspective and more complex and gradualist views of politics.  
• Economic development increases the size of the middle class. The increased 
wealth reduces inequality and class distinctions. The middle class moderates 
conflict as they would choose moderate and democratic parties not the radical 
ones.  
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• Economic development brings more jobs for the populace, therefore implying 
less reliance on the state for employment.  
• Economic development would also create unbearable pressure for an 
authoritarian structure. The class structure has dramatic shift: the growth of a 
middle class in urban areas and the migration of the rural poor to the cities 
becoming peasant working class; which breaks the feudal links of the 
authoritarian regime.  
• Economic development increases people’s wealth and their liberties. Hence 
leads to the emergence of a large number of voluntary, autonomous social 
organizations. These autonomous organizations seek to increase political 
participation, place a check upon government, enhance political skills, and 
generate and diffuse new opinions. Economic development is therefore 
instrumental in the emergence of civil society. 135 
 
Gill asserts that most of the factors listed above may explain why popular sentiment 
broadly favours democracy, but not why political actors might act to replace 
authoritarian by democratic rule; they are socio-economic explanations which 
establish contexts for political action without explaining why particular political 
actors act the way they do. Gill chose the final factor – the development of civil 
society forces – to be the vital dynamic of democratization. 136 
 
There are also other modernization researchers who focused their work on economic 
                                                 
135
  Based on discussion in Diamond, pp. 475-485, which is in turn based principally 
on Lipset; cited in Graeme Gill, The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil 
Society and the Transition Process, 2000, p.3-5 
136
  Graeme Gill, The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the 
 75 
 
 
development not as the cause of democratization but the factor for consolidation of 
democracy. For instance, Haggard and Kaufman (1995) develop theories of 
democratization through non-regional comparisons along thematic lines heavily 
centred on economic reforms and their relation to democratic consolidation.137 
Diamond, the theorist influential in updating modernization theory, has picked up the 
1960s concern with mass participation and political culture in newly ‘modernized’ 
states and emphasizes, in particular, the role of political culture and a dynamic civil 
society for democratization. In the process, he has shifted modernization away from a 
discussion on the causes of democracy towards a focus on consolidation138. 
 
1.3.2 Critique of Modernization Theory 
 
In the latter 1960s and early 1970s, there was much criticism of the original 
Western-inspired modernization theory, from those on the right (Huntington, 1968) 
who were sceptical of the Western model’s universalism, and those on the left, who 
connected Western policy toward development in various regions to Western 
ethnocentrism, the dependency syndrome and imperialist domination139. This was 
probably a low point in post-war confidence in the general theoretical and empirically 
backed connection between economic development and political democracy, 
especially with numerous military takeovers of government in Latin America, Asia 
and Africa, and with several communist takeovers through armed struggle in Vietnam, 
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Laos, Cambodia, Angola and Mozambique140.  
 
To sum up, the critiques of modernization are from the following aspects:  
 
Modernization is ahistorical. It presumes that all societies can replicate a transition 
which actually occurred at a particular moment in space and time. At least one 
observer has shown it is not so. O’Donnell’s141 (1973) suggests that in bureaucratic 
authoritarian developing countries, the development of capitalism gives a numerically 
small but political powerful bourgeoisie more resources and opportunities to 
maximize their interests through the repression under dictatorship but not the 
democracy.   
Modernization is inherently ethnocentric. Modernization takes the experience of the 
West, especially the leading capitalist democracies as universal rules whilst ignores 
the development of the East, the third world. So it is Eurocentric and ethnocentric. 
Modernization is overly structural. As analysts pointed out, a purely political 
economy approach tends to downplay local cultural and socio-political legacies of 
nations and regions, in order to highlight economic policy issues and to develop more 
universal policy preferences142. Also it is at the expense of human action.  
Modernization is also methodologically problematic. Lewis rejects modernization 
theory as an explanation for why democracy is likely to occur, because it never has 
been able to demonstrate a clear cause and effect relationship (1997:13). He does cite 
the level of socioeconomic development as useful in explaining the sustainability of 
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democratic practices, though143. Przeworski and Limongi144 (1997) suggest that the 
evidence supports the thesis that democracy survives better in wealthier nations but 
not the original proposition that democracy is a simple consequence of economic 
growth. 145  
 
Generally speaking, over the years, the charges of Eurocentrism brought other 
varieties of political development into political literature, including Latin American 
corporatism, Third World dependency politics, indigenous systems, and most recently 
East Asian developmental-ism which I will discuss at greater length below. 
 
1.3.3 Comparative historical sociology 
 
In democratization literature, historical sociology and structuralism are the two terms 
which are often used interchangeably. The two intellectual origins of this approach 
are: it offers a state-centred view, to ‘bring the state back in146’ to politics, which 
arose out of a reaction to the excessively society-based accounts of political change 
embedded in behavioural-ism in the 1960s; it also drew explicitly on a critique of the 
short-termism and causal simplicity of modernization as an explanation of 
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democratization147. 
 
Scholars have long recognized the importance of longer-term historical analysis in the 
study of the path to Western liberal democracy. This school of historical sociology 
constituted the major alternative perspective of analysis of the emergence of 
democracy to the modernization literature before the transition literature; one of the 
most stimulating and fruitful attempts to do this has been the work of Barrington 
Moore Jr.148 
 
Through class conflict over time, historical sociologists trace the transformation of the 
state, in order to explain how democracy – which they see as state transformation – 
has sometimes emerged. Barrington Moore’s (1966) major study of political change 
constitutes a significant milestone for historical/sociological understanding of 
democratization. His comparative analysis of 8 ‘big’ countries, Britain, France, the 
US, Germany, Russia, Japan, China and India, through the 19th century and into the 
20th, identified the different historical trajectories that each had travelled to reach 
modernity149. 
 
The approach adopted by Moore was very different to that used by many writers from 
the modernization school which was prominent in political science at his time of 
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writing. Moore defines his task as to ‘discover the range of historical conditions 
under which either or both of these rural groups (the landed upper classes and the 
peasantry) have become important forces behind the emergence of Western 
parliamentary versions of democracy, and dictatorships of the right and the left, that is, 
fascist and communist regimes.150’  
 
There are four actors, landed upper classes, peasantry, state and bourgeoisie, in 
Moore’s basic assumption, whose patterns of relationship create different paths to 
modernity, and also resulting different political outcomes. The three paths he 
identified are: a bourgeois revolution, leading to capitalism and democracy; 
revolution from above, leading to industrialization and fascism; and revolution from 
below, leading to communism. 
 
Only through the path of bourgeois revolution, can it be led to capitalism and 
democracy, and the crucial variable is the absence of a conservative alliance against 
the lower classes which would be able to consolidate traditional power arrangements. 
The absence of such a structure was associate with the development of an independent, 
and powerful, bourgeoisie which was itself the key to democracy, ‘No bourgeois, no 
democracy. 151’ 
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The nature of Moore’s explanation for democracy is overwhelmingly societal and 
economic rather than political, and also his work was concentrated mainly on the 
emergence of the first democracies; to update his work with the expansion of the new 
parliamentary and stable democracies and also to bring in a political dimension with 
specific political institutions and actors, Moore ’ s work was modified by 
Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) whose work emphasize the central 
importance of urban working classes for democratization152. Their work has been 
made in a very important book called Capitalist Development and Democracy153.  
 
Class power, the power and autonomy of the state and the trans-national configuration 
of power are the three power constellations whose relationships structure the path to 
democratic or non-democratic transition in Rueschemeyer et al. In discussing the 
impact of class forces on the course of political development, Rueschemeyer et al. 
argue that classes have behaved in a systematic manner during the development of 
capitalism.  
 
• The landed upper class appears to be the chief opponent of democratization.  
• The bourgeoisie plays as both the supporter for a representative democratic 
constitution; and the opponent for a participatory government where lower 
classes have the right to political participation.  
• The middle class support democratic values in principle, but its part becomes 
ambiguous, as it tended to oppose to democracy when felt threatened by 
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popular pressure. 
• The role of peasants and rural working classes is restricted by their capacity 
for autonomous organization and vulnerability to influence by the dominant 
classes. 
• The urban working class constitutes the most consistently pro-democratic 
force. As Moore asserts that the independent bourgeoisie is essentially 
democratic and the main force for democracy. On the contrary, it was the 
working class, unusually with the support of middle class that was responsible 
for the achievement of full democracy. 
• Capitalism is important in the rise of democracy. The urban working class is 
strengthened during the expansion of capitalism but not the rural subordinate 
classes. The landed upper class is weakened at the same process. The 
bourgeoisie is strengthened as well and becomes a counterbalance to the 
power of the old upper class. 154 
 
These historical sociological studies have shown that how agricultural 
commercialization and industrialization shaped the character of different social 
interests; hence changed the social and economic structures which paved the path to 
democracy. 
 
1.3.4 Critique of Historical Sociology 
 
The work of historical sociologists on comparative democratization is regarded as 
                                                 
154
 Based on Graeme Gill, The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society 
and the Transition Process, 2000, pp.107-9 
 82 
 
 
richly grounded which offers an alternative explanation with the possibility of 
comparison across time and regions. The major critiques can be summarized in the 
following:  
 
• For structuralism, the same problem lies with its ontology and epistemology. 
Structuralism provides us with a view of the world that is too simple or simply 
wrong.  
• The historical sociologists do recognize the role of agency as significant in the 
political development, for example, the class, or even the state as the agent for 
democratization. However, for critics who only accept individuals as agents, it 
is not persuasive taking collective action as agency. 
• It emphasizes the long-term historical transformation, in which democracy is 
reached by class struggle. It seemed unable to offer an explanation for the 
sudden democratization which later took place in East and Central Europe and 
the former communist countries in the Soviet Union. Another new literature 
on Transition became influential which is aiming to solve all these 
shortcomings of structuralism. 155 
 
1.3.5 Transition literature 
 
The emergence of the third wave of democratization in the late 20th century gave rise 
to what has been called ‘transition literature’, or sometimes termed, the agency 
approach, which sees democracy as created by committed conscious actors, 
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‘ providing that they possess a degree of luck and show a willingness to 
compromise156’. Transition literature has been very influential in shaping our 
understanding of the regime shift.  
 
For the transition literature, modernization theory and historical sociology are both 
over-determining when explaining political outcomes with economic, historical and 
societal factors. Because only when capitalism is developed to a certain level or the 
leading classes have gained enough power, in a word, a democratic outcome is 
determined by structural elements. Where the structure is unfavourable, the 
democracy is not likely to happen or, even if it takes place, it is not possible to endure. 
Transition approach, being optimistic rather than pessimistic, prefers a perspective 
that democracy can be created independent of the structural context by agency157.  
 
The intellectual starting point and perhaps the most important work of transition 
literature is the work of Dankwart Rustow158 who is also a critique of modernization.  
His ideas can be summarized in the following:  
The only condition for democracy is a unified national state, which he calls a 
background condition. It shows that citizenry of the democracy in question agree that 
they all belong to the same particular political community. Therefore, the aim of 
democratization is not to create a new conception of the political community but to 
transform the existing political system.  
The creation of democracy is a dynamic process in the context of a ‘prolonged and 
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inconclusive political struggle’, which passes through three stages which later 
transformed into liberalization, transition and consolidation. 159 
a) The first phase is the preparatory phase during which a polarization of 
political life results. 
b) The second phase is the decision phase. During this period, the 
political leaders recognize that there is a diversity of views, and 
thereby seek to institutionalize ‘some crucial aspect of democratic 
procedure’ to structure and channel this diversity during which, ‘a 
small circle of leaders is likely to play a disproportionate role’. 
c) The third and final phase is habituation phase during which political 
leaders learned from the successful resolution of some issues and 
thereby start to trust the new rules and procedures. New structure is 
established and linked with the mass of the populace by effective 
parties.160 
 
The dynamics of elite interaction during the process of transition played a key role 
throughout the three phases in this model. It later yielded a rich and interesting 
literature. The path-breaking, and paradigm-setting, work in this regard was the 
collective study edited by Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence 
Whitehead. 161 Their work can be summarized as:  
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 85 
 
 
 
Transition is the interval between one political regime and another, and it is 
characterized by uncertainty and indirection. This uncertainty means that the 
transition may lead to democratic regime or another form of authoritarian rule.  
There are insufficient structural or behavioural parameters during the transition. 
Structural factors may help with the process but they are much less salient than under 
normal circumstances.  
The high degree of indeterminacy is embedded in situations where unexpected events 
(fortuna), insufficient information, hurried and audacious choices, confusion about 
motives and interests, plasticity, political identities, as well as the talents of specific 
individuals (virtu), are frequently decisive in determining the outcomes.  
Hence it is almost impossible to identify what alternative the groups would choose to 
support. Not only the rules of the political game are subjected to uncertainty, but also 
is the identity of all of the main actors, their motives, and the likely course of action 
they will pursue.  
The main focus of study is the dynamics of various elite actors’ interaction. The 
division within the authoritarian regime is regarded as crucial and the root of every 
transition. This division is usually caused by domestic issues other than international. 
It created opportunity for other political actors to participate in the political process.  
The vital question in the division is whether to take liberalization or repression. The 
people who are going for liberalizing the regime need to make sure that the hardliners 
are not too threatened to stop the change from happening. They would form pacts 
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which play a very important role during the transition.  
The influence of civil society is also mentioned in the transition however short-lived. 
Popular involvement is provided. The people can also participate through 
involvement in ‘founding elections’, which may be important for the development of 
parties. However they argue that the populace becomes demobilized as 
democratization proceeds. The opening of negotiations between regime reformers and 
opposition moderates is important in bringing this about. 162 
 
The work of Schimitter, O’Donnell and Whitehead provided an agency-centred 
theory of democratization, which situated the study of democracy with mainstream 
political science methodologies and epistemologies. It became the key reference for 
transition studies which, by drawing on theories of political action, it offered a 
political explanation of political development as opposed to sociological or historical 
approaches.  
 
Another transition theorist, Przeworski 163(1991:19) pioneered a rational choice 
explanation of transition processes, which ran parallel with the rise to prominence of 
rational choice in other areas of the study of politics164. Along with other agency 
scholars who see the role of civil society as ambiguous or unimportant, Przeworski 
(1991) went further to suggest that popular mobilization has  been unfavourable to 
democratization as elites feel so threatened that they abolished the ongoing 
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liberalization.  
 
1.3.6 Critique of Transition Literature 
 
There have been a number of critiques towards the elitist approach of transition 
school. To sum up, these are a few main points:  
 
Transition approach is excessively empirical and voluntaristic. The key elements in 
the approach are its elite/individual focus and the emphasis upon uncertainty. As 
discussed before, structural factors are not supposed to be decisive, the decisions and 
actions of elites or even individual leader thus become overly important in the process; 
the uncertainty of personal preferences and actions exists throughout the transition. 
This elite focus and uncertainty prominence makes the theorizing impossible. It is 
thus impossible to make any predictions for change. 165 
Transition scholars set out a conservative definition of democracy. They prefer to 
concentrate on democracy as a set of procedures for creating institutions and the 
government. 166 They suggest that it makes more sense to establish a ‘procedural 
minimum’ for a functioning ‘democracy’ and work from this. 167 There are clear 
problems for their analysis. If the normative aspect of democracy is ignored, then it 
cannot explain the appeal of this form of government except through the terms of the 
rational actor seeking personal advantage, an explanation which does not fit well with 
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the enthusiasm often evident at this time.168  
The ambiguous role it defines for civil society is also questionable. It downplays any 
non-elite and in particular civil society, actors, which weaken its explanatory power.  
 
1.4 Does the literature help our understanding of the Chinese case? 
 
After reviewed the literature on democracy and three major schools on 
democratization, we can see the divergence among different democratization theorists 
in the West, which is due to the different perspectives they take to research. When 
relating the country in question to this vast literature, in this case, China, scholars fall 
into two camps in terms of the perspective they take: the first one is the modernization 
school, who sees the positive relations between economy and democracy, China’s 
record of high percentage economic development in nearly three decades since the 
Reform, and the noticeable political, social transformation which resulted from it, for 
instance, the enlarged civil rights, the liberalization of press, the direct democratic 
election practiced at the village level, the proliferation of NGOs, convinced them that 
democratization is something that will happen sooner or later. The sceptics, however, 
see the unbalanced economic and political reform, the strength and resilience of the 
authoritarian regime, the under developed civil society, the suppressions that took 
place now and then, as the signs of continuing authoritarianism, and for them, 
democracy is not coming any closer to China169, even if it comes, it is not liberal170. 
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For the sceptics, there are a large number of them, tend to put China in the category of 
East Asia, as they found many common features of the countries within this region: 
comparatively stable authoritarian regimes which have enjoyed economic 
development in recent years with the delay of democratization. The distinctive East 
Asian history, culture and identity, thus became the explanation for this phenomenon. 
This will be elaborated in the following chapter.  
 
1.5 Conclusion 
 
In the first chapter of the thesis, the existing literature on democracy and 
democratization have been reviewed, which gives us ideas about how these two terms 
are constructed in the western political discipline. A historical approach has been 
adopted here when explaining the evolution of the concept on democracy. The two 
original strands of democracy (direct democracy and liberal democracy) have been 
identified. A constructivist view of democracy has been presented. The route of 
liberal or representative democracy becomes the only justified form of democracy 
since the 1940s has been also explored. An explanation of how an elite-oriented 
democracy has gradually been replaced by a more participatory democracy has been 
provided.  
 
The expansion of democratization studies in the 1990s as a result of the large-scale 
regime change in the former European communist states have also been fully 
investigated together with Huntington’s well-known wave theory. With the literature, 
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major representatives coming from three different schools and their main claims have 
been introduced, including the modernization school, comparative historical 
sociology and transition literature. Critiques towards each of the schools have also 
been be presented as they are either emphasizing too much the determinate nature of 
the structure in constructing their theory while neglecting the initiative of the agency 
or vice versa. Of course, their works are valuable in the sense of providing this thesis 
with a broader literature background.  
 
Recalling the definition of democracy, we can find that the applicability of this term 
requires historical, social and cultural context. In fact, for all the three predominant 
democratization schools, this context matters.  
 
Historical context. Each school comes from a specific historical background or bases 
their foundings upon a historical approach. For instance, modernation school became 
influential after the onset of Cold War as theorists tried to justify liberal democracy as 
opposed to the Soviet bloc. The transition of East European Communist countries into 
democracies in the late 20th century gave rise to the transition literature. The historical 
sociologists based their foudings on the history of capitalism. The well-known wave 
theory seems simply describing the history since 1828171.  
 
Social context. Some works of the modernizationists have paid attention to the 
relationship between economic development and the rist of civil society. While the 
historical sociologists are mostly concerned about the social structure and the roles 
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different social classes have played on the way to democracy172.  
 
Cultural context. Some cultural specific variables such as ‘civic culture’173 and the 
rational and individualistic values embodied in European culture174 were applied to 
explain the causality of democratization by the modernization school.  
 
In the following chapter, the democratic debate regarding the specific state—China 
will be investigated fully with historical, social and cultural context. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATISATION IN CHINA 
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2.0 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I will review the literature which relates China 175  with 
democratization. Generally speaking, ever since the suppression of student 
demonstrations in June 1989, scholars in and out of China have vigorous in debated 
about the prospects for a democratic transition in the PRC. The school of 
modernization theory, based on the fact that the Reform in China has achieved 
considerable economic growth, conclude that democratization will sooner or later take 
place in the PRC. Their claims are based on four aspects. Firstly, democratization is 
regarded as long-term political consequences of democracy. The economic 
development will lead to democratization as it did elsewhere. Secondly, the 
implications for demoracy can be found in a range of recent reforms, such as the 
decentralization of power within the Party, the strengthening of the Legislature, the 
expansion of media as the civil society force, and the competitive democratic 
grassroots election at the village level. Thirdly, economic liberalization lays the 
groundwork for democratization. Last but no least, the sequence of the liberalization, 
‘economic first, political second’, will help to build a more sustainable democracy in 
the future. 
 
The sceptics, on the contrary, stress the strengths and resiliency of the existing 
authoritarian arrangements and the legacy of history and culture in China and other 
East Asian authoritarian states. They cautiously apply some democratic concepts to 
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China and/or East Asia, terms such as, ‘ semi civil society 176’ , ‘ illiberal 
democracy177’ or ‘capitalism without democracy178’. Firstly, the sceptics state that 
there is no causal relation between economic development and democratization. 
Secondly, the implications for democracy actually are implication for the 
strengthening of the authoritarian regime. Thirdly, economic liberalization does not 
automatically lead to democratization. Last but not least, the Asia Model has a 
distinctive order from the Western liberal tradtions.  
 
2.1 Modernization School 
 
In the first camp, theorists and researchers focus less on the toughness or fragility of 
the current political system, and look ‘instead at the long-term democratizing 
implications of economic and social change’179. Their views can be concluded as 
follows:  
 
2.1.1 Economic Development and Democratization 
 
During the last three decades, China’s openness to the world and the move away from 
the command economy has resulted in the continual nationwide economic growth. 
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Democratization will become inevitable as the political consequences of economy, the 
communication revolution, and the emergence of a more diverse society and an urban 
middle class. Individual will gain more independence, resource and power vis-à-vis 
the state which necessitates the adoption of democracy and the rule of law. 
 
Henry S. Rowen’s article, ‘The Short March: China’s Road to Democracy’, 
published in the Fall 1996 issue of The National Interest, began by observing that all 
countries (leaving aside states that make nearly all their money from oil exports) 
which had attained a Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPpc) of at least 
US$8,000 per year (as measured by the Purchasing-Power Parity or PPP standard for 
the year 1995) stood no worse than Partly Free in the ratings of political rights and 
civil liberties published annually by Freedom House.  
 
In his thought-provoking essay, ‘When Will the Chinese People Be Free?’180, Henry 
Rowen revisits and updates his optimistic argument that China will experience 
gradual democratic change. This change, he claims, will raise China from Freedom 
House’s ‘Not Free’ category to its ‘Partly Free’ category by 2015 and then to 
the ranks of ‘Free’ countries just ten years after that.  
 
Rowen’s theory is drawn mainly on the modernization literature. Rowen noticed that 
over the last decade, China’s per-capita growth has averaged a highly impressive 8.5 
percent annually, reaching a GDPpc of $6,000 in 2006 international-PPP dollars. He 
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then estimates that an average per-capita growth rate of 7 percent a year will be 
enough to raise GDPpc to $10,000 PPP by 2015; that is when China edge into the 
Partly Free category. After that, slower workforce expansion plus China’s expected 
approach toward convergence with the world’s leading developed economies suggest 
that the growth rate will climb less steeply. Annual growth of 5 percent in GDPpc 
starting in 2015 will bring China to roughly $14,000 PPP (in 2006 dollars) by 2025. 
That is when, Rowen predicts, the more than one-sixth of the world’s people who live 
in China will be citizens of a country correctly classed as belonging to the Free 
nations of the earth.  
 
Rowen inquired into recent modernization scholarship which tells about the nexus 
between economic development and political freedom. The hypothesis that 
development might lead to democracy, is associated with Seymour Martin Lipset. 
After analyzing more than a hundred countries, Robert J. Barro found that higher 
incomes and higher levels of (primary) education predict higher freedoms181. He also 
found significant time lags between the appearance of a factor positive for electoral 
rights and its expression in politics. He interpreted such lags as tokens of inertia in 
institutions affected by changes in economic and social variables, and noted that after 
about two decades ‘the level of democracy is nearly fully determined by the 
economic and social variables.’182 This observation helps one to understand why a 
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rapidly growing country such as China has a freedom rating today well below the 
level that its current income would predict.  
 
As other theorists found in the contemporary Chinese polity, there are many new 
factors and variables at work, 183 
 
• The nature of political discourse is changing. There is an important evolution 
in the thinking of the leaders; 
• an increased probability of social unrest that will demand a high-level strategic, 
rather than tactical response; 
• the influence of Hong Kong and Taiwan on mainland politics, and 
• the consequences of the Chinese leadership’s involvement in world affairs.  
 
Despite the signs suggesting the durability or resilience of China’s non-democratic 
regime, even the casual visitor to China would quickly note how much more freedom 
the Chinese enjoy today compared with the early years of economic reforms, let alone 
in the Maoist era. 184Yang anticipated that, in the coming years, 
 
• The Chinese economy will continue to grow to support improvements in 
living standards and educational levels; 
• The rule of law will likely become more firmly established. The last 
development is the enactment of a March 2007 law that protects 
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private-property rights. 
• And village elections will probably spread to urban neighbourhoods, while 
other experiments in governance will go forward. 
 
Thus Yang found it hard to avoid agreeing with Rowen that China will move into the 
Partly Free category sometime in the not-too-distant future. These reforms will be 
discussed in greater length in later chapters.  
 
2.1.2 Implications for Democracy 
 
The modernizationists tried to find implications for democracy in a range of recent 
reforms, which include: 
Firstly, the decentralization of power within the Party: the change within the Party to 
accept a species of interest-based politics (even if most interests are pursued by and 
through agencies of the state) 185 ; the strengthening of legislature - People’s 
Congresses at all levels of the hierarchy, especially the National People’s Congress; 
the rule of law: the development of a legal system in the legal reform; 
Secondly, civil society: the expansion and commercialization of media, and the 
beginnings of investigative journalism; the proliferation of Non-governmental 
Organizations (registered with the government); 
Last but not least, competitive democratic grassroots elections at the village-level. 
 
During the Reform decades, as the modern market economy is gradually formed, its 
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operation and function is incompatible with the Leninist requirement of 
comprehensive party and state control over society. For some observers, CCP has 
faced a dilemma which other authoritarian regimes have faced, to continue economic 
liberalization or to tough it out. Oksenberg cited Robert Dahl’s theory186 that we may 
anticipate that the leaders’ calculations will be governed by an assessment of the 
relative costs, benefits, and risks to them of each course of action. That is, the leaders 
would calculate that communist rule, political stability, and honest government would 
be enhanced rather than weakened by a process of democratization. 187  
 
After the 1989 crackdown, although there are still some repressions happening now 
and then, there have been no harsh and large-scale suppression towards democratic 
movement or dissidents. Even the largest-scale suppression since 1989, towards 
Fanlungong’s (a religious organization) demonstration in Beijing, has not involved 
martial law enforcement or military forces as those took place in 1989. As Rowen 
observed, the CCP has chosen to pull back in several domains. The ‘separation of the 
Party and government’, the ‘separation of the Party and enterprises’, although have 
not been implemented completely, during the decentralization process, more space 
and autonomy has been created and given to local councils and some special 
departments such as legal institutions and media outlets.  
 
The National People’s Congress and local congress at all levels, used to be a rubber 
stamp for the Party and government policies, now become more progressively 
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autonomous, initiating legislation and actively reviewing and altering the proposals 
for legislation presented to it188. The legal reform has enhanced the autonomy of the 
juristic institutions. More laws and regulations have been codified and enforced, 
which are providing the legal guidance for the economic activities in the new market 
economy. The civil society has expanded as the media now have more freedom in 
reporting and press and the number of various social associations, guilds, and 
environmental NGOs grows tremendously. One of most encouraging aspects of the 
liberalization Reform is the democratic practice in rural China, where villagers have 
the opportunity to decide which ones to be elected to form their village committees, 
which be discussed at greater length later.  
 
2.1.3 Legitimacy and Liberalization 
 
Some observers also pointed out that as literacy, urbanization, and mass-media 
exposure rise, modernizing societies experience characteristic shifts in values. They 
assert that the economic performance has become the legitimacy of rule189, therefore, 
the CCP, facing the risks of economic stagnation and political disaffection, will have 
to hold on with economic liberalization, which lays the groundwork for 
democratization. 
 
The regime’s legitimacy is defined as the public’s belief that the regime is lawful and 
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should be obeyed190. The importance of legitimation can be shown in two aspects:   
 
Firstly, the performance related legitimacy is tightly connected with the economic 
growth; the failure in performance could result in a perception that the right of the 
existing regime to rule is eroding, which may bring up political crisis leading to the 
transition of the regime. 
 
Secondly, legitimacy is also crucial in the rulers’ belief in their right to rule and their 
confidence to continue ruling. Indeed, if the rulers see their position in the hierarchy 
as legitimate and unshakable, they will have the confidence to continuing ruling. 
Should their belief in their right to rule erode; the regime thus becomes weak and 
vulnerable. Gill listed out different factors which can cause the erosion of the belief 
and failures in performance is one amongst them191.  
 
The market economy which has been introduced to take the place of central planned 
and command economic system has fuelled China’s growth in the last 3 decades. 
Prior to the disastrous Cultural Revolution and the economic crisis that came along 
with it, the rule of the CCP is legitimized by its military success in gaining national 
independence and driving away all the foreign imperial forces. However, after nearly 
three decades of the foundation of PRC in 1949, the life expectancy of Chinese people 
has not been improved but got worsen in terms of the non-stop political mobilization 
and laggard economic growth. Facing this severe crisis in the late 1970s, CCP leader 
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Deng Xiaoping decided to launch a series of reforms with the major intention of 
promote economic growth while in reality these reforms helped with economic 
liberalization.  
 
In Huntington’s view, liberalization:  
 
is the partial opening of an authoritarian system short of choosing governmental 
leaders through freely competitive elections. Liberalizing authoritarian regimes 
may release political prisoners, open up some issues for public debate, loosen 
censorship, sponsor elections for offices that have little power, permit some 
renewal of civil society, and take other steps in a democratic direction, without 
submitting top decision makers to the electoral test. 192 
 
This conception of liberalization is valuable as seen in the following aspects193:  
 
First, it refers to the opening of the political system to enable independent activity on 
the part of the citizenry or segments of it. Liberalization constitutes a partial rolling 
back of state activities and control in some sectors of life.  
 
Liberalization is limited as compared to regime transition. Because it is initiated by 
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elites, they will make sure liberalizing some parts of the society does not affect they 
power of rule. They make concessions at the edges while the essential power 
hierarchy remains unchallenged. Even in the spheres from which the authority has 
withdrawn, the authority retains the ability to rule or to change particular outcomes; in 
a word, they possess enough power to intervene and reverse an outcome which is 
unfavourable for the Party. For instance, as I discussed before, the village level 
competitive election is the lowest level of the hierarchy, therefore, the democratically 
elected offices have little power upon the higher levels; and if the higher authority 
does not favour the outcome of the election, it can change it by recalling another one. 
It is because of the nature of liberalization. When an authoritarian regime is under 
pressure, most of the time, pressure that is from performance failure, it would 
consider liberalization as one possible solution, making concessions without giving 
out essential power, in order to improve the bad performance and hold on to the 
legitimacy of rule. The distinction between liberalization and democratization, 
therefore, is the limited nature of the former. Democratization is the fundamental 
transformation from an authoritarian regime to a democratic polity, which requires the 
accountability of governors, checks and balances of power and so on. Theoretically, 
liberalization and democratization are distinctive political process, but in reality, the 
two often shade into one another194:  
 
Liberalization does not automatically spawn democratization, however, once 
liberalization is initiated, there is always pressure for the regime to expand it. During 
this process, liberalizing moves may become radicalized and transformed into forces 
for democratization. (This process is contingent upon individual circumstances.) For 
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instance, as I mentioned before, the National People’s Congress, the legislative 
assembly, has become more progressively autonomous. During the 1989 incidence, it 
even tried to call emergency meetings of the people’s delegates, in order to abolish 
the martial law. However, it became result-less due to the intervention of the Party. 
Whether this tame legislative assembly will drive the political agenda in a 
democratising direction is not clear yet, but it has become more vocal and critical in 
the discussion of public policy.  
 
The press of China, especially some urban newspapers, are becoming more assertive 
when less censorship is placed upon them since the Reform. More professionalized 
journalists now enjoy a freer hand compared to prior to 1978. Whether the press will 
become truly independent as the fourth power is uncertain yet, but new space for 
criticism and investigative journalism is being created.  
 
The lowest level village election has been practised more than a decade. There has 
already been some similar practice at the higher county and township level. Although 
it is still very limited and at the moment seems unlikely to be enlarged to the 
provincial or national level, the practice will continue. Some surveyors have already 
discovered that truly democratically elected officers enjoy more legitimacy than those 
who are not. 
 
Rowen, along with other modernizationists, believes that liberalization will lay the 
groundwork for democratization and China’s long-term prospects for achieving a 
stable form of liberal-democratic government will in all likelihood be best if the 
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liberal part comes first as groundwork for the democratic part195.  
 
2.1.4 Democratic Developmental State 
 
They tend to see in China the same economic and sociological processes that have led 
to democracy elsewhere in East and Southeast Asia196. Here, some theorists raised the 
question of the sequence of economic and political when they explore into the 
democratization process in Asia. 
 
There has been a recent scholar debate on the right sequence of economic and 
political liberalization. Firstly, there is the Southern European Model, which includes 
Spain, Portugal and Greece, where the transition governments were able to 
concentrate on political reform and political consolidation first, without embarking 
upon economic transformation at the same time. However, their capability for doing 
so is due to two factors: 1. the international factor, European Community provided 
financial aid for economic integration into the community, the structural adjustment 
funds amounted to a transfer of about 5 per cent of gross domestic product of Spain, 
Portugal and Greece197. 2. In these countries, there were already functioning market 
economic systems, which had made some progress during the post-war years. ‘The 
Southern European countries were structurally able, and consciously chose, to 
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concentrate first on politics, secondly on social welfare policies, and only later on 
structural economic reforms…we consider this the optimal sequence if it is all 
possible. ’198 
 
Recent development in East Asia reopened the debate on the sequencing question. 
Combining ‘democracy’ and ‘developmentalism’ into the model of ‘democratic 
developmental state’; became especially influential in the early 1990s. This school199 
asserted that the development-oriented, growth-promoting authoritarian regimes 
might be good for democracy in the long run.  
 
The Asian Model refers to the developmental model of a number of Asian countries, 
notably South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, in which economic liberalization 
preceded political liberalization. This was considered to be the necessary sequence of 
democratic transition200.  
 
However, it is not narrowly East Asian debate; the similarity can also be found in 
Pinochet’s Chilean dictatorship and in Franco Spain. Explaination of this model is 
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offered as follows,  
 
Economic modernization along with the improvement of educational level, bring 
about civil society. Increased trade liberalization exposed citizens to other systems 
and governments to international pressure for political openness201. The state loses its 
control over the people during the economic liberalization, opening up space for the 
development of a civil society202. The economic dynamism can be carried over into 
the first years of the democratic transition which can help with political consolidation. 
In a initially poor country, ‘it may first be necessary to rule by authoritarian means 
with strong and durable controls over labour, and unpopular measures to curb 
consumption and reward enterprise. Such controls may have to remain in place for a 
generation or longer, until they induce a self-sustaining system of productive 
efficiency. Only then is it safe to embark upon a controlled liberalization which may 
lead smoothly, and without economic dislocation, to an open and competitive political 
regime.203’ 
 
To sum up, as most of these theorists agree, democratization will come to China 
sooner or later, of which the most possible form of Chinese democratization would 
be:  
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• a democratization initiated ‘from above’204.  
• a process which might be difficult, protracted, complicated, and inconclusive. 
205
 
• The actual transition will undoubtedly be a politically contingent process. 206 
• China’s leaders are likely to find introducing democracy at lower levels of the 
system and firmly committing themselves to the attainment of full democracy 
over a protracted period to be an increasingly attractive option. 207 
• China’s political transformation will not be determined by the top elite alone, 
but will be subject to negotiation and contestation among diverse interests in 
state and society. 208 
• Can be called as a ‘hazy’ or ‘gray’ democratization. Both the people and 
the elites are self-interested, eager to maximize their own power and serve 
their own interests. As they jostle and compete with one another, it will 
become apparent that none can control the others completely. Thus they may 
be driven to agree upon rules to regulate the political process. 209 
• The sudden or big-bang transition toward democracy can occur only if all or 
most within the ruling elite calculate that the advantages of a shift from slow 
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liberalization to more rapid and fundamental democratization outweigh the 
risks of maintaining authoritarian rule. 210 
 
2.2 Sceptics 
 
In the sceptics’ camp, however, there has been criticism towards the over-determined 
nature of modernization theory; beyond modernizationists, these sceptics see the 
authoritarian regime of China has been strengthened other than weakened by the 
Reform, as the economic growth provides more resource for the elite to hold on to the 
control of the hierarchy. Generally speaking, their views, as opposed to those of the 
modernization school, can also be summarized in four aspects respectively.  
 
2.2.1 Pessimism versus Optimism 
 
The approach and methodology that has been taken by modernization school is 
criticized by them as over-determinant and too simple. As we reviewed in the first 
chapter, the critiques towards modernization are mainly focused on its structuralism 
perspective. However, in China’s case, there are some specific points that are made 
by the sceptics.  
 
Firstly, the economic development itself is very uneven amongst different areas. It is 
very problematic using economic development as a yardstick for the probability of 
democratization. China has a vast rural peasant population, and there are significant 
area disparities between east coastal and west inland. Some theorists have asserted 
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that to include mainland China in the catalogue of East Asian market economy is also 
inappropriate and incorrect. ‘The coastal areas of the mainland may indeed be 
subject to liberalizing processes similar to those at work elsewhere in the region, but 
for the time being communist-ruled China does not fully conform to an ‘emerging 
market’ logic, and can therefore be placed outside the limits of the region.211’  
 
One of the critiques of Rowen’s prediction of China’s democratization prospect is 
Minxin Pei, a senior associate and director of the China Program at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. Minxin Pei thinks that a more fruitful intellectual 
exercise might be to ask not when but how China could become free. For the 
variables (the implications for democracy as explained by the modernizationists) 
which are causing structural changes in societies and political systems are 
unforeseeable; these variables can indeed be identified and be speculated how they 
might contributed to the change, but it is difficult to predict when they will make that 
change occur212.  
 
As a China specialist, Pei used to be optimistic about China’s transition to democracy, 
in his earlier assays such as ‘Creeping Democratization’ in China213, he claimed 
that although there have been no signs of direct or overt democratization, 
‘endogenous and incremental changes in the political institutions of the authoritarian 
regime are gradually forming subtle but important checks and balances against the 
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ruling party’s monopoly of power, strengthening the rule of law, and cultivating 
self-government at the grassroots level’214. When he compared China’s reform with 
other states in East Asian, he further confirmed that democratization will come to 
China, and China’s model, along with other East Asian authoritarian regimes, is 
indeed a success model, since it achieves the twin goals of economic prosperity and 
democracy215.  
 
However, after a decade, seeing no fundamental breakthrough in China’s political 
system, Pei revisited his incremental democratization ideas about autocracy, and 
became a sceptic towards modernization approach216.  
 
Regarding Rowen’s optimism about China’s democracy, He listed four reasons to be 
not so optimistic:  
  
Rowen may be underestimating both the determination and the resourcefulness with 
which the CCP stands ready to defend its political monopoly against the forces that 
economic modernization is now unleashing. He pays no heed to the grave or even 
fatal political consequences for the current ruling elites should economic growth 
slow down. He overlooks the deleterious effects of socioeconomic inequality, which 
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is rising at an alarming pace in China, on the country’s democratic prospects. 
(China’s Gini coefficient – a measure of overall income inequality in a society on a 
zero-to-one scale – has risen from 0.30 to 0.45 during the past three decades.) The 
evidence of liberalizing political reform that he cites is too weak to support the claim 
that economic modernization has spurred the anticipated democratizing process217. A 
serious flaw in Rowan’s theory, Pei pointed out, is the assumption that, the ruling 
elite will accept democracy as inevitable and do nothing to blunt the political effects 
of socioeconomic modernization. He further claims that, crony capitalism – a 
political economy dominated by an elite-based alliance among authoritarian rulers, 
their relatives, and well-connected businessmen – is a rising reality in China.  
 
Pei was once enthusiastic about the incremental style of democratization in China, but 
after over a decade of observation, he abandoned his former idea and instead states: 
the possible pattern of a democratic transition would only be, ‘when the accumulated 
systemic risks and an unexpected shock jointly spark a huge political crisis that helps 
to break the equilibrium and – after other twists and turns, perhaps – ultimately 
precipitates a democratic transition’218.  
 
2.2.2 Anti-democratic versus Pro-democratic 
 
The modernization school see the implications of the Reform as pro-democratic, 
while the sceptics see them as strengthening the authoritarian regime, which is 
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anti-democratic in nature.  
 
Their arguments can be generally summarized as219:  
 
• There was little support for democracy in Chinese political thought, whether 
traditional or contemporary. Even the 1989 student demonstrations, which are 
regarded as influenced by democratic waves at the time, were not 
fundamentally democratic in nature, and furnished little evidence of an 
emerging civil society.  
• The Chinese dissident community is too weak to have actual influence over 
China’s future.  
• The institutional arrangements are deeply embedded in society, institutional 
developments such as village elections and the strengthening of the National 
People’s Congress, which are often cited as evidence of democratization, are 
still in an incipient stage. They face considerable opposition and an uncertain 
future, and it is too early to say whether they will lead to democracy. 
• The Reforms are yielding sufficient economic resources and coercive 
capabilities to keep the communist elite in power indefinitely who are 
determined to maintain its power through authoritarian rule.  
• The regime’s capacity to suppress dissent and quell unrest through expanded 
surveillance and the strengthening of the People’s Armed Police is increasing 
other than decreasing.  
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Therefore, they concluded with the rise of a corrupt ‘soft’ authoritarianism like that 
found in Suharto’s Indonesia or Park Chung Hee’s South Korea other than towards 
democracy.  
 
Some of the sceptics started to attribute the regime ’ s resilience to its 
institutionalization during the Reform years. One of the most influential China experts, 
Andrew Nathan published an essay in 2003 in which he examined the CCP regime’s 
institutionalization thoroughly. Nathan asserted that the regime, unlike other 
communist regimes in Soviet Union or Eastern Europe which fall apart in the third 
wave of democratization, has been able to reconsolidate itself220. He advanced the 
term authoritarian resilience221, and attributed the cause of its resilience to the concept 
of institutionalization, which can be demonstrated in four aspects222.  
 
2.2.2.1 Succession of CCP 
 
The increasingly norm-bound nature of CCP’s succession politics. Nathan discovered 
that the CCP’s recent succession between its third and fourth generation has proved 
CCP an exception for authoritarian regimes which are regarded as not capable of 
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conducting orderly, peaceful, timely, and stable successions.  
 
However, Nathan noticed that this institutionalization has not been achieved without 
painful lessons. The power struggles in the so-called first and second generation of 
CCP leaders provided a proof of this.  
 
• Mao Zedong, as the central leader, enjoyed supreme authority until the end of 
his life. There was no rule for the terms of office or age limits for him. Party 
congresses and National People’s Congresses, which were supposed to meet 
regularly, seldom met. Mao purged Liu Shaoqi, the president of the PRC at the 
time. And Lin Biao, his successor, fled and died in the power struggle with 
Mao.  
• Deng Xiaoping himself was purged several times until he seized power during 
his power struggle with Hua Guofeng. Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were 
purged by Deng as his chosen successors.  
• Jiang Zemin stepped to the central leader position after the power wrestling 
during the 1989 pointed by Deng.  
 
However, the succession between the third generation of Jiang Zemin to the fourth 
generation of Hu Jingtao was regarded so far as the most ‘orderly, peaceful, 
deliberate, and rule-bound succession in the history of modern China outside of the 
institutionalization of electoral democracy in Taiwan223.’ Nathan concluded the 
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indications of institutionalization as follows224:  
 
• Terms of office and age limits: Jiang survived his full allotted time in office, 
and left, according to the informal rule of age limits which was established by 
the Politburo in 1997 that senior leader should not be reappointed to another 
term after they reach the age of 70. 
• Successor: Hu was not appointed by Jiang, but was chosen by Deng as the 
successor to Jiang. Jiang did not remove Hu out of office. 
• Non-intervention of elders: the retired elders, (consisting after 1997 of Wan Li, 
Qiao Shi, Song Ping, Liu Huaqing, and several others), unlike their 
predecessors (Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Li Xiannian), did not possess 
the power or the intention to intervene in the succession. 
• Non-military intervention: the military exercised no influence over the 
succession.  
• Consensus based: the selection of the new Politburo was made by consensus 
within the old Politburo. None of the top leaders was powerful enough to force 
a nominee on his colleagues against their wills.  
 
2.2.2.2 Meritocratic Cadres 
 
Nathan found there is an increase in meritocratic as opposed to factional 
considerations in the promotion of political elites  
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Nathan noticed that there have always been both meritocratic and factional elements 
in promotions within the Chinese party-state except for the period of the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-76). However, the new leading group rose to the top predominantly 
because of administrative skill, technical knowledge, educational background, rather 
than personal loyalty. Deng Xiaoping’s 1980 instruction of undertaking a ‘four-way 
transformation’  (sihua) of the cadre corps is to promote cadres who were 
‘ revolutionary, younger, more educated, and more technically specialized ’ 
(geminghua, nianqinghua, zhishihua, zhuanyehua). Hu Jintao was thus promoted 
several levels by the CCP first secretary of Gansu Province, where he was then 
working; Wu Bangguo became party secretary of Shanghai Science and Technology 
Commission; and Wen Jiabao became deputy head of the Gansu geology bureau.  
 
In 1983, the CCP’s Organization Department created a list of the most promising 
cadres of the ‘four transformations’ generation, which it turned to whenever it 
needed to recommend a younger cadre for a post carrying ministerial rank. Hu Jintao 
was selected from this list to become Party secretary of Guizhou, Wen Jiabao to 
become deputy head of the powerful Central Party Office. The same 
cadre-rejuvenation policy led Deng to order that someone younger than 50 be 
appointed to the Fourteenth Politburo Standing Committee in 1992. That choice fell 
upon Hu Jintao, so that his current accession to the position of General Secretary 
marks the orderly working out of the same process set in motion twenty years earlier.  
 
Nathan further claims that a norm of staff neutrality has become to some degree 
accepted at high levels within the Party Centre, the State Council, and the Central 
 118 
 
 
Military Commission, so that the careers of rising stars have been relatively 
unperturbed by factional turmoil at the top. He noticed that when Zhao Ziyang was 
purged in 1989, a few of his associates were immediately purged, but most of them 
were gradually moved into secondary bureaucratic posts over the course of the next 
couple of years; some even continue to advance in their careers. Wen Jiabao, for 
example, served eight consecutive years as director of the powerful Party Central 
Office under three different general secretaries, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Jiang 
Zemin. In contrast to the old spoils-like practices in which a leader’s purge led 
quickly to the rooting-out of his followers several levels down the political system, 
the new system limits the damage that factional strife dose to the orderly careers of 
the rising generation of leaders.  
 
2.2.2.3 Separation of Party and Government 
 
It refers to the differentiation and functional specialization of institutions within the 
regime. 
 
Nathan noticed that there has been a gradual ‘separation of Party and government’ 
and ‘the separation of Party and enterprise’, which was originally proposed by Zhao 
Ziyang; it has happened by evolution, as the separation of responsibilities and spheres 
of authority – which Max Weber saw as definitive characteristics of the modern state 
– has gradually increased.  
 
The ‘separation of Party and government’, the ‘separation of Party and enterprise’ 
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and the institutionalization within the regime, are demonstrated in the following225:  
 
• Party Centre: a group of specialists who manages ideology, mobilization and 
propaganda. In the outgoing regime, it includes people like Hu Jintao, Wu 
Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun. 
• State Council: a group of people who are selected increasingly for their 
expertise, now make economic policies with less intervention from the 
ideology-mobilization specialists. This now includes Premier Wen Jiabao, 
Vice-Premiers Huang Ju and Wu Yi, most State Council members, and most 
provincial governors and Party secretaries.  
• Provincial – level governors and Party secretaries: their authority to set local 
policy in economic development, foreign investments, welfare, environment, 
education and health is increasing.  
• State enterprises: many large state own enterprises have changed to joint 
state-private ownership. Thus decisions of the managing level are made 
chiefly on economic rather than political bases.  
• The NPC: it has become progressively more autonomous, initiating legislation 
and actively reviewing and altering the proposals for legislation presented to 
it226. 
• The police and courts: a norm of judicial independence has been declared, 
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226
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1-125; cited in Andrew J. Nathan, ‘Authoritarian Resilience’, Journal of Democracy 
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predominantly in the 1995 Judges’ Law227. In economic and criminal cases, 
judges are enjoying more independence than before.  
• The military: has become smaller, more technically competent and more 
professional. Central Military Committee, the highest military office, its 
members are selected more for their professional accomplishments and less for 
political loyalties than before228. There have been calls to make the army a 
non-partisan national force, which is regarded as a sign of a growing 
professional ethos229. 
•  The media: although the media is owned by the state, it has become more 
commercialized and market-oriented.  Some central outlets are directly under 
the control of the Party’s Propaganda Department, such as the People’s Daily, 
the New China News Agency, China Central Television, Party newspapers, 
and army newspapers and so on. But these media together with other 
newspapers, magazines, radio and TV stations, now compete in the national 
media market. ‘In the political domain, they often push the envelope of what 
the regime considers off-limits by investigating stories about local corruption 
and abuses of power’230. 
 
Nathan asserted that this institutional complexity, autonomy, and coherence, attributes 
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228
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that according to Huntington’s theory should equip the regime to adapt more 
successfully to the challenges it faces231.  
  
2.2.2.4 Political Participation 
 
CCP’s legitimacy is strengthened by the establishment of institutions for political 
participation.  
 
In a 1993 nationwide random-sample survey conducted by Tianjian Shi, 94.1 percent 
of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that, ‘We should trust 
and obey the government, for in the last analysis it servers our interests’ ; a 2002 
survey by Shi also found high percentages of respondents who answered similarly 
regarding both the central and local governments232. For Nathan, the reason why 
China’s authoritarian regime continues to enjoy high political legitimacy can be 
explained in the following ways.233 
 
The improvement of the average persons’ living standards is due to economic 
development. New direction in Party policy, represented by Jiang Zemin’s theory of 
the ‘Three Represents’, which says that the Party should represent advanced 
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productive forces, advanced culture, and the basic interests of all the Chinese working 
people. That is, that it should stand for the middle classes as much as or more than the 
workers and peasants; the Party offers Party membership to able persons from all 
walks of life; the new Property Rights Law234 grants the property protection to 
private entrepreneurs.  The Chinese population favours stability and fears political 
disorder. Political repression may itself have generated legitimacy by persuading the 
public that the regime’s grip on power is unshakeable. The establishment of the 
institutions increases political participation. 
  
This last explanation is valued the most by Nathan. He listed a number of them:  
• The Chinese participate at the local and work-unit levels in a variety of 
ways: voting, assisting candidates in local-level election, and lobbying 
unit leaders. Participation is frequent, and activism is correlated with a 
sense of political efficacy235.  
• Competitive village elections: In localities with competitive village 
elections, leaders’  policy positions are closer to those of their 
constituents than in villages with non-competitive voting236.  
• The Administrative Procedure Law of 1989 allows citizens to sue 
government agencies for alleged violations of government policy. 
According to Minxin Pei, the number of suits stood in 1999 at 98,600. 
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The success rate (determined by court victories plus favourable 
settlements) has ranged from 27 percent to around 40 percent237.  
• Party and government agencies maintain offices for citizen complaints – 
letters-and-visits departments (xinfangju) – which can be delivered in 
person or by letter. 
• People’s congresses, people’s political consultative conferences, and 
United Front structures have become an increasingly important channel 
by which citizen complaints may be aired through representatives. 
• The media are increasingly taking the role of tribunes of the people by 
exposing complaints against wrong-doing by local-level official.  
 
Nathan’s conclusion is that, under conditions that elsewhere have led to democratic 
transition, China has made a transition instead from totalitarianism to a classic 
authoritarian regime, and one that appears increasingly stable.  
 
2.2.3 Democratization and Liberalization 
 
The liberalization does not necessarily lead to democratization. As opposed to the first 
camp of modernization theorists, sceptics claim that there is no direct link between 
liberalization and democratization.   
 
For instance, Pei sees there is a critical distinction between liberalization and 
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democratization238. Evidence of the former is fairly abundant in present China, Pei 
admits. But he further discloses that239: There are as yet no real institutional channels 
through which societal interests, political groups, and ordinary citizens can influence 
the selection of rules or the making of public policy. Legal reform has been limited to 
narrow technical improvements in laws and legal practices.  Efforts to strengthen the 
legislative branch are stalled as well. Village-level elections – the most promising of 
all experiments aimed at political reform – have produced results that are mixed at 
best. Contrary to many optimistic predictions, moreover, the principle of electoral 
contestation has remained stuck at the village level, and has conspicuously not been 
expanded up the ladder to cover township governments.  
 
Grugel, agreed with Pei, when she claims that, there are some political changes 
followed the opening up of economy, but the Reform in the political domain, rather 
than initiation of a controlled democratic transition, has only been the rationalization 
of the state and improvement of bureaucratic efficiency 240 . The economic 
liberalization is not leading to greater openness with the ruling party or a greater 
receptiveness to civil society demands; in other words, economic liberalization is not 
bringing political democratization.  
 
The sceptics’ points of view can be generalized in the following:  
 
• Along with Pei’s term of ‘Crony Capitalism’, the sceptics agree on the fact 
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that the new bourgeoisie class in China, which is supposedly the driving force 
for democratization, is unlikely to play the same role in contemporary China.  
 
In China, the business elites are closely tied with the government. As one theorist 
pointed out, industrial development is often heavily dependent upon government 
support in its early stages241. Because it needs proper policies of the government and 
the provision of government contracts, the informal favours and backdoor deals are 
the characteristics of China’s developing economy. The economic liberalization gives 
rise to the connection between businessman and authoritarian rulers, thus the 
democratization lacks popular bases and supports.  
 
• The state and elites have been able to resist the pressure for democratization, 
as during the economic liberalization, the capability of the state to repress is 
not weakened but, to some extent, strengthened.  
 
As one theorist pointed out, the Chinese state aims to be both developmental and 
repressive; the strong state is legitimized in China because of its appeals not only to 
developmentalism but also to nationalism242. The state tends to be strong and its 
capacity to resist democratization is greater than those developing states in Latin 
America or Africa. 
 
The bureaucracy in China under the single party control is capable of applying a 
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two-sided strategy of economic growth and repression. Its capacity has been enlarged 
during the Reform years, thus help the regime to stay in power.  As a consequence of 
this strong bureaucracy and state, the only possibility of a democratic transition will 
depend upon the elite and change within the ruling party243.  However, it is very 
unlikely to happen.  
 
The elites, both economic elites and political elites view democratization from below 
as the cause of instability in the society. Especially after 1989, the Party has been 
committed to economic modernization, which is legitimating its rule, and they use it 
as an excuse to resist any pressure from below asking for democracy. Any radical 
democratization will bring social unrest, which in turn may cause economic 
stagnation or even economic depression. The chaos in the former Soviet Union states 
seemed to have proved this to CCP leaders.  
 
As one sceptic states, ‘China is not simply an authoritarian system undergoing 
democratization, but is a Leninist system undergoing both political change (one dare 
not call it democratization) and economic reform.’ 244 
 
2.2.4 Illiberal Democracy 
 
The sceptics are suspicious about the myth of the success of the Asian Model, which 
were regarded by modernization school as bringing both democracy and economic 
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prosperity. It seemed more so after the Financial Crisis which swept over Asian 
developmental states. On the contrary, sceptics found the reason for the Asian 
countries resistance of liberal democracy lies in the power of the culture.  
 
Strong local culture has shaped the nature of politics in East Asia, as some theorists 
have pointed out. Especially for South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, the countries 
with the most homogeneous Confucian traditions, sceptics argue that the quality of 
democracy is of a distinctive order from the Western liberal tradition. Some observers, 
for instance, Daniel A. Bell, Kanishka Jayasuriya245 and so on, asserted that this 
culture cannot support Western liberal democracy, although it may be compatible 
with an illiberal, more authoritarian and communitarian democracy.  
 
Bell et al. argues that it is the persistence of ‘Asian Values’ that has allowed the 
region to resist full liberal democracy, or even democracy at all, in some cases; it is 
developing its own culturally specific form of political model, which is a model 
aiming at economic growth and mixed with some of the principles of democracy and 
authoritarianism. ‘Illiberal democracy246’ is the term they used to label this model.  
 
This term is useful as it captured the two essential elements of East Asian 
democratization. The one is democracy, because a recognizably more democratic 
polity has been established during this process. 247 
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• The political role of the military has receded. 
• The contrived high level of popular support for the dominant party has eroded 
and there is growing recognition of opposition support among the citizenry248.  
• A public sphere of political issues has enlarged, state control over those kind 
of public discourse have been loosed, though not eliminated.  
• A growing business class and its enlarged political role, its strengthened 
bargaining power with the state. The new middle class has partly shifted the 
balance between state elites and capitalist elites.  
 
The other element is illiberal as opposed to liberal. The East Asian democratization 
process has its own distinctive features which can not be found in the western liberal 
tradition, but regarded as related to the local culture – Confucianism. These features 
are summarized as follows249:  
• The concentration of power: power remains in the hands of a few elites, or the 
one top leader.  
• There is little sign in any of the East Asian nations of an active and effective 
parliament, or an independent judiciary. 
• Democratization is not about the empowerment of civil society, but rather 
reflects a renegotiation of the relationship between political elites and 
capital250.  
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• It is based on Confucian-rooted cultural values. As Singaporean Prime 
Minister Lee outlined in official norms, these values are communitarianism, 
familism, decision making by consensus, and social and religious harmony251.  
• This culture is different from western historical democratic experience, which 
evolved positive roles for individual citizens, and an autonomous civic culture 
which honours and sees virtue in social and moral pluralism. However, the 
same historical development cannot be simply repeated again in East Asian; 
while the adoption of some specific institutional of liberal democracy can be 
copied by Eastern Asian states.  
• Incrementalism, gradualism and under control by elites are the features of the 
process. It is because the authoritarian regimes are able to conduct the strategy 
of firstly economic modernization and liberalization, then political openness. 
As earlier experience proved that a more radical liberal democracy is 
associated with failure in performance. The authoritarian regimes then used 
the priority of economic growth as an excuse to put off the political 
democratization. Later, the performance-based legitimacy of political 
authoritarianism allowed the regime to control the pace and limits of 
democratization, without clear-cut regime change. 
 
However, in the Chinese case, there are other political cultures apart from 
Confucianism, which are identified as an antithetical to liberal democratic values, 
pre-Communist political culture and the long-standing Chinese power structures of 
the imperial tradition. (Randall 1997)  
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2.3 Missing Part 
 
After I have discussed the major arguments of these two camps, modernization school 
and sceptics, I find both of them agree on one fact, that is, during these years of 
economic reforms and other series of reforms since 1978, there has been some 
important and intriguing changes within China’s society and state, which has resulted 
in the debates over democracy and democratization as the prospects for China’s 
future. However, there is an important part missing in the debate, which is the 
discourse of democracy within China.  
 
It is thus necessary to engage with the historical aspects of the debate within China. 
The historical discourse is helpful in telling us  
 
• the development of the ideas about democracy in China; 
• why some of the ideas are valued more by Chinese people and Chinese 
intellectuals than other ones; 
• the role of China’s culture and identity in shaping the political discourse.  
 
In the next chapter, I will discuss the discourse of democracy in China from the 
historical perspective in order to understand how democracy has been constructed and 
reconstructed after its introduction to China since the 19th century.  
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 131 
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the views of two opposing groups (the modernizationists and the 
sceptics) have been fully investigated on both sides. The discussions and debates are 
largely focused on the changes took place at the three levels of the state-society 
relations since the initiation of the Reform in the late 1970s.  
 
Firstly, changes at the state level, including the ruling party CCP and the legislature, 
NPC. Modenization theoriest see positive evolution inside CCP and the strengthening 
of the legislature as implications for liberalization which may eventually leads to 
democratization. The sceptics, on the other side, state that the Reform has given more 
resourses to CCP andd thus increased the resilience of the regime to democratic 
transition.  
 
Secondly, changes at the society level. The expansion of media, especially the press, 
is regarded as positive civil society forces by the modernizationists, while the sceptics 
deny the existence of such forces at all.  
 
Last but not least, the democratic practice at the grassroots level is noted by the 
modernizationists as positive institutional progress which may spread to the higher 
levels. The sceptics disagree that this very much limited democratic experiment will 
produce any significant influence upon the authorities in the future.  
 
In the chapters 4, 5 and 6, these three levels will be discussed respectively in more 
details through the application of an incremental model. Modernizationists might be 
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too optimist, and the sceptics might be too pessimistic, while an incrementalist is a 
pessimistic optimist whose job is to explain what is believed to be happening in the 
last three decades in China. Before that can be modelized, how the term of 
‘democracy’ is introduced into China and what historical, social and cultural context 
is involved need to be explored.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
DISCOURSE OF DEMOCRACY IN CHINA 
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3.0 Introduction 
 
So far we have examined the literature on democracy, on democratization, and on 
China democratization; however, all these are from the Western literature. Most of the 
scholars are from the West, who were born in the West and may or may not 
necessarily speak Chinese; some of them are Chinese and indeed speak Chinese, but 
they were either born, or educated, or trained in the West, for instance, the US, UK or 
other European Countries; or if not, they are taking the perspectives which have been 
set up and advanced in Western social and political science. One piece, an important 
piece, is missing from this huge literature; that is, how Chinese people, especially 
Chinese intellectuals, who were born, brought up, receiving education, doing research 
on the same topic and living most of them life time in China, the country which is 
under investigation, perceive democracy and democratization, which concepts were 
originally coming from the West and had been practiced by the Western people for as 
long as 25 centuries252. What perspective do these people take? Do they value 
democracy as the same as in the West? Do they have the same inspiration like those 
in the West to strive on the road to democracy? Although democracy was only 
introduced to China until the 19th Century, it has been influential in Chinese people’s 
national salvation and independence movement. It is then worthwhile to trace the 
historical discourse of democracy and democratization in China; and to examine how 
the conception of democracy is constructed and reconstructed in the Chinese 
academy.  
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In this chapter, a histocial approach is adopted. Three eras are identified, the 
introduction of democracy into China, the intellectual movement during which 
socialist democracy (Maxism) triumphed and eventually became the ideology of CCP, 
the recent debate on democracy in China. The recent debate involves four major 
intellectual groups, the dissidents, the liberal economists, the New Left, and the 
mainstream incrementalist. Amongst them, theorists who share a view that China’s 
democratization should following an incremental model have done some intensive 
work on this subject. Some of their works actually formed the original thoughts of this 
thesis.  
 
3.1 Democracy in China – From a Historical Perspective 
 
The historical discourse of democracy can be divided into three eras, the first one, 
starts from the middle 19th Century and ends right before the beginning of New 
Cultural Movement (1915-1922), it is the introduction of democracy, at that time, the 
liberal democracy was the mainstream democracy; the second era starts with the New 
Cultural Movement and ends after the foundation of PRC, during which the socialist 
democracy replaced liberal democracy and became the ideology of Chinese 
Communist Party, which later became the ruling party of China; the third era starts 
from the Beijing Spring Democratic Movement and till now, it is a very complicated 
process, during which time, there have been various debates and discussions on 
democracy and democratization between different schools of Chinese scholars.  
 
3.1.1 The Introduction of Democracy 
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Democracy was firstly introduced to China in late Qing Dynasty, around the middle 
19th century. Wei Yuan, in his book ‘Hai Guo Tu Zhi’, introduced the political 
systems in the US and Switzerland, the two democracies in the Western world at that 
time; which is the first time that western democratic system was introduced to China. 
Thus Chinese people for the first time, got to know that there was a way of organizing 
government that is different from feudal kingship which has been regarded by 
Confucianism as the only form of legitimate regime in China for thousands of years.   
 
Since the middle 19th century, China has suffered a series of defeats in wars with the 
other countries. As a consequence of the unequal treaties Qing had to sign with the 
victors, China was forced to open its gate and new ideas of democracy, science, 
liberalism, which were originally from the West, were introduced into China. Many 
Chinese people, especially the intellectuals, started to think about the reason why 
China, used to be the great Middle Kingdom, had become so weak and backward 
compared to the Western states. Some of them came to the conclusion that it was the 
feudal autocratic monarchy based on Confucianism that was too incompetent to build 
a strong and united China; it has lost its legitimacy to rule and thus should be replaced 
by a more advanced and legitimate democratic polity. Revolutionaries, led by Sun 
Zhongshan, inspired by this idea, successfully founded a new Republic of China in 
1912 (Xinhai Revolution), which was built upon the principles of national 
independence and democracy.  
 
However, the government of the time was in fact controlled by warlords, and the 
democratic constitution was not carried out. ‘The New Republic…was designed to 
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be democratic, but soon deteriorated into a dictatorship under Yuan Shih-kai.’253 The 
democratization of China was actually a failure. Chinese people were still facing the 
task of national independence and state salvation, especially after Japanese troop 
invaded China later in 1931. Under this circumstance, the New Cultural Movement 
(1915-1922, culminated in the May Fourth Movement in 1919 with students and 
intellectuals protests against the warlord government) marked a turning point in the 
discourse of democratization.  
 
3.1.2 The Revised Mr Democracy 
 
The New Culture Movement (xin wenhua yundong) was inaugurated by the creation 
of Xin Qingnian (the New Youth journal), established in 1915 by Chen Duxiu, one of 
the intellectual leaders of the Movement. In an essay published in January 1919 to 
celebrated the third anniversary of the journal, Chen Duxiu gave democracy and 
science the nicknames ‘Mr Democracy’ (de xiansheng) and ‘Mr Science’ (sai 
xiansheng), and proclaimed that ‘only these two gentlemen can save China from the 
political, moral, academic, and intellectual darkness in which it finds itself’.254 
Democracy thus became a symbol of the May Fourth era.  
 
The influence of the New Culture Movement can be summarized as follows:  
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3.1.2.1 Marxism 
 
After the Chinese people’s hope of building a strong modern China state was 
diminished by the corrupted warlord government, they have to explore a new way of 
saving China. It marked the upsurge of the wave of Chinese nationalism. While the 
Wilson’s Fourteen Points255 were regarded as hypocritical, the intellectuals turned 
away from Western liberal democracy and started to show their enthusiasm for 
Marxism.  
 
After the foundation of the new government, the Beiyang warlords, who were driven 
by their own political interests, dominated in the regime.  Instead of compelling 
away the influence of foreign imperial powers and building a strong and united state, 
they were afraid of losing political power over their territory and started fighting wars 
with one another; for the same reason, they made concessions with foreign imperial 
powers to get monetary and military support.  
 
China took part in the World War I on the side of the Allies in the hope of eliminating 
German power in Shandong Province. However, after the victory, Shandong was 
awarded to Japan by the Versailles Treaty instead of returning to China. Chinese 
people, together with students, intellectuals, started to express their dissatisfaction 
through demonstrations.  
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This May Fourth Movement was regarded as the peak of the New Cultural Movement. 
It took place at a time when major developments in politics, thought and society were 
already under way. Its name is used to cover an era. It is also a turning point for 
intellectual thought about democracy.  
 
Western style liberal democracy gave the reformists and revolutionaries their first 
inspirations during the late Qing and early Republic era. Instances can be found in the 
works of Yan Fu, Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and Tang Sitong256. However, the 
imperial presence in China by some of the most advanced democratic states of the 
time gave rise to the anti-imperialism sentiments. The secret agreements between 
Japan and Great Britain, France and Italy to entitle Japan to remain in Shangdong 
after Germany was expelled were viewed as a betrayal. ‘This flagrant denial of the 
new Wilsonian principles of open diplomacy and self-determination touched off the 
May Fourth incident’257.  
 
Compared with the betrayal of the West, the new Soviet Russian government very 
soon received acclaim among Chinese intellectuals by the declaration of the abolition 
of all Sino-Russian unequal treaties in March 1920. 258  Marxism now drew 
unprecedented attention from Chinese literati and was studied seriously by some 
pioneers.  
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3.1.2.2 ‘Down with Confucianism’ 
 
Chinese intellectuals blamed the cultural heritage of China for its weakness and 
corruption, mainly Confucianism and asked for a re-evaluation of Chinese culture 
institutions. During the two thousand years of feudal society in China, Confucianism 
has maintained its all-important status as the basis of the rule of the dynasts. 
Confucianism, originally established by Confucius and Mencius, is mainly about the 
philosophy of forming a hierarchical state and society, by which people’ s 
relationships are defined. The core element is called ‘Ren’ (benevolence). For 
‘Ren’ , many Confucianists have given it different explanations in different 
dynasties. However, the basic meaning of ‘Ren’, is to love people, as Confucius 
once answered his student Fan Chi259. It requires love for relatives and friends, but 
also to love all the people; sacrifice of one’s own interest to benefit the community; 
unselfishness, ethics and morals. In this way, the society can become a harmonious 
integral entity.  
 
Mencius thought that the emperor was the ‘son of the heaven’, who was authorized 
by the heaven to carry out benevolent governance. He said ‘people are more 
important than monarch’260. If the government fails to provide for the people’s needs 
for adequate food, clothing, shelter, and education, then the people are entitled by the 
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half) 
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heaven to overthrow the reign of the dynasty. The thought of ‘ benevolent 
governance’ and emphasis placed on the people’s interests other than the emperor 
can be taken as the original democratization of thinking in China. It has been argued 
that this ‘the people as fundamental’ thought is similar to John Locke’s social 
contract theory. The government is legitimated by the consent of those governed, 
which gives the powers to the government (John Locke, 1688). The people have the 
right to withdraw their consent which is similar to Mencius’s ‘the people as 
fundamental’. 
 
However, the major purpose of the dynasts to use Confucianism as the legitimate 
ideology is to legitimize their own right to rule. Confucianism requires the obedience 
of people in the lower rank of the hierarchy to the higher ones, especially the loyalty 
and conformity to the emperor himself. Any radical or revolutionary thoughts or 
speeches that are not within the boundary of Confucianism are regarded as dangerous 
and forbidden. Thus, despotism was legitimized and maintained by this system for 
thousands years. During the New Cultural Movement, Confucianism was subject to 
iconoclastic onslaught and was abandoned by participators within the movement.  
 
The New Youth journal was seen as the main arena for this battle against 
Confucianism. ‘After the 1911 Republican Revolution, the newly born democracy 
failed to be consolidated, and was quickly replaced by authoritarian politics, imperial 
restoration, and warlord militarism’261. In witnessing socio-political disorder, the 
                                                 
261
  Edward X. Gu, ‘Who was Mr Democracy? The May Fourth Discourse of 
Populist Democracy and the Radicalization of Chinese Intellectuals (1915-1922)’, 
Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 35, No .3 (Jul., 2001), p.591 
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radical and/or liberal scholars realized that the first task for building a new China was 
to evaluate or even destroy Chinese traditional values.  
 
A wave of ‘down with Confucianism’ started by the serial article published in New 
Youth in 1916 – ‘Appraisal of Confucius’ (Kongzi Pingyi)262 in which author Yi 
Baisha offered an analyse and evaluation of the abuses of the Confucianism. Chen 
Duxiu became one of the pioneers in ‘down with Confucianism’ by writing and 
publishing essays such as ‘Nineteen Sixteen’ (Yijiu Yiliu Nian)263, ‘We Last 
Awareness’ (Wuren Zuihou Zhi Juewu)264, ‘Constitution and Confucianism’ 
(Xianfa Yu Kongjiao)265 and so on. The fiercest attack to Confucianism came from 
Lu Xun, who used the scribbles and novels as weapons to disclose the crime of feudal 
ethics. Wu Yu was regarded by Hu Shi as the old hero in the movement of ‘down 
with Confucianism ’  who was well-known by denouncing feudal ethics as 
‘people-eating’.  
 
Another strike to the old tradition is from the linguistic reform called Baihua 
movement which is to use colloquial language in writing instead of the classical 
Chinese. The intellectual transformation was due to the earlier institutional 
development, the creation of Peking University, as a modern institution of higher 
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 Yi Baisha, ‘Kongzi Pingyi’ (Appraisal of Confucius), Xin Qingnian, Vol. 1, No. 6 
(15.2.1916) and Vol. 2, No. 1, (1.9.1916) 
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 Chen Duxiu, ‘Yijiu Yiliu Nian’ (Nineteen Sixteen), Xin Qingnian, Vol. 1, No. 5, 
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 Chen Duxiu, ‘Wuren Zuihou Zhi Juewu’ (We Last Awareness), Xin Qingnian, 
Vol. 1, No. 6, (15.2.1916) 
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 Chen Duxiu, ‘Xianfa Yu Kongjiao’ (Constitution and Confucianism), Xin 
Qingnian, Vol.2, No.3, (1.11.1916) 
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learning266.  Cai Yuanpei, who became the President of Peking University in 1917, 
started to reform this institution by welcoming ideas from all over the world. Chen 
Duxiu, who was then a professor in Peking University and the founder of New Youth, 
supported Hu Shi in the promotion of Baihua, as ‘an essential tool both for modern 
thinking and for bringing education to the common people’267. Actually, Baihua, as 
written vernacular Chinese, has a long history; but it is only after 1919, it finally took 
the place of mainstream classical Chinese. ‘Madman’s Diary’ (Kuangren Riji)268 
is the first novel written in Baihua by Lu Xun. For the Confucian doctrine, only 
intellectuals can learn and communicate with written classical Chinese; however, the 
esoteric language was soon abandoned by the participators of the New Cultural 
Movement. Later, the authority had to admit the use of Baihua in Schools.   
 
3.1.2.3 Radicalization of the Intellectuals 
 
During the intellectual transformation of the early 20th Century, Chinese literati 
became more radicalized; some of them are not just asking for the abandonment of 
Chinese traditional values, also asking for a total westernization of China state and 
society. In the May Fourth discourse of democracy, firstly there was a trend from 
democracy to populism, then from populistic democracy to the dictatorship of 
workers and peasants, in a word, as one theorist pointed out, eventually some May 
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 Lu Xun, Kuangren Riji (Madman’s Diary), Xin Qingnian, Vol,4, No, 5, 
(15.5.1918) 
 144 
 
 
Fourth radicals became converted to the revolutionary Marxism-Leninism269.  
 
Gu in his essay about May Fourth discourse of populist democracy and the 
radicalization of Chinese intellectuals, advanced a different approach as compared 
with other scholars who have produced a liberal image of the May Fourth notion of 
democracy270. Gu, on the contrary, asserted that the understanding of democracy by 
the May Fourth intellectuals was rather different from liberal democracy.  
 
The discourse can be summarized in the following four phases271:  
 
•  In the first place, the sponsors of the New Cultural movement, such as Chen 
Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Hushi and so on, were intended to launch a cultural 
revolution in amongst the intelligentsia.  
 
This means that from the beginning, these intellectuals were not interested in 
gradualist or incremental reforms; they felt it urgent for them to rescue China from 
collapse. That’s why compared with their intellectual forerunners, New Culture 
intellectuals were more radical.  
 
• These intelligent young men, inspired by patriotism, believing that the only 
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  Edward X. Gu, ‘Who was Mr Democracy? The May Fourth Discourse of 
Populist Democracy and the Radicalization of Chinese Intellectuals (1915-1922)’, 
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way to build a new powerful China state was to import new ideas and thought 
from the West. Therefore, they started to introduce a large number of Western 
doctrines which they considered necessary.  
 
Especially those which reinforced the cultural criticism (to animadvert traditions); and 
nation-building, (to rescue China and rebuild a strong state); are favoured by the 
authors. For instance, Darwinism, utilitarianism and pragmatism of William James 
and John Dewey, (through the work of Hu Shi)272, experimentalism, Nietzscheanism, 
(associated with Lu Xun)273 and so on. They were also advocates for democracy, 
science, literary revolution, individual freedom, human rights and the emancipation of 
women and the youth.  
 
•  From early 1919 onward, many journals and magazines started to propagate 
the idea of democracy as the so-called new tides of the world. However, Gu 
asserted that their perception of democracy was anything but liberal.  
 
The three predominant representatives of the New Culture Movement, Chen Duxiu, 
Gao Yihan, and Li Dazhao, regarded democracy as Rousseausian democracy. There 
was a trend from democracy to populism. Chen Duxiu, in one essay published in the 
New Youth, stated that ‘the democratic state is the genuine state, in which the state is 
the public property for all the citizens, people are masters of the country, and the 
                                                                                                                                            
of Populist Democracy and the Radicalization of Chinese Intellectuals (1915-1922)’, 
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rulers are servants of the people’. 274Gao Yihan introduced Western theories of social 
contract by comparing Rousseau’s theory with Hobbes’s and Locke’s, according to 
whom, state sovereignty and the people’s sovereignty were integrated as one, the 
government is no more than a servant for the public to impose the sovereignty of the 
state-that is , popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty can be carried out by people to 
substitute the government which fails to do so. Li Dazhao, also mentioned in his 
article that the state is built upon the principle of Rousseau’s theory, ‘once social 
contract is reached, the land becomes the territory, and the people become the citizens 
of the country…It is the state.275’  
 
Furthermore, later the Rousseauian perception of democracy, in particular the popular 
sovereignty was radicalized to the extreme of populistic democracy. Gu found that the 
translation of ‘democracy’ into Chinese gradually changed. It was rendered as 
‘pingmin zhuyi’ and ‘shumin zhuyi’ in the New Culture era; both mean the 
principles of the common people. And the usage of these terms actually encouraged 
intellectuals to understand ‘people’ as ‘the lower classes’, that is, the poor, the 
labouring class, the working class, workers, peasants and so on, as Gu noticed.  
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  Chen Duxiu, ‘Jinri hi jiaoyu fangzhen’ (Today’s guiding principles for 
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Especially during the May Fourth Movement, when workers started strike and shops 
were closed by business owners in Shanghai as supports and echoes of Students’ 
demonstration and struggle in Beijing. Because of the scale and influence of 
Shanghai’s strikes, the movement spread to over 100 cities in 22 provinces of China. 
Chinese intellectuals who took part in this movement have seen the power of the 
masses, particularly the lower classes that played the main role in the movement.  
 
• Under these circumstances, Marxism started to attract more and more attention 
from the May Fourth radicals. Particularly after the Russian Revolution, in 
which Marxism played as ideology and was successfully implemented, New 
Culture intellectual started to regard Marxism as the one and only effective 
strategy of class revolution through which their ideals of Chinese 
modernization could be realized.  
 
Actually, after the start of the New Culture, many intellectuals, apart from the 
conservative ones, showed their interests in various versions of socialism. Chen 
Duxiu regarded socialism, Darwinism and the doctrine of human rights as the 
so-called new tides. He, together with Li Dazhao announced their conversion to 
Marxism and turned New Youth into a vehicle for the new Chinese communist 
movement in 1920276. In July 1920, New Youth introduced a special column called 
‘The Study of Russia’, in which many translations introducing and praising the 
achievement of the Soviet Union were published. The common people as in the 
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rendering Chinese ‘pinmin zhuyi’ for democracy, were increasingly identified with 
the workers and peasants in the trend of intellectual enthusiasm from seeking 
populistic democracy to explore the concept of the dictatorship of workers and 
peasants.  
 
3.1.2.4 Birth of CCP 
 
The radicalization of the intellectuals in the New Culture Movement brought the 
Chinese communist movement which resulted in a drastic change in society that 
fuelled the birth of the Communist Party of China.  
 
Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, the representatives of the Movement, were among the 
leading founders of the 1921 Chinese Communist Party. Mao Zedong, the future 
Party leader, was inspired by May Fourth thoughts and ideas became a communist. 
For the CCP, May Fourth Movement promoted the spreading of Marxism in China, 
which aroused the people’s consciousness and preparded for the unity of the 
revolutionary forces.  
 
To conclude, it is the unique historical discourse in China that has turned Chinese 
people, especially Chinese intellectuals away from the liberal ideas of democray, into 
embracing the more radical doctrine of Marxism. Several factors are essential in this 
process: firstly, the threat China was facing at the time – the reality of a fragmented 
and weak state, authoritarian corrupted government after the Republican Revolution, 
the foreign imperial presence on China’s territory – all urged intelletuals to find a 
solution to save the nation and the Chinese race, especially after the humiliation in the 
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international society in 1919, intellectuals became more radical; secondly, they have 
abandoned the old ideology and perceived democracy in a radical way, which 
explains why they were highly interested in the model of populist democracy; Last 
but not least, the success of Marxism in Russia showed a concrete scheme that is 
more practical than other abstract theories.  
 
3.2 Recent Democracy Thoughts and Debates 
 
After the Second World War and the Civil War, the Nationalist Party retreated to the 
island of Taiwan, and the CCP founded a socialist state based on Marxism-Leninism 
in 1949. The party-state, with Mao Zedong as the supreme leader, was in nature a 
totalitarian regime277. The features of totalitarian state can be summarized as278: 
totalitarian regime is characterized by the absence of any social, economic or political 
pluralism, by an elaborate and guiding messianic ideology, continuing extensive and 
intensive popular mobilization, and a leadership which rules (often charismatically) 
within undefined limits and with great unpredictability for both members of the 
regime and ordinary citizens. (This is viewed as an ideal type, and therefore never 
realized in its ideal form.) Between the period of 1949 to 1976 (when Mao Zedong 
died), the belief of Chinese people in the ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism was 
deeply rooted during numerous political mobilizations and mass movements initiated 
by Mao and CCP. However, the monopoly of the ideology became less unshakable 
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  Here, no difference is made between the Party regime and the Party-state in this 
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   This is discussed in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic 
Transition ad Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist 
Europe, 1996, Chapter 3, and is well summarized on pp.44-45; cited in Graeme Gill, 
The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process, 
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after the death of Mao and the Reform programme pushed forward by Deng Xiaoping.  
 
After the disastrous Cultural Revolution (started in 1966 by Mao and ended with his 
death in 1976), the new top leader of the so-called second generation, Deng together 
with other leaders in CCP found it urgent for a reform in the laggard planned 
economy system. The reform was mainly in the economic domain, which includes 
introduction of market economy and opening up to the outside world in order to 
attract new technology and foreign investment. The series of reform programme 
started in 1978, since when, new ideas and thoughts came to China along with the 
opening up policy. The information from the outside world and communications with 
the international society give Chinese intellectuals new inspirations since the New 
Culture Movement earlier in the century; the reform changed the old state-society 
relations, people have more civil liberty than before, which caused some scholars to 
rethink and redefine the China state-society relation. Also, after years of economic 
reforms focusing on development and modernization without political 
democratization, many problems such as corruption, inequality and environmental 
degradation triggered a debate within the literati on the prospects of democratization 
as a solution to China’s crisis. Generally speaking, after 1976, especially after the 
start of the Reform, there have been four groups of intellectuals taking part in this 
debate according to their positions279: the dissidents;  the liberal economists; the 
New Left (or the Conservatives); and the mainstream incrementalists.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
2000, p.73-4 
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  It is noticeable that the majority of these intellectuals are experts in economics. 
Because their start point of the research is to find solutions to the problems come 
along with economic reform, political democratization is one possible solution which 
is taken into consideration as a request for economic development.  
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3.2.1 Dissidents 
 
The dissidents are a loose group which consists of the leaders of Chinese Democracy 
Movement (Wei Jingsheng as one of the representatives) and some liberal journalists 
(He Qinglian 280 ). Generally speaking, these people are against the current 
authoritarian regime of CCP. To solve the problems confronting China today is and 
has always been democracy, which is juxtaposed by Wei Jingsheng as the fifth 
modernization with the four modernizations of industry, agriculture, national defence 
and science and technology.   
 
There have been three mini democratization waves taking place in China since the 
end of the Cultural Revolution:  
 
• Beijing Spring liberalization movement which was considered to be inspired by 
the manifesto Fifth Modernization by Wei Jingsheng in 1978. 
 
Andrew Nathan’s book ‘Chinese Democracy’  (1985) was devoted to this 
movement which has another name as the Democracy Wall. The wall refers to the one 
in Xidan of Beijing. At first, people put up big-character posters (Da Zi Bao) on the 
wall asking for rehabilitation and compensation for the wrong verdicts and injustice 
they suffered during the Cultural Revolution. However, later criticism towards Mao 
and the politics appeared; radicals even asked for democracy, human rights, rule of 
                                                 
280
 She became well-known for disclosing the corruption of government officials and 
cadres of state-own enterprises, and she attributed the root of corruption to the 
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law and the liberty of speech. Some people started to publish non-official journals, 
and by doing so, the dissidents’ voice and activities became more organized. 
‘Beijing Spring’ was one of the most influential journals at the time, (as the 
‘Prague Spring’ of 1968), which was used to name the movement, showing 
people’s demands for democracy and liberty after the ten years of chaos brought by 
the disastrous Cultural Revolution281.  
 
The rise and fall of this movement was regarded as interconnected with the power 
struggle at the top level between Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng after the death of 
Mao282. Hua Guofeng, as the successor pointed by Mao himself, tried to legitimize his 
status as the central leader by showing adherence and loyalty to Mao’s doctrines. 
‘The Two Whatevers’283, the invention of his was criticized in the discussion of 
‘the criterion of truth’ initiated by Deng and his subordinate Hu Yaobang.  Hu in 
his article published at major party newspapers, Luminosity Daily, People’s Daily 
and Liberation Army Daily, asserted that ‘the practice is the sole criterion of truth’ 
as opposed to Hua’s ‘whatever Mao decides we should vindicate; whatever Mao 
instructs we should follow’284. The Democracy Wall Movement, as the voice from 
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 Hu Yaobang, ‘Shijian shi Jianyan Zhenli de Weiyi Biaozhun’ (The Practice is the 
Sole Criterion of Truth) was firstly published on Luminosity Daily on 11th, May, 1978, 
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the masses, was seen as undermining Hua’s doctrines while supporting Deng’s. By 
1980, Hua had to resign as chairman both for Party Centre and Central Military 
Committee. Deng won the battle and soon he realised that this mass democratic 
movement was out of boundary and decided to take action to cease it. That’s why he 
threw out the ‘Fourth Cardinal Principles285’ as the borderline for discussion.  
 
On 5th of December, 1978, a big-character poster by Wei Jingsheng – ‘The Fifth 
Modernization – Democracy and so on’ at the first time put forward the request for 
Chinese democratization. In March 1979, the authority started to suppress the 
Democracy Wall. Deng in his speech on the 16th expressed his concerned that the 
Democracy Wall went too far. On the29th, March, 1979, Bejing government 
announced prohibition to big-character posters and publication that was ‘hostile to 
socialism, leadership of CCP, Proletariat Dictatorship and 
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism’286. Wei Jingsheng, the founder of ‘Exploration’ 
journal was arrested together with other dissidents and activists. Until 1981, the 
movement was totally suppressed by the authority.  
 
• Students’ movements during 1986 where subject to a crackdown by CCP under 
the name of ‘anti-bourgeoisie liberalization’ and the power struggle amongst the 
top leaders resulted in Hu Yangbang’s resignation as Party Secretary. The 1986 
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student movement was regarded as the forerunner of the 1989 demonstration. 
 
The students’ movement of 1986 expressed the request from students for political 
reforms of CCP.  Students in universities and colleges, inspired by articles on 
democracy published in journals such as ‘Beijing Spring’ in Beijing and ‘World 
Economics Guide’ in Shanghai, asked for democratization, human rights and liberty. 
Some radicals started to criticise the CCP for its despotism and dictatorship. A 
number of demonstrations took place in Beijing organized by university students. One 
of the representatives was Fang Lizhi, at the time the vice president of Chinese 
Science and Technology University, who famously brought forward the importance of 
respects for ‘democracy, liberty and human’. This astrophysicist praised students’ 
democratic consciousness when he gave speeches in a number of universities.  
 
However, at the time, although Hu Yaobang was the nominal Party Secretary (the 
highest position in CCP), Deng Xiaoping together with other elders such as Chen Yun, 
still held the power to intervene and overrule the Party. Hu showed his sympathy to 
the student movement and was not taking immediate action; which was regarded by 
Deng as conspiracy to mobilize masses to undermine the elders’ power. (As Deng 
and Hu made use of the Democracy Wall to against Hua.) Deng removed Hu from 
power in 1987, and crackdown on the movement. Fang was dismissed from his office; 
and he, together with Wang Ruowang, Liu Binyan, was expelled from the Party in the 
name of ‘bourgeoisie liberalization’. 
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• The 1989 student demonstration which started by the death of Hu, and ended by 
military intervention. This movement resulted in strong international response, the 
date when Tiananmen incidents happened was used to name the whole movement, 
June Fourth. (Like the May Fourth is abbreviation for the New Cultural 
Movement)  
 
June Fourth Movement was inspired by May Fourth Movement which took place 
seventy years ago when students played a major role in seeking a democratic and 
prosperous prospect for China. After the 1986 student movement, some student 
activities, such as discussions and posters, although banned, have remained in some 
universities of Beijing. Fang Lizhi, one of the representatives of 1986, wrote to Deng 
in January, 1989, asking for amnesty for Wei Jingsheng and other political prisoners 
and political reforms. His letter was supported by other intellectuals. The sudden 
death of Hu trigged a series of activities of mourning and protesting. Students of 
universities in Beijing started to parade and demonstrate in public. They established 
autonomous student organizations and united as one union: Beigaolian (Beijing 
College Students Union). Students gave speeches in public on democracy, democratic 
movement in East European, Gorbachev’ s political reform in Soviet Union, 
expressed their protest to profiteering by bureaucrats and official corruption and their 
passion of striving for democracy and liberty. 
 
On 26th of April, in terms of Deng’s opinion, People’s Daily published an editorial 
‘We must clearly and unequivocally be opposed to convulsions’ (Bixu Qizhi 
Xianming de Fandui Dongluan) which is referred to as April Twenty-sixth Editorial 
afterwards. In this editorial, the student movement was defined as unrest manipulated 
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by a few with ulterior motives. It asked for the whole party and all people to realized 
this and unite together against it.  
 
In response to the editorial, about 50,000 students paraded on the next day. Later, the 
student movement became radicalized, which resulted in a hunger strike by hundreds 
in Tiananmen Square as their request for a conversation with the authority was put off 
by the government. They added appeals for renouncement of the April Twenty-sixth 
Editorial and re-name the student movement as patriotic. During this time, not only 
students, but the ordinary citizens, workers and medical personnel in Beijing, started 
to support students voluntarily. Students in Shanghai and other big cities also 
expressed their supports although not as the same scale as that of Beijing. The 
authority’s reaction was the enforcement of martial law on 20th of May. On the 4th of 
June, military troops drove into Tiananmen, and students were forced to leave. The 
demonstration ended in bloodshed.  
 
The Party Secretary, Zhao Ziyang, another sympathizer of students, tried to solve the 
confrontation between students and the Party by persuasion. However, he was 
dismissed by Deng and other elders in May 1989, and was placed under house arrest 
till the end of his life. Student leaders were either arrested and later released and left 
China, such as Wang Dan; or fled overseas and continue with the democratic 
movement, such as Feng Congde, Wang Chaohua.  
 
The influence of these three waves of mini-democratization led by dissidents is 
significant in the following aspects:  
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Firstly, the background of these movements is connected with the international 
influence of democratization waves. Especially in the second and last student 
movement, the democratization process taking place in East Europe and Soviet Union 
encouraged China’s youth to seek for China’s its own path to democracy. During the 
June Fourth Movement, Gorbachev came to visit China and talked with student 
activists. The political reform he led under the same socialist system provided a 
possible model for China’s reform.  
 
Students and dissidents, unlike their forerunners of the May Fourth who were 
desperate to find a way out to rescue the whole nation, they are more rational in terms 
of choosing and thinking about the prospect of a democratic China. Perhaps the only 
merit of the numerous mass mobilization launched by Mao is educating a population 
with political sensibility and awareness. Because of the acquaintance with both 
Chinese state-society and the Western democratic system, the dissidents’ criticism 
towards authoritarianism can be very sharp and to the point.  
 
Some theorists have discussed the effect of civil society in these movements. They 
cited that the establishment of civil organizations such as student guilds (the most 
famous, Beigaolian), labour unions, and the role of press media. The non-official 
publications during the Democracy Wall Movements received little supports from 
official media. However, during the June Fourth, journals and newspapers reported 
the news on student demonstration despite the ban from government. For instance, 
‘Science and Technology Daily’ (Keji Ribao)287 published a front page report on 
                                                 
287On the 23rd of April, 1989, Keji Ribao (Science and Technology Daily) published a 
front page report on student parade and on the 4th page as well. 
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the student’s parade. In Shanghai, 300,000 copies of World Economics Guild’s issue 
of 25th April were subjected to confiscation by Shanghai Party Committee, because it 
contained criticism towards Hu Yaobang’s dismissal by the Party Centre and showed 
sympathy to students. Party Secretary of Shanghai, Jiang Zemin asked the 
editor-in-chief, Qin Benli to replace it, which was resisted by Qin; eventually the 
original content was eliminated but left vacant when published.  
 
While for the sceptics, they blame the underdevelopment of civil society forces for the 
failure of these movements. Instead of praising the activism of civil society, they 
concluded that the organizations formed during the movements were very few and 
weak compared to the large number of official organizations. China’s unbalanced 
development explains why such organized activities only took place in large urban 
cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. China’s economy has just started to boom during 
the late 70s and 80s, middle class as the main force of a mature civil society has not 
grown to a considerable size.  
 
Third, the strong international response from other countries put pressures upon the 
CCP leaders to continue liberalization instead of coercion. Right after the June Fourth 
Incidence, the US, UK, EU and a large number of democratic states express their 
condemnation towards this human rights abuse and in terms of which, loans to China 
were suspended; visits and meetings were cancelled or put off; weapon exportation to 
China was prohibited. Domestically, the CCP regime tendsto be more conservative 
and many reform programmes were replaced by conservative plans. China’s national 
economic growth slowed down due to both international and domestic factors.  
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Deng, as the supreme leader, was determined to push forward the reforms as 
originally designed by him. In 1992, his Nanxun speech was announced which 
expressed his determination288. In the same year, the growth of GDP peaked 12.8% 
and since then the rate has always been far higher than the average growth rate. 
Meanwhile, the loosening of ideological control during the liberalization, actually 
gave people more liberty than that of the 1989.  
 
Although the dissidents led three major democratization waves in contemporary 
China, the limited scale and influence of these movements have not resulted in 
fundamental social or political changes in China’s state and society relations. 
Especially after 1989, many student leaders and dissident intellectuals fled overseas 
for safety. Their voices can hardly be heard by ordinary Chinese. However, for the 
present, they may not be a powerful group who will play an important role in China’s 
transition; they represent the most radical and democratic ideas and thoughts of the 
Chinese. 
 
3.2.2 Liberal Economists 
 
The liberal economists form the second group of scholars within the debate. To put 
economists in the political debate is because they actually are playing a role in the 
debate. Some of these economists are often invited by the government to attend 
                                                 
288
 In 1992, Deng Xiaoping visited Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shanghai and other cities in 
the southern part of China, he gave a series of speeches which were called ‘Nanxun 
Speech’ (South Tour Speech), the main point of these speeches is to reemphasize the 
importance of continuing the Reform. 
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meetings for making national or local economic policy. The Leninism political system 
is incompatible with liberal economy; therefore, these liberal economists’ ideas and 
thoughts towards a liberal economic system will inevitably have its influence in 
political system when designing relevant policies.   
 
The representatives of these economists are Mao Yushi, Zhang Shuguang, Sheng 
Hong, Tang Shouning and so on. Mao Yushi together with the others founded the 
Unirule Institute of Economics in Beijing, aiming for high quality research in 
economic theory and cutting-edge social-economic problems. What they have realized 
is that the market system cannot work properly with CCP’s one party rule. Sooner or 
later, economic stagnation will appear. Based on liberalism, they ask for the 
protection of private property and political reforms towards democratization.  
 
3.2.3 New Left 
 
The New Left, or Conservatives are a group of economists whose ideas and thoughts 
are closer to social democracy other than Marxism-Leninism289 as opposed to the 
liberals. One of the representatives is Hu Angang who works in the National 
Conditional Research Centre of Qinghua University. The others include Cui Zhiyuan, 
Wang Hui, Lang Xianping and so on.  
 
                                                 
289
  See, for example, Zheng, Yongnian talked about the New Left in his book, 
Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity and International 
Relations, 1999; C.H.Kwan ’ s article, ‘ Zhongguo Jingji Xuejia Shili 
Fenbutu-Chaoyue Geige yu Baoshou de Kuangkuang’, (Distribution of forces of 
Chinese Economists-Go beyond the Frame of Reformer and Conservative), (13th, Dec, 
2002) who is a consulting fellow in RIETI (Research Institute of Economy, Trade and 
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These people concerns are social equality and justice. Hu Angang thinks that the 
market system has its own limitation which creates the need for state ’ s 
administration290. Efficiency and equity are both important in the making of social 
policies. They also emphasize the uniqueness of Asian values and culture, thus liberal 
democracy which originated from the West is not so relevant to the development of 
China. They also ask for solutions towards the environmental pollution brought by 
economic development. The works and reports by Professor Hu Angang have 
provided reference to the decision makers in the Party Centre and the State Council291. 
Although the ideas of the New Left were theoretically against the market economy 
strategy launched by the CCP, they are not treated as dissidents but can have their 
own voice inside the system. The New Left also differs from the dissidents in the way 
that they seek to negotiate with the authority by providing consultation and advices 
other than trying to overthrow the whole regime through radical democratization 
movement.  
 
3.2.4 Mainstream Incrementalists 
 
The fourth group is the largest of all in the debate. Therefore, they are called 
mainstream incrementalists. In the economic domain, they think that China should 
take gradual steps towards a totally market economy. Based on this, they advanced 
models such as Incremental Democracy, gradual democratization.  
                                                                                                                                            
Industry), accessible by http://www.rieti.go.jp/users/kan-si-yu/cn/c021213.html  
290
 See, for example, Hu Angang, Shencun yu Fazhan, (Survival and Development) 
1988, in this book, he identified a unique path to modernization of China as 
distinctive to that of the West. This book was read by members of the Politburo.  
291
 In 2000, Hu was appointed as the Director of the Centre for China Study, its 
publication, ‘China Report’ provides references to cadres of the provincial level 
exclusively.  
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Their ideas about an incremental model of democratization are based upon the 
critique towards that of the dissidents. Firstly, the radical model of political 
democratization before the establishment of a market economy and growth of a 
considerable middle class is not realistic which has been proved by the failure of the 
previous democratization movements. Secondly, radical political reforms as 
implemented in the former Soviet Union have resulted in economic stagnation and 
chaos and unrest in the society which proved to be a not so perfect model. Thirdly, the 
Asian models of economic development and gradual democratic transition are 
regarded as successful precedents. Their polity is a mixture with authoritarian and 
democracy, which is determined by the Confucian traditions and history. China shares 
these features with them therefore China should be taking the same path towards 
democratization. Last but not least, the only way to a democratic transition which the 
CCP and the elites would possibly agree on is this incremental model. Incremental 
means slow but progressively in this term; however, a few years of stagnation before 
a threshold is understandable and a sudden advancement towards democracy can also 
be expected after years of steady progress. The CCP has been taking the economic 
liberalization and started to implement democracy in grassroots such as the villages. 
Under the incrementalism, the process seems under control of the elites, they still 
possess the power to cease or intervene, therefore, they will not feel too threatened to 
tough it out.  
 
This group consists of Chinese scholars and China specialists both inside and outside 
the system; they can be economists or political theorists. The thoughts of some 
domestic scholars can be influential as the authority often consulted them for advices.  
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Some of the representatives are:  
 
Yu Keping and his incremental democracy conception. Yu, Deputy Director of the 
Bureau of Translate and Edit of CCP Central Committee (hereafter abbreviated as 
BTE), asserts that a stable economy is the base of democracy. The political reforms 
should be implemented gradually and steadily. Inner-party democracy and grassroots 
democracy are the present forms of Chinese democracy. Democracy should be built 
upon the base of legalization and institutionalization. The rule of law and democracy 
are the two sides of the same coin. He has spent years in research of Chinese civil 
society as the model of Chinese democracy. Democracy when implemented in 
different societies may take distinctive forms, and China will have its own way. His 
works include:  Ideological Innovation and Incremental Democracy in China 
(Zhongguo de Yishixingtai Chuanxin he Zengliang Minzhu de Fazhan) (2007); The 
Rise of Chinese Civil Society and Its Implications for Governance (Zhongguo 
Gongmin Shehui de Xingqi Jiqi dui Zhili de Yiyi) (2006); Chinese Civil Society: 
Concepts, Categories and Institutional Environment (Zhongguo Gongmin Shehui: 
Gainian, Fenlei yu Zhidu Huanjing) (2006); and so on.  
 
He Zengke, Deputy Director of the Research Centre of Comparative Politics and 
Economics in BTE, also is an expert in incremental political reforms and democratic 
transition. He termed it in progressive political reforms in his essay, ‘Progressive 
Political Reforms and Democratic Transition’ (Jianjin Zhengzhi Gaige yu Minzhu de 
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Zhuanxing)292; in which he compared China’s political reform with economic reform 
and concluded that political reform is following the same progressive pattern. China is 
in the middle of the transition from totalitarianism to authoritarian and eventually 
towards a democratic polity. Therefore, his research is mainly focused on the features 
of the reform politics, which includes guidelines, approaches, dynamic mechanism, 
historical discourse and the development prospects.   
 
Shao Daosheng, a researcher in Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and another 
advocate for incremental democracy. For instance, he talks about ‘Internet-style 
democracy’  in his article ‘ Internet-style Democracy: An Important Part of 
Incremental Democracy’ (Hulianwang Shi de Minzhu: Shehui Minzhu Jianjin Shi 
Gaige de Zhongyao Yihuan), published in the 6th issue of China Information Industry 
(Zhongguo Xinxi Jie) in 2004293.  
 
Chen Sixi, in the article ‘Incremental Reform of Electoral Institution in China’, 
(Zhongguo Xuanju de Jianjinxing Gaige)294 , talks about the implementation of 
incremental model in the electoral institutions. Liu Yawei has also done researches 
into the competitive elections carried out in county and village levels, in which he 
examined the incremental democratic model at grassroots. His thoughts can be found 
in ‘Incremental-style Democracy – Direct Elections in China’s counties and 
                                                 
292
  He Zengke, ‘Progressive Political Reforms and Democratic Transition’ (Jianjin 
Zhengzhi Gaige yu Minzhu de Zhuanxing), Beijing Administrative College Journal 
(Beijing Xingzheng Xueyuan Xuebao), 2004, 3rd and 4th issues.  
293
 Shao Dansheng,‘Internet-style Democracy: An Important Part of Incremental 
Democracy’ (Hulianwang Shi de Minzhu: Shehui Minzhu Jianjin Shi Gaige de 
Zhongyao Yihuan), China Information Industry (Zhongguo Xinxi Jie), issue 6, 2004 
294
  Chen Sixi, ‘Incremental Reform of Electoral Institution in China’ (Zhongguo 
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villages’ (Jianjinshi Minzhu – Zhongguo Xianxiang de Zhijie Xuanju)295. Ji Weidong, 
talks about the dynamics of incremental reforms in his article, ‘New Dynamics of 
Incremental Reforms – From Breaking up the Whole into Parts to Combining Parts 
into Whole ’  (Jianjin Gaige de Xindongli – cong Huazhengweiling dao 
Helingweizheng)296.  
 
There are also some economists such as Wu Jinlian, Fan Gang, Lin Yifu and so on 
who are not so interested in political reforms, they are advocates for Asian 
authoritarian style developmental path. They are influential experts who have been 
taking part in the establishment of the CCP’s economic developmental strategy.  
 
However, so far one of the most comprehensive researches on incremental model 
would be the work that has been done by Tang Liang whose major contribution is 
embodied in the book, Incremental Democracy: Chinese Politics in Transition 
(Jianjin Minzhu: Biange Zhong de Zhongguo Zhengzhi). His main ideas can be 
summarized in the following paragraphs297:  
 
The complex and changing nature of Chinese politics required the academic 
researchers to rethink about the dualism verdicts of democracy and autarchy. Against 
                                                                                                                                            
Xuanju de Jianjinxing Gaige), Social Sciences in China, (2004: 01).  
295
  Liu Yawei, ‘Incremental-style Democracy – Direct Elections in China’s 
counties and villages’ (Jianjinshi Minzhu – Zhongguo Xianxiang de Zhijie Xuanju), 
www.Yannan.cn, http://www.yannan.cn/data/detail.php?id=2975  
296
  Ji Weidong, ‘New Dynamics of Incremental Reforms – From Breaking up the 
Whole into Parts to Combining Parts into Whole’ (Jianjin Gaige de Xindongli – cong 
Huazhengweiling dao Helingweizheng), Twenty-first Century (online edition), Sep, 
2002, Issue No. 6.  
297
  Based on Tang Liang, Jianjin, Minzhu: Biange Zhong De Zhongguo Zhengzhi 
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the yardstick of a liberal democratic model, Chinese regime falls into the category of 
autarchy. However, we are exploring a polity under transformation. The CCP rejects 
any political radicalism which could bring social unrest and thus threatens the regime, 
yet allows gradual reforms in the institutions which slowly create spaces for liberty 
and rights.  
 
There have been some initial achievements under CCP’s political reforms. Chinese 
regime is now much closer towards the direction of comprehensive democratization 
as compared to the situation before the Reform; although the fundamental 
breakthrough has not happened, one can find quantitative and qualitative changes in 
various areas of state and society relations. The crackdown towards dissidents occurs 
less frequently, and it never diverts Chinese reforms from the liberalization direction 
(for instance, after the 1989 crackdown, the economy quickly recovered during the 
early 90s). Compared to the poor record in political and civil rights, economic human 
rights have been improved significantly in terms of subsistence and development.  
 
Tang offered an analysis into the existing political system and undergoing political 
reforms in order to evaluate the possibility of turning the initial achievements into 
full-scale democratization. Thus he examined the main dynamics of this political 
transition.  
 
• The first dynamic is the interaction between economics and politics. 
298
 
                                                                                                                                            
(Incremental Democracy: Chinese Politics in transition), 2004, Chinese version 
298
 Based on Tang Liang, Jianjin, Minzhu: Biange Zhong De Zhongguo Zhengzhi 
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Tang asserts that politics and economics, ideology and policy, state and society are 
connected and interacted. When Deng Xiaoping launched the reform and open-up 
policy decades ago, his initial intention was to realize the modernization of Chinese 
national economy. However, the further transformation in the economic domain and 
the improved efficiency require the corresponding institutionalization in governance 
and bureaucracy. Furthermore, the information from outside China increasingly flows 
into this once conservative state; along with the fundamental changes taking root in 
the state-society relations; and demands from grassroots asking for reforms; all 
resulted in the inconsistency between economic reforms and political reforms.  
 
Tang discovered that in the reform era, there is a sequence that economic reforms 
always come before political reforms. The rapid economic reforms demand changes 
to the old inefficient bureaucracy and new laws and policies to guide economic 
activities. Once the political reform is initiated in terms of these demands, it can 
actually push economic liberalization to a deeper and more comprehensive stage.  
 
What we can discover from the track of China’s reforms is, as Tang pointed out, the 
interaction between economic and political reforms. Once freed economics ask for 
changes in politics, and the changes in politics in turn would set free more 
productivity from the once planned economy. To understand this discourse, one needs 
to extensively probe into Chinese domestic politics and economics. For instance, 
Chinese government encourages the development of private enterprises and 
corporations with foreign investment while in the mean time, carries out the 
                                                                                                                                            
(Incremental Democracy: Chinese Politics in transition), 2004, Chinese version 
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privatisation of state-owned companies. The privatisation of large state firms, creative 
innovation of the socialism orthodoxy, helps to create economic independency of a 
large number of people who were employed by the firms, thus they were released 
from the dependency upon the state which in turn, as Tang asserts, positively 
influences the political awakening of Chinese people.  
 
• The second one is the impact of globalization. 299 
 
Tang finds out that although the original intention of the opening-up policy is to bring 
in foreign investment and advanced technologies, once this process expands, ideas, 
norms and thoughts that are from the Western liberal world were also received by 
Chinese which started to challenge the existing ideas, values and cultures. This in turn 
has changed Chinese people’s old ideology and way of living.  
 
China’s international status as a rising power has been strengthened by these years of 
fast economic development. As China becomes more and more involved in the global 
economy, (especially after the accession to WTO), and China’s active participation in 
other affairs of the international community, such as becoming the 2008 Olympic host 
country; more concerns and requests have been frequently expressed by the 
international community: if China wants to play a significant figure in the world 
politics, it should act like one, for instance, show respects for international norms 
such as human rights. Meanwhile, Chinese leaders, keen to build an image of an open, 
benign, responsible power, also are willing to socialize in the international community 
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 Based on Tang Liang, Jianjin, Minzhu: Biange Zhong De Zhongguo Zhengzhi 
(Incremental Democracy: Chinese Politics in transition), 2004, Chinese version 
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through introduction of international standards into domestic and foreign policy 
making processes. Under most situations, although the first intention was not political 
but mainly economical, the result turned out to be political as well. For instance, 
China’s main aim is to gain the benefit of free-trade when it accessed into the WTO, 
however, later on they found that domestic laws and regulations have to be amended 
to make sure that they catch up with the international trading rules. 
 
Tang further discovered that China’s closer relationship with other states, especially 
western democratic states has led to greater pressures from the international context 
upon domestic policy making. Western states’ condemnation of China’s human 
rights profile was always confronted by Chinese government on the ground of 
non-intervention upon domestic issues; however, the statement of the government 
changed in a subtle way. The government becomes more willing to engage in 
‘human rights talks’ with western states or international human rights regimes on 
an equal basis.  In addition, the government would make some political gestures 
such as releasing a few imprisoned dissidents right before Chinese leaders’ important 
visiting western countries.  During the recent years, the government would keep 
quiet on some sensitive issues raised by domestic civil groups. In 2001, Chinese 
People’s Congress passed the accession of China into the International Convention on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights with the reservation to labour union articles. In 
2003, the constitutional amendment about a new statement ‘State respects and 
safeguards human rights’  was confirmed, and later added into the Chinese 
Constitution.  
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• The third dynamic is the transformation of the CCP itself.300 
 
Tang asserts that sticking to the leadership of CCP is not totally incompatible with the 
goal of democracy. From the Tiananmen Incident, one may conclude that when the 
mass democratic movement comes to a threshold of threatening the regime itself, the 
Party would have to take the ultimate actions to crackdown. This is just one side of 
the story. The other side is that CCP itself has been undergoing a series of 
transformation.  
 
Party old leaders are being placed by younger leaders; former cadres are being taken 
over by new cadres. Compared to the previous generations, the current party leaders 
are much younger and much better educated. A large number of them are experts in 
science, technology, economy and all kinds of areas. They are less tied with the old 
ideology yet more open-minded, efficient and pragmatic. These positive 
transformations of CCP helped to promote the top-down political reforms and also, 
might give more space to the bottom-up democratic movement in the future.  
 
During the years 1950s to 1970s, the triumph of the Chinese Revolution, the 
independence of the Chinese state, and the aim of building up socialism, guaranteed 
the legitimacy of the CCP regime. Also, the main characteristic of the socialist 
political system and socialism ideology is one party rule.  Nevertheless, when the 
ideology itself has been weakened and the obligations are not as powerful as before, 
the CCP will have to find new bases for its ruling legitimation. The success of earlier 
economic reforms has legitimatized the CCP regime since the late 1970s. In the new 
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millennium, how to consolidate this legitimacy through deeper reforms has become 
the major task for CCP leaders and cadres. That’s why Tang claimed that the third 
dynamic is one of the most promising factors for continuous reforms and opening up.  
 
• The fourth dynamic is the development of civil society forces.301 
 
Tang attributes it to the democratic awareness of people and the growth of civil 
groups. Since the foundation of the PRC, the CCP has controlled the most resources 
of the society, and is always very cautious about any radical political reforms, for 
instance, the 1989 student movement was taken as a threat to the regime itself.  
 
It seems not possible to change the Party’s domination in recent future. While words 
like democracy, political institutions and political reforms were seen as taboo and 
never appeared in state controlled media two or three decades ago; the situation has 
changed significantly. The CCP have expressed its determination to carry on with the 
institutionalization within the political system.  
 
During the reform years, the control over the media has been loosened although not 
totally diminished. The development of media, especially the internet, has given 
people more space to have a say in public issues. The most significant structural 
change taking place in China’s society today is the growth of the population which 
formed the so-called middle-class. It is regarded as the bases for transition to 
democratic politics.  
                                                                                                                                            
(Incremental Democracy: Chinese Politics in transition), 2004, Chinese version 
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Tang concludes that we could become more optimistic about the future of a transition 
to democracy, as we broaden our research focus from the simple dualism of 
democracy and autarchy, to the larger scale of the interaction between economic 
reforms and the change of political superstructure, of the discourse between 
globalization and Chinese domestic society, of the transformation of CCP and the 
development of civil forces.  
 
He also looked into the obstacles to this incremental model of transition, which he 
summarized as302:  
 
The instinct of holding up to the power and regime of CCP and the conservative 
leaders and cadres who maintain the opposition of political reforms are the obstacles 
of democratization; however, these are not the supreme obstacles. The most important 
social and economic problems existing in China are poverty, poor performance of 
state-owned enterprises, region discrepancy, increasing wealth gap between rich and 
poor, great number of laid-offs303 and educational problem. Tang further concerned 
that, should these problems remain unsolved, even the western style democracy has 
been realised in China, the normal functioning of political regime could still be at 
stake. One of the examples often cited nowadays is the former Soviet Union, in which 
case the adoption of multi-party free election has created a lot of problems and even 
brought crisis to the new regime. He also criticised the radical democrats because they 
have an illusion that once the democratic system is established, all the 
                                                                                                                                            
(Incremental Democracy: Chinese Politics in transition), 2004, Chinese version 
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social-economic problems could be solved immediately; this impression is gained 
from the developed world, where society is stable and the social-economic problems 
such as poverty, unemployment are not as serious as the ones in developing countries.  
 
Tang believed that once China’s economy comes onto the smooth track, there will be 
more space for the transition to democratic politics. The problems of politics 
corruption, social injustice and lack of protection for human rights are inter-connected 
with the inefficiency of current political and economic system; however, simply give 
democratization as the answer to all these questions is not a thoughtful answer. The 
concern about possible social unrest and economic stagnation caused by a radical 
democratic movement can only be released when all the major social-economic 
problems are not so severe.  That is when, Tang believed, the democrats within the 
system will have gained more power and even more political space to realize 
democratization. 
 
3.3 Incremental Democratization with Chinese Characteristics 
 
An incremental model of democratization that I have been trying to establish in this 
thesis is a model that has its cultural context and meanings. Firstly, the most 
important feature of this model is incrementalism. It means that it takes time to 
proceed. There can be a few years of consecutive liberalization followed by some 
years of stagnation or even a set back. For instance, during the late 1970s to the mid 
1980s, which is the initiation period of the economic reforms, the centralized 
economic system was reformed and the private sector began to grow. After the 1989 
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students’ movement, there were a few years of set-back when the reform was 
suspended until 1992 after Deng’s well-known Speech of the Southern Tour. 
However, a quick transformation could be expected in the future. The gradualism or 
the incrementalism of this model determined the discursiveness of this process.  
 
Secondly, this model is established with Chinese characteristics. These characteristics 
include, China’s unevenly developed local economy, unevenly distributed population, 
the uniqueness of Chinese traditional culture and its long history and so on. China has 
the third largest territory of the world which inhabits the world’s largest population. 
Majority of the population live in or close to the south eastern coastal area where most 
of the urbanization and modernization projects and programmes take place. Fewer 
people live in the north western inland area where the local economy is 
underdeveloped. It is thus very difficult to find a standard parameter when 
investigating social economical processes in different parts of China. It does not 
indicate that with more well-educated people who belong to the middle income class 
as we can see in the big cities in the southeast, the pace of liberalization and 
democratization could be faster than the rural area where most of the peasantry live. 
However, the regional disparity increases the difficulty of an over-all evaluation and 
assessment in social, economic, and political studies.  
 
China’s long history of the domination of Confucianism in the political culture has its 
influence upon the present civil society development. The values and ethical of 
Confucianism have been long rooted in Chinese culture and tradition which are 
distinctive from the western values. For example, ‘to build a harmonious society’ 
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was brought up in the 16th Party’s Congress304. Although it was not explicitly 
referring to Confucianism, it seems that Confucius’s ideas about maintaining the 
harmony in the state and society are experiencing a renascence. While in the western 
world, the civil society forces emerged as sometimes opposed to the authority and 
there is a long tradition of allowing politically independent and opposing parties 
against the ruling party, in Chinese society, it is consensus decision making and 
harmony.  
 
It is not a cultural or structural determinism. The influence of the structure should not 
be exaggerated and should be balanced with the effects of the agency. In this 
incremental model, the influence of the agencies is also acknowledged. For example, 
in the following chapters, the influence of certain political figures will be discussed. 
The importance of the rival between the reformists and the conservative figure in the 
early reform period is investigated. A norm-based legitimacy has been replaced by a 
performance-based legitimated rule.  
 
The structure and agency construct the whole model. A structure could be changed by 
the action of the agency, while any agency has to operate within the given structural 
restraints. However, it is not feasible to identify all the possible functioning structural 
and agent elements due to the complex and fluid nature of the object of the thesis. It is 
manageable to identify a few of them. In the following chapters, a discussion into 
three aspects of the incremental model will be presented.  
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have examined discourses of democracy in China from historical and 
cultural (mainly Confucianism and Socialism) perspectives, from which one can find 
how the liberal ideas of democracy after being introduced to China, have been 
reconstructed under specific circumstances; and how the ideas of liberal democracy 
have been replaced by more radical populistic democracy during the New Cultural 
Movement which eventually led to the adoption of the Marxist socialist democracy 
through the founding of CCP. The recent democracy thoughts are explored through 
the debate about possibility and form of democratic transition in China; in which the 
dissidents inspired by this prospect, have launched several movements to realise a 
radical and quick democratization; the economists, both liberal and conservative, have 
tried to place their influence over the economic policy-making by the authority which 
have also brought some impact on the political; the mainstream incremental group, 
believe in a gradual but progressive transformation towards a more democratic polity, 
whose ideas are the closest to the authority and have become the most influential of 
all groups within the debate.  
 
The three areas in which this incremental-style transition can be best illustrated are 
the evolution within the regime, the competitive election at the grassroots, and the 
growth of civil society forces (the press media, for instance). These subjects will be 
the themes of the following chapters through which the changing nature of China’s 
state-society relations can be disclosed while a redefinition of state-society relations 
can be made and advanced.  
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In this thesis, a similar attempt to escape from the dualism of democracy/autarchy as 
claimed by Tang is made by analysing the impact of these reforms – changes in 
political superstructure, grassroots democratic practice and the growth of press 
autonomy and so on.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INCREMENTAL REGIME EVOLUTION 
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4.0 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters, we have extensively reviewed the literature on democracy, 
its specific discourse in China and the incremental model of transition presented by 
mainstream scholars. In Chapter 4, 5 and 6 three aspects of this model will be 
discussed respectively, the changes within the regime, the development of grassroots 
democratic practice and the growth of new press as one of the emerging civil society 
forces.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the debate on China’s regime change almost 
covered every aspect of China’s state-society relations; due to the length restrict of 
this thesis, it would be unmanageable to explore into detail of everything; thus, here, 
the research strategy will be focused on the gradual evolution of the CCP (Chinese 
Communist Party) and the strengthening of NPC (National People’s Congress) in 
terms of the belief that more valuable insights could be obtained through a 
comparatively deep exploration on a small scale than a superficial research of 
everything.  
 
During the last three decades of the Reform (since 1978), the Chinese communist 
regime has undergone a series of changes. Although the CCP still claims itself as a 
Marxism-Leninist party and PRC as a socialist state; the de facto ideology has 
evolved from original Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to a mixed doctrine of 
authoritarianism. In the first place, the CCP has abandoned the highly centralized 
planning economic system, and now aims at establishing a so-called socialist market 
economic system largely driven by spontaneously-formed markets; which was guided 
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under the doctrine of ‘build up economy’ after giving up the doctrine of class 
struggle. Secondly, the CCP itself has evolved during the reforms to adapt to the 
changing internal and external environment; for example, the ‘three represents’305 
can be seen as a departure point from orthodoxy Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. The 
economic growth has bred a considerable middle class, which was regarded by the 
CCP as a new base of its rule; that is why the leaders threw out the ‘three represents’ 
to bring this new social force into the regime. Furthermore, the reforms have 
considerably strengthened political institutions such as the legislature (NPC), the 
judiciary (the rule of law) and the administration (State Council).  
 
4.1 The Incremental Development of CCP 
 
As we discussed before, in order to maintain its one-party rule, the CCP, together with 
mainstream incremental school of intellectuals, is against the ideas of dissidents about 
any radical democratization. Thus, the precondition for the CCP to launch any kind of 
political reforms is to make sure the leadership of CCP is unshakable which can be 
best illustrated in Deng’s  ‘Four Cardinal Principles’ doctrine. Democratization is 
defined as a long-term process and any quick transition will result in chaos and unrest.  
 
Although the radicals tried to realize their ideal liberal democratic model, so far the 
CCP has been playing the dominant role in the initiation of political reforms. 
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However, the process of reforms is not as smooth as assumed by some modernization 
theorists; there has always been dispute within the CCP leaders themselves on the 
pace of the liberalization or on whether to start liberalizing at all.  
 
After the disastrous Cultural Revolution, the CCP was facing some severe economic 
crisis which was likely to threaten the survival of the regime if not tackled properly. 
Deng, who won the power battle with Hua Guofeng, realized that the best strategy 
should be economic liberalization. His view was supported by other leaders who also 
believed in reforms, such as Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and so on. However, a 
number of CCP leaders were more cautious about lose of control as the consequence 
of liberalization and on the contrary, asserted that the regime should seek to 
strengthen its control and the use of force to suppress the opposition. Chen Yun, was 
regarded as the representative of these conservatives or hardliners. Li Peng, who 
signed the martial law during the June Fourth Movement, (although authorized by 
Deng and other elders), was seen as the most conservative figure after Chen Yun 
retired.  
 
Despite their divergence, the basic interests of the leaders are the same – to maintain 
one-party rule. That’s why although they disagree on some issues such as the pace of 
the liberalization or the speed of opening-up, they all give priority to the economic 
growth: the conservatives criticise the reformers’ policy when the liberalization goes 
too quick but never try to reverse it as they realized the need for economic 
development; even the most radical reformers can take the same line with the 
conservatives in the crackdown on the mass movement, coming out of people’s 
demands for democracy and rights. (For instance, Deng, regarded as the initiator for 
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liberalization, took the hard-line towards the democratic movements.) The dispute 
between the reformers and hardliners306, though less obvious during the post-Deng era, 
to a large degree determined the incremental nature of the reforms.  
 
The incremental evolution of the CCP can be summarized as307:  
 
4.1.1 CCP in Reform 
 
During the Reforms year, new Party members and cadres have replaced the old ones; 
compared to their predecessors, they are less ideologically-bound (as the Party 
ideology weakens); better educated and younger in age. The Party has evolved in 
terms of the change in its membership, and become more inclusive than exclusive 
politically. ‘Three Represents’ gives middle class especially entrepreneurs the 
opportunity to get Party membership, which granted them political participation.   
 
4.1.1.1 From Revolutionary Regime to a Reformed Regime 
 
In the Maoist period, the CCP was a pure ‘revolutionary regime’308, which means 
that the leaders and cadres of the revolution army (the PLA, People’s Liberal Army), 
mostly made up of peasants who had very little education or professional training, 
took various positions in party committees and governments of all level. The only 
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strong belief amongst them is the belief in Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, which helped 
them to win over Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) and civil war against KMD (1945-49) 
as they believed. By the time when PRC was founded, most of these solders and 
cadres have stepped into their mid-age or even older. Their age and strong ideological 
belief constrained their ability to learn new skills for state governance, new 
technologies or become professional bureaucrats. Mao himself came to the top 
position through numerous battles with his political opponents outside the Party and 
power struggles within the Party, have build up a strong belief in class struggle which 
has always been the creed of CCP before Mao’s death. The main feature of the 
Maoist regime was restless political mobilization and peoples’ campaigns (always in 
a large national scale) initiated by Mao and his followers to purge his opponents and 
to eliminate any non-Maoist ideas which were always under the name of anti-rightists. 
For instance, the 1957-58 anti-rightists campaigns purged over 500,000 so-called 
rightists most of whom were not rehabilitated until the end of the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-76). Compared to the anti-rightist campaign, more people were persecuted and 
wrongly prosecuted during the Cultural Revolution which not only almost brought the 
national economic to collapse, also to a large extent undermined the legitimacy of the 
CCP through the original revolutionary victory and economic construction of the first 
decade after the founding of PRC.  
 
Post-Mao leader Deng Xiaoping, who was purged during the Cultural Revolution 
under the name of ‘taking the capitalist road’ by Mao and later rehabilitated and 
recognized as the core of CCP’s second generation of leaders in the Third Plenum of 
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the 11th Party Congress309, has seen the disastrous effects of Mao’s personality cult 
and the poor capability of the bureaucratic system consisting of elderly, 
non-professional cadres who are against it. Therefore, he launched reforms in the 
selection and promotion of younger and more specialized cadres. In 1980, Deng 
instructed senior Party leaders to undertake a ‘four-way transformation’ (sihua) of 
the cadre corps by finding and promoting cadres around the age of 40 who were 
‘ revolutionary, younger, more educated, and more technically specialized ’ 
(geminghua, nianqinghua, zhishihua, zhuanyehua)310, which accelerated the transition 
of power from the old generation to the new comers. Deng also set up the retirement 
system, thus the cadres who reached the age limit were advised to leave their 
positions which did not used to be so. After about two decades of the reforms, the 
members of the revolutionary regime, some died, more retired, finally were all 
replaced by younger, and better educated expert bureaucrats and meritoratic cadres. 
For instance, the cadres with a college diploma made up of a very small portion in the 
whole bureaucratic hierarchy in the Maoist regime. After the Twelfth Party Congress 
of 1982, the number of provincial-level cadres who had a college diploma rose up to 
20%311. While in 1997 when the Fifteenth Party Congress was held, the rate went as 
high as over 90%312.  
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Compared with Mao Zedong, the leadership of Deng era depends more on the 
collective leadership than the cult of personality, because none of them has the 
monopoly authority as Mao had. Deng Xiaoping is regarded as the chief designer of 
China’s reform and opening-up policy. As he put straight forward in his theory, ‘be 
practical and realistic.’  His policy is more pragmatic and less confined by the 
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism ideological orthodoxy. Deng and his colleagues have 
seen the failure of Soviet-style political and economic system; in political system, cult 
of personality would lead to the dictatorship of one man just like Stalin did in Soviet 
Communist Party, the class struggle and people’s campaign are no longer the primary 
objects of CCP; in economic system, the central planning has restrained the 
productivity and the development of national economy. The difference between new 
meritoratic generation of leaders and cadres and their predecessors is that, most of the 
new generation have not taken part in the glorious revolution, but they have 
experienced the failure and frustration of socialist politics and economics during the 
60s and 70s; thus they are less bound by the old ideology but tend to be more 
pragmatic and capable of dealing with problems that require specialized knowledge. 
 
4.1.1.2 Taking in New Members 
 
Another important evolutionary change within the Party is it enlarged its membership 
to take in new private entrepreneurs. In the socialist orthodoxy, these people belong to 
the class of bourgeois as opposed to proletariat class of workers. CCP claimed itself to 
be the vanguard of Chinese proletariat and aimed to eliminate capitalism. The CCP, 
after the founding of PRC in 1949, started to nationalize all the private enterprises and 
                                                                                                                                            
Chinese Politics in transition), 2004, p5 
 186 
 
 
tried to transform the bourgeoisie into labourers. As Deng put it, ‘a Party member 
must be a person who engage in labour work and does not exploit others’ in his 
report as amendment to the Constitution of CCP submitted to the Eighth Party 
Congress313.  
 
However, as the private economy renascences and prospers ever since the 1980s after 
the Reform was launched, the number of private entrepreneurs grows and the status of 
the private economy rises in the whole national economy314. The authority now gives 
more space to the development of the private economy. As the Reform deepens, 
especially along with the privatization of the state-owned enterprises, more people 
who were themselves Party members started to join this new entrepreneur class. This 
new political force demands for recognition from the Party in order to raise its 
political status and enlarge its political participation.  
 
At first, due to the objection from the conservatives within the Party, private 
entrepreneurs were not allowed to take the Party membership right away. However, 
they became active in all levels of People’s Congress, Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and the Federation of Industry and Commerce 
(gongshang lianhehui), which was actually encouraged by the authority in order to 
give them certain social status and opportunity to express their views315. Gradually, 
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more and more of these people were taken in as members by local party committees. 
That largely explains the increase in the number of party members amongst private 
entrepreneurs during recent years. It grows from 13.1% in 1993 to 17.1% in 1995, 
later in 2000, the figure grows to 19.8%; which means in 2000, amongst 100 private 
entrepreneurs316, about 20 have got CCP membership317.  
 
In an important speech Jiang Zemin gave on the day of the Celebration of the 
Eightieth Anniversary of the Establishment of CCP, which was published in People’s 
Daily the next day, Jiang pointed out that,  
 
Since the Reform and Opening Up, new changes have occurred in China’s social 
class structure, there have been private entrepreneurs and technical personnel in 
the private scientific and technological enterprises, managerial and technical staff 
employed by foreign-funded enterprises, self-employed (getihu), owners of 
private enterprises, practitioners working in the intermediary organizations, 
independent professionals, and so on…These people, together with workers, 
peasants, intellectuals, cadres and PLA officers, are also the builders for the cause 
of socialism with Chinese characteristics…(therefore we) should absorb the 
excellent people from other parts of the society into our party who accept the 
Party Creed and Constitution, consciously striving for the Party courses and Creed, 
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passing through long-term test, and fulfilling the membership qualification. 
(Author’s translation from Chinese) 318 
 
This expressed the recognition from the CCP for the new middle class majority of 
who are private entrepreneurs, managers, technicians and other professionals. Jiang’s 
speech marked an important amendment to CCP’s orthodox ideology, which also 
demonstrated the desire of CCP to enlarge its bases of rule by bringing new class 
force into its organization. This is the core of the ‘three represents’ doctrine which 
was designated by Jiang as a progressive innovation on Dengism. A year later, in 
November 2002, on the 16th Party Congress, the ‘three represents’319 were officially 
written into the Party Constitution.  
 
4.1.2 Deng and After 
 
The political reforms initiated from the top and the democratic demands from the 
dissidents were regarded as contradictory ideologically, however, in fact, these two 
processes were clashing with each other and sometimes intertwined. The actual 
political reforms were pushed forward by intellectuals and political elites that were 
close to the camp of the reformers within the Party and guided by pragmatic 
incrementalism. On the other hand, the Party has always tried to seek support for its 
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reformist path from intellectuals. The Party, especially the conservative wing within 
the Party, is vigilant about any radical democratic movements which were often 
associated with liberalization moves by the reformers, and always, (together with the 
reformers within the Party), suppress these activities by the radical intellectuals, 
however, more tolerance of such kind of democratic demands have been shown, and 
some of the demands were actually taken by the Party and implemented through the 
reforms. In terms of CCP’s positive evolution, this political tolerance will possibly 
grow. 
 
4.1.2.1 Reformers, Conservatives and the Liberals 
 
Since the beginning of the Reform in early 1980s, there have always been two 
different or sometimes contradictory opinions with the Party itself. The reformers 
who are keen to push the economic liberalization to set up a market economy in 
nature (perhaps) mixed with some elements of the old planned system; and the 
conservatives who are against the idea but willing to maintain the planned economy 
system mixed with some (limited) features of the market economy. Is it market or 
planned economy in nature becomes the departing point for these two groups. As we 
mentioned before, Deng was regarded as the head of the reformers and Chenyun was 
the most influential conservative figure.  
 
The liberals are mainly liberal radical intellectuals, young students who are out of the 
Party; and some of the liberals within the Party. These people are inspired by 
democracy, liberty and human rights, asking for accelerating marketization in the 
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economics and democratization in the politics. They welcomed the ideas of the 
reformers to liberalize the economy, and stood with the reformers against the 
conservatives when they were obstructing the Reform. The conservatives are the 
defenders for the orthodox communism; they assert tight control over all aspects of 
people’s life, for instance, to impose control on the social, economical, political and 
cultural activities; some even want to resume the old planned system prior to the 
Cultural Revolution. Their views can be explained in two aspects: firstly, these people, 
mostly bureaucrats, were close to the authorities, and they had strong belief in 
Marxism-Leninism; secondly, these people received most profits under the old system, 
the Reform thus constituted a threat to their vested interests. They did not totally 
agree with the reformers, however, they were totally against the liberals. For the 
reforms who wanted to release the productivity without changing the one-party rule, 
they relied on the liberals, especially the liberal economists to develop the strategy for 
the national economic growth. While on the other hand, they can not tolerate liberal 
ideas on the demands for fully democracy and liberty. At this time, the conservatives, 
as a balancing force to the liberals, were be encouraged by Deng.  
 
Between the late 1970s and the late 1980s, the interaction and contradiction of these 
three forces mapped out the political discourse in China. As Xiao Gongqin asserted, 
the necessity of this kind of confronting and clashing is determined by the nature of 
the transition of totalitarian regimes320. In his article, he offered an analysis for the 
complex interaction between Deng (core of power), liberals (intellectual and students 
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as the majority) and the conservatives in the Party (bureaucrats who are advocates for 
orthodox ideology).  
 
In 1978, the discussion on the ‘criterion of truth’ was initiated by Deng and his 
followers, by which the ‘two whatever’ doctrine was overthrown together with the 
fall of the conservative figure Hua Guofeng. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the 
Third Session of the Eleventh Party Congress recognized the rise of Deng as the core 
of power and his ideas on the Reform. During this time, the ongoing Democracy Wall 
movement initiated by liberal intellectual such as Wei Jingsheng provided supports 
for the reformers from outside the system.  
 
In the next year, Deng, believed that the movement was out of control, and threw out 
the ‘four Cardinal Principles’ as the guideline. However, later Wei and a number of 
other liberal intellectuals were arrested and the movement was cracked down.  In 
1980, Hu Yaobang, regarded as a reformer figure, was appointed by Deng as the 
General Secretary of CCP. Deng, despite the announcement of ‘four Cardinal 
Principles’ in the former year; gave an important speech on the institutional reforms 
which contained some rather radical ideas. In this speech, titled ‘The Institutional 
Reforms of the Party and State Leadership’ (Dang he Guojia Lingdao Zhidu de 
Gaige), was given at an enlarged meeting of the Politburo on 18th of August, 1980321. 
In this speech, Deng talked about the over-centralization of power, in which he says, 
the over-centralization of power will impede the implementation of socialist 
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democratic system and the Party’s Democratic Centralism. He called for a solution 
for the problems of the interference of the Party in the work of the government, the 
Party and the government being inseparable. He pointed out that there was a need for 
a political reform at the institutional level, which should be initiated progressively, 
continuously and step by step from centre to local. In addition, he mentioned the need 
for the changes in the promotion and life tenure of the cadres – the Party needs more 
cadres with younger age, better education and more professional skills while the life 
tenure for cadres should be abolished, the old cadres should retire according to their 
age and let the younger, able ones take over the jobs.  
 
Encouraged by Deng’s speech on political reform, some radical intellectual started to 
become active, for example, the ‘Luminary Daily’ (Guangming Ribao) started to 
release many articles written by these intellectuals. However, the conservatives were 
not happy about this. Chen Yun and his followers brought forward an 
‘anti-bourgeoisie-liberalization’ discuss into political domain. They expressed their 
dissatisfaction towards inflation which they believed resulted from the Reform. Chen 
asked for a slowing down for the reforms, focusing on the readjustment of the 
economic system. ‘Abandon the development, seek for stability’ was advocated by 
Chen and other conservatives. The ‘anti-bourgeoisie-liberalization’ movement 
initiated by conservatives was actually supported by Deng, which soon spread to the 
cultural terrain. For instance, in 1981, the film ‘Bitter Love’ (Ku Lian) which 
expressed the discontent towards the current political reality was harshly criticized by 
the authority. The New China News Agency broadcasted the commentator article, 
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‘The Four Cardinal Principles Must Not Be Violated – Review Screenplay ‘Bitter 
Love’’ (Sixiang Jiben Yuanze Burong Weifan – Ping Dianying Wenxue Juben Kulian) 
in which the author of the screenplay was regarded as acting against the Four Cardinal 
Principles.  
 
However, conservatives’ intention to slow down the Reform cannot be tolerated by 
Deng and other reformers; indeed, they could hardly find support from inside or 
outside the system. In 1982, on the Twelfth Party Congress, a number of reformers 
were elected to the Central Party Committee while some conservatives lost their 
positions. Together with this political atmosphere, intellectuals found more hopes in a 
reform of the politics. Wang Ruoshui, the deputy Editor-in-Chief of the People’s 
Daily, published articles criticizing the leftist in China and asks for humanitarianism 
to become an element for the socialist democracy322. Wang’s ideas were strongly 
attacked by Hu Qiaomu, the ideological conservative. He denounced Wang as 
vilifying the Party and Socialism which later resulted in Wang’s dismiss in 1983. A 
movement to ‘Eliminate Spiritual Pollution’ (Qingchu Jingshen Wuran) was 
launched by conservatives in 1983 to criticize Wang and other intellectuals inspired 
by humanitarianism. 
 
In 1984, Deng’s decision to open up 14 coastal cities was approved by the Party 
centre and the State Council in March. This was not processed without objection from 
the conservatives. Chen soon expressed his concerns over the establishment of the 
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commodity economy. He emphasized the importance of planning in the socialist 
economy, he believed that planning should be the chief while market as the 
subordinate323. Some reformers were purged, for instance, Xiang Nan and Lei Yu.  
 
In 1986, Deng gave another important speech on political reforms. Intellectuals and 
students were greatly encouraged and in the end of the year, students ’ 
demonstrations broke out all over the country. However, the next year saw the 
dismissal of Hu Yaobang as the General Secretary and a number of liberals were 
expelled such as Fang Lizhi. Wang Ruowang, and Liu Binyan. Fang did not stop 
criticising the authority. In 1988, he together with others, continued to give speeches 
and lectures on campus in Beijing. Students of the universities and colleges, received 
new ideas and thoughts, became active in various seminars, colloquiums and salons.   
 
The year 1989 marked the peak of the liberal movement and also saw the down fall of 
it. ‘Anti Peaceful-Evolution’ became the slogan for conservatives and the reformers, 
such as Deng, also started to tighten the control over the society. Some of the radical 
reformers who showed sympathy to the liberals were purged. Zhao Ziyang, regarded 
as another reformer General Secretary (as Hu Yaobang) was removed from power and 
under home arrest for the rest of his life.  
 
However, during 1989 to 1992, the conservatives were able to take control of the 
politics and economics; the repressive strategy resulted in abandonment of some of 
the former liberalization policies and economic stagnation. Deng’s visit to the South 
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re-emphasized the importance of economic reform and later in the Fourteenth Party 
Congress the project of building a socialist market economy was finally established.  
 
4.1.2.2 The Post-Deng Era 
 
Actually, the interaction between these three forces was over after the death of 
Chen324. Chen and Deng were the two most influential figures in the Party centre 
whose status was established by taking important positions for a very long-time. 
Because of their long-time authority in the Party, they have a lot of followers who 
were old comrades in arms, colleagues, friends, relatives, or people who were 
promoted or appointed by them. Chen believed in the old planning system while Deng 
favoured the market economy. Because of the important powers they possess 
respectively, none could impose his will on the other. Deng and his followers, on the 
one hand, wanted to change the laggard economic system, which would obviously be 
objected by Chen, thus they have to make some concessions such as slowing down 
the opening-up process; on the other hand, when the demands for democracy coming 
from outside the system became too strong, the reformers will need the strength of the 
conservatives to put it under control. This explains why the course of the Reform was 
unevenly developed in different years, and so incrementally progressing during the 
Dengist period.  
 
After Deng and Chen, the new leaders, such as the so-called third generation leader 
Jiang Zemin and the fourth generation Hu Jintao, did not have the same power as their 
predecessors; also, they did not have an opponent who possesses the same status as 
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Chen. As discussed before, although there is still conservative-and-reform divergence, 
the conservatives are not strong enough to pull the Reform back as Chen did. Since 
the 1992 speech of the South Visit, Deng’s ideas were followed by Jiang and Hu; 
after 1994, Deng’s health was deteriorating and he seldom came out in public. The 
post-Deng era came during which time the development was even faster than Deng’s 
period; more fundamental social, economic changes have taken place since then.  
 
The features of the Post-Deng era are explained and identified as follows, 
 
Deng’s doctrine was largely carried on by his successors: economic liberalization (to 
establish a market economy) with political repression (the Four Cardinal Principles as 
the ideological boundary). However, the ‘three represents’ modified the four 
Cardinal Principles, which marked an even weakened ideology. The Reform since 
1978 has resulted in deep social change, for instance, the new classes of the middle 
level. Therefore, the dynamics of the Reforms now come from various social forces, 
which consequently increased the strands of discursive positions and the uncertainty 
of the course of the Reform. The Party leaders are not strongmen as Mao and Deng; 
they have to follow the doctrines and are unable to mobilize the party members and 
masses as Mao or Deng did; therefore, what they are capable of is grasping 
opportunities to utilize the new social forces; which in turn added more uncertainty to 
the future politics.  
The economic development has improved people’s living standards; however, the 
consensus upon the Reform has split, especially amongst the intellectuals. The 
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problems, such as corruption, inequality and social injustice, which were deeply 
rooted within the authoritarian system, have triggered people’s concern over the 
prospect of the Reform. The debate that took place in the end of the 20th century 
between liberals and the New Left, which drew little attention from the ordinary 
Chinese, demonstrated the split amongst intellectuals.  
The stagnation in political reform has resulted in an apparently prosperous market 
economy and a seemly stabilized authoritarian regime. Deng’s Speech of South Visit 
asked for the continuing reform and the tightening of the ideology control at the same 
time. This liberalization on pure economic side has bred the so-called ‘Crony 
Capitalism’325, in which the handful of political elites and the business elites possess 
the advantageous positions in the state and society while the majority of people have 
very few resources and wealth.  
China becomes more involved in the world especially after the accession to WTO.  
The 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing obviously gives China another opportunity to 
get to be known by the world. CCP has changed its strategies and metaphors to 
conform to the international standards. For instance, the discussion about human 
rights used to be considered as forbidden zone of the politics. The discussion on 
dissimilation and humanitarianism was raised by Zhou Yang and Wang Ruoshui 
during the early 1980s which was originated from criticizing and rethinking about the 
Cultural Revolution326. As mentioned before, the conservatives within the Party, led 
by Hu Qiaomu, launched a so-called ‘Eliminate Spiritual Pollution’ to suppress the 
radical intellectuals. However, after 1980s, especially after 1992, the authority, facing 
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the pressure from the international community, had to make some concessions to 
improve China’s image of a state with poor human rights record. Ratification of 
human rights conventions and constitutional protection to human rights are regarded 
as positive and progressive. However, as some commentators pointed out, the real 
breakthrough in the large improvement of human rights conditions would be a 
long-term process327.   
The suppression upon dissidents has given more credits to the dissidents. The CCP 
ideology has been amended and lost its sanctity. Its credibility has been undermined 
at the same time. While on the other hand, the dissident intellectuals, who were 
subjected to oppression from the authority, are regarded as the conscience of the 
society. For instance, Fang Lizhi, who was dismissed from party and his office after 
1986 student movement, continued to play a significant role in the 1989 democratic 
movement. Jiang Yanyong, a doctor who firstly reported the truth of SARS in Beijing 
to the international community, received much support from the people.  
 
4.1.3 Conclusion 
 
Democratic consciousness was strengthened both inside and outside the system due to 
the economic and social changes of the society and the extensive opening-up. As 
discussed before, the revolutionary victory, socialism and the coercive power of the 
regime used to provide the bases of rule by the Party; however, as the ideology 
withers, CCP has to legitimize its rule by performance in the reforms. The challenge 
to this legitimacy will continue to push forward the reforms within the Party along 
                                                                                                                                            
(Incremental Democracy: Chinese Politics in transition), 2004, p13 
327
  For instance, see Tang Liang, Jianjin, Minzhu: Biange Zhong De Zhongguo 
Zhengzhi (Incremental Democracy: Chinese Politics in transition), 2004, p14 
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with the political reforms. Meanwhile, the growth of the democratic forces both inside 
and outside the Party system may possibly eventually change the equilibrium and 
guide the liberalization process to an irreversible direction, which finally may lead to 
a fully democratization.  
 
After examining the incremental evolution of the CCP, the recent political 
development in the legislature institution-National People’s Congress also needs to 
be explored.  
 
4.2 The Strengthening of NPC 
 
According to China’s Constitution, National People’s Congress is the highest organ 
of state power; its permanent body is the Standing Committee of the National People’
s Congress (abbreviated as NPC); NPC and its Standing Committee exercise the 
legislative power of the state. 328 Local people’s congresses are also the highest 
organs of the same level, in terms of the Constitution. Other powers of NPC include 
electing, recalling or removing the most important personnel in government such as 
President, Vice-President, Premier, Vice-Premiers, State Councillors, Ministers, 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission and others on the commission, 
President of the Supreme People’s Court and the Procurator-General of the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate; examining and approving the plan for national economic and 
social development and the state budget, and the reports on their implementation 
                                                 
328
  Articles 57 and 58, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, adopted in 
1982. 
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respectively; deciding on questions of war and peace and so on329.  
 
From the articles of the Constitution, the NPC and its Standing Committee exercised 
the most power. However, the Constitution also mentioned ‘under the leadership of 
CCP’ in its Preamble. In fact, the most powerful organ is the Politburo of CCP, and 
the General-Secretary of CCP as the top leader; which are not elected or decided by 
NPC. During the Maoist year, the Party Committee of central and local levels, 
exercise the decision power of personnel and other aspects. The one-party controls all 
is realized through its appointments of government officers and delegates to people’s 
congress of all levels. The governments and councils carry out the decisions made by 
the Party committees and make policies and lodge bills; people’s congress then 
agrees with any proposals the party committee and government bring forward. Its 
constitutional-designed power cannot be exercise, that’s why the people’s congress 
is called a ‘rubber stamp’.  
 
Especially during the Maoist years, Mao exercised the supreme power; all the other 
members of Politburo could do is to go along with Mao. The NPC and local people’s 
congresses were playing the insignificant role in Chinese politics. After the Reform 
and Opening-up, the Chinese politics have undergone some positive changes in which 
the strengthened status of people’s congress was also included. This process can be 
summarized as follows: 330 
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  Articles 62 and 63, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, adopted in 
1982. 
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4.2.1 Rule of Law 
 
Before the Reform, decisions on important issues were always made by the Party 
committees and governments which were not through legislative means. Political 
leaders, especially the top leader, have the most decisive votes. During the Reform 
years, these decision-makings were increasingly codified as laws and regulations. 
People’s congress as the legislative organ, thus becomes more and more involved in 
the decision-making process which in turn made it an important platform for 
policy-making.  
 
As required by the constitution, the plans for economic and social development, 
mainly the work reports of State Council, the Supreme Court and the Supreme 
Procuratorate, together with the state budget, are submitted to the NPC for 
examination and approval. After the initiation of the Reform, more and more other 
plans, reports and decisions have been submitted to the legislature, due to a number of 
reasons. Firstly, the Party drew upon the lesson of the Cultural Revolution, begins to 
push the legal reforms to institutionalize within the regime. Secondly, the new market 
economy needs corresponding laws and regulations to regularize the activities331. 
Consequentially, there was an increase in the number of new laws and regulations.  
 
The increased lawmaking can be shown in the number of new laws that have been 
codified by the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth NPC and its Standing 
Committees respectively. The numbers are, 60 by the Fifth, 63 by the Sixth, 86 by the 
                                                                                                                                            
(Incremental Democracy: Chinese Politics in transition), Chapter 6, 2004; 
331
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Seventh and 116 by the Eighth NPC. There has been a significant and gradual 
increase in the number. However, during the tenure of the Ninth NPC and its Standing 
Committee (1998-2003), 74 laws were made. Although it decreased in quantity, 
lawmaking has been improved qualitatively.  
 
In 1999, approved by NPC, one section was added to Article Five of the Constitution 
as the first section, ‘The People’s Republic of China practices ruling the country in 
accordance with the law and building a socialist country of law’. The rule of law has 
been raised to a higher status, which required higher standards in lawmaking. The 
Ninth NPC and its Standing Committee has completed a number of legislations 
regarding international trade and intellectual property rights according to the WTO 
regulations before and after China’s accession which were welcomed by other WTO 
member states. Another improvement occurred in the deliberation process of the law 
drafts; law drafts which were more controversial are subjected to three or four times 
reconsideration (used to be twice examined); the contract law was eventually passed 
until the fifth time.  
 
In 2006, the Tenth NPC and its Standing Committee established the law on 
supervision, which indicates a significant move in the institutional reform of people’s 
congress. Another important law is the one regarding property rights. The basic 
principle of this law is to give protections to the state-owned, collective-owned and 
private-owned real properties.   
 
4.2.2 Institutionalization 
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The system of people’s congress has been reformed; new professional staff increased; 
the efficacy and efficiency of the institution have been improved. These changes 
come along with the increased autonomy and independence. People’s congress 
started to exercise its substantial power, for instance, examine the bills and acts, use 
its power to revise and even overrule some of the decisions. Meanwhile, it started to 
supervise the work of the Council, the court and the procuratorate, acting as checks 
and balances.  
 
The Party Committee’s leadership and control over NPC is carried out through the 
following ways332: 1. make sure that party members take over more than half of the 
seats in NPC, in every NPC and its Standing Committee, the number of party 
members has been always over 50%; 2. control its operation through establishing 
party groups. The party committees above the county level set up party groups in 
standing committees. The party groups are actually the highest leading organ in 
standing committees of people’s congress; 3. control of the personnel, constitution 
guarantees NPC and its Standing Committee the power to elect some of the most 
important positions in government, however, the Chairman, Deputy Chair, Secretary, 
Vice Secretary, Directors, Deputy Directors, and other members of the Standing 
Committee are all decided by the Central Party Committee. Party Committee exercise 
the power to appoint or remove personnel of these positions.  
 
After the Reform, the leadership of CCP in people’s congress has not been 
                                                 
332
  Tang Liang, Geige Shiqi Zhongguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui de Zhidu Gaige he 
Zuoyong Qianghua, (Institutional Reforms and Functional Strengthening of People’s 
Congress in the Reform Era), Asian Economy, 1999:6, pp. 3-4; 
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fundamentally changed; however, the autonomy of people’s congress has been 
enhanced during the political reforms. For instance, CCP leaders such as Deng 
realized that political power has been over-centralized in the party committees; 
therefore, they asserted that the party should be separated from the legislative and 
administrative organs. On the Thirteenth Party Congress, there was a call for the 
‘separation of the Party and government’, which stressed that the party’s leadership 
should be political, and the party’s guideline should be carried out through legislative 
means. In terms of this change, people’s congress now has more autonomy in 
lawmaking process.  
 
Another positive progress is the enforcement of the Legislation Law, which was 
established by the Ninth NPC in the year 2000. In Article Eight, it lists a number of 
issues that should be regulated by legislation, in Article Nine, it authorizes the State 
Council to make administrative laws according to some of the issues listed in Article 
Eights, however, it further excludes issue about crime and penalty, deprive of citizen’
s political rights, imprisonment and so on.  
 
 The NPC was the exclusive lawmaking organ, while its Standing Committee only 
had the power to make byelaws according to the constitution prior to 1982. The 
constitutional amendment of 1982 authorized the Standing Committee the legislative 
power to establish, amend laws, examine and approve the economic plans and state 
budget, supervise the State Council, Supreme Court and Supreme Procuratorate. This 
enlargement of legislative power of Standing Committee has resulted in more 
improvement in the lawmaking. The members of the Standing Committee meet more 
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frequently than that of the NPC. All delegates of the NPC (around 3000 people from 
all over the country) only meet annually for one week; considering the large number 
and the limited time of the meeting, it is not possible to satisfy the requirement of 
lawmaking. While the members of the Standing Committee meet every two month, 
under specific circumstances, special meetings can also be convened when necessary. 
Generally speaking, delegates of people’s congress have their own full-time careers 
apart from the duty of attending the Congress; while amongst the members of the 
Standing Committee, there are more experts in politics, laws and policies, who are 
more capable of exercising the legislative power. Therefore, since 1982, over 80% 
laws have been deliberated and passed by the Standing Committee, and most of the 
law drafts that were presented to NPC for approval have also been previously 
examined by the Standing Committee333.  
 
New staff has been trained and new offices have been established in all levels of 
people’s congress since the Reform. This is largely due to the increasing demand for 
lawmaking in the marketization which consequentially strengthened the institution of 
people’ s congress. Especially after 1982, standing committees with enlarged 
legislation power expand the number of staff and offices. A significant institutional 
change is the establishment of special committees within the Standing Committees. In 
1982, NPC set up 6 new special committees. The special committees were formed to 
make laws for one specific area, for instance, the Environment and Resource 
Committee (founded in 1993), and the Agriculture and Rural Committee (set up in 
1998).  
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Some substantial powers such as examining the performance of councils, courts and 
procuratorates have been practised by the people’s congress. In 2001, delegates of the 
Shenyang People’s Congress (a city in north China) made inquiries into the 
corruption within the City Council, the Court and the Procuratorate. The Congress 
then vetoed the work report of the People’s Court by less than half of the approval 
votes. This is the first case in history that the work report from ‘Yifu Liangyuan’ 
(One government-the council; two offices-the court and procuratorate) is disapproved 
by people’s congress334.  
 
4.2.3 Appointment of Cadres 
 
People’s congress also started to influence the appointment and removal of personnel 
by the party committees. Theoretically, people’s congresses have the power to elect, 
decide, recall or remove the officers of the most important positions of the same level. 
However, the party committee was the organ that actually exercises this power. It 
produces the list of the names to the positions waiting for people’s congress’s 
approval. The nominees of the party committee lose to the candidates nominated by 
people’s delegates, or people’s congress rejects the officer in charge, have taken 
place since the Reforms.  
 
As I mentioned before, the control of CCP over NPC is mainly through the way of 
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taking over majority seats in the Congress. However, after 1980s, a call for enlarging 
inner-party democracy from the Party centre gave party members more autonomy in 
voting as delegates335. It indicates that the party members do not have to approve the 
nominees recommended by the party committees which in turn give the congress 
more independence and freedom in the appointment of personnel. 
 
Theoretically, chief executives of the centre government organs and local councils are 
decided by people’s congress of the same level. In the past, the party committee used 
to produce the list of names for each position and the congress functioned as a rubber 
stamp. There was always one candidate for each office, which meant the congress had 
no right to nominate but to approve the one and only candidate. After the 1982 
constitution, delegates now have the right to nominate. (Over 30 delegates to the NPC 
and provincial people’s congress, or over 20 delegates to city level people’s congress, 
or over 10 delegates to town and county level people’s congress can raise a proposal 
collectively.) The principle of competitive election is also recognized, which requires 
at least two candidates for the same position. Secret ballot and change in other 
facilities also signalled a positive evolution in the institution.  
 
For instance, in 1993, general election was taking place amongst the provincial level 
governments. The position of Governor of the Zhejiang Province was taken by Wan 
Xueyuan the nominee of the congress, while the party candidate Ge Hongsheng lost 
in the election. This is the first time the nomination of party committee was 
disapproved by the congress at the provincial level. The highest ranked officer who 
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was recalled by the congress was Yang Huiquan, at the time the Vice-Governor of 
Hunan Province336. The substantial power of recalling and removing officers has been 
exercised more often after that337.  
 
There have also been calls for adoption of some of the functions of the Western 
parliamentary system, such as administrative investigation, making inquiries, 
impeachment and so on, in order to strengthen the role of NPC in supervision.  
 
4.3 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have examined the incremental evolution within the regime, focusing 
on the leading party and the legislature-NPC. The Chinese regime has evolved from a 
revolutionary one to a reformed one. The process was driven by the interaction 
between reformers, conservatives within the system and liberal intellectuals both 
within and outside the system. New members are absorbed by the Party, such as 
youger, better educated cadres and members from the new middle class. After Deng’s 
death, there is no supreme leader as Deng or Mao. Their successors do no enjoy the 
authority as they did. Therefore, a collective leadership of decision-making gradually 
replaces the pattern of one man decides all.  
 
The legislature has been strengthened which is demonstrated through various aspects, 
it has become more autonomous and independent. The rule of law has been 
recognized and established to place the rule by law. The NPC also starts to exercise 
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its constitutionally based substantial rights of supervising and reviewing the works of 
the government. With more professional staff and improved efficiency, the legislature 
also starts to show its influence in the appointment and removal of high ranked 
cadres.  
 
However, the nature of the incremental model determined the limited scale and 
limited degree of these changes. The one-party rule has not been changed. What one 
may anticipate from the future would be, for liberals, the growth of the middle class 
as the pillar for a democratic transition; or, for incremental theorists, the gradual 
change that’s taking place within the state and society, which might eventually alter 
the state-society relations and bring about not only quantitative but also qualitative 
transitions. One example that has been most frequently explored and cited is the 
democratic practice in China’s numerous villages which will be discussed in the 
following chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
(Incremental Democracy: Chinese Politics in transition), 2004, p276; 
 210 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
GRASSROOTS DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE 
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5.0 Introduction 
 
Amongst the rich literature of comparative democratization studies, there are very few 
theories on the relationship between democracy and peasantry338. When talking about 
China’s political development, this topic is unavoidable. What role the peasants play 
in the democratization process differs in different countries. In the case of China, the 
emergence of the village committees as the self-governments in rural China has raise 
the questions on the relations between peasantry and democratization; such as asking 
about whether there is any democratic implications brought by the village 
self-government.  
 
As one theorist pointed out, the Chinese scholars doing research on the ‘Village 
Committee Autonomy’ always offer a description of the phenomenon which is not 
always supported by a theory framework339. Despite the large amount of substantial 
research done in different villages, the scholars diverge into two camps: the ones 
believe that it is empowering the peasantry and the state which would eventually 
bring about democratization340; and the ones that are sceptical about this.  
 
For example, Xu Wang’s book ‘Mutual Empowerment of State and Peasantry: 
                                                 
338
  Zheng Yongnian, Xiangcun Minzhu he Zhongguo Zhengzhi Jincheng (Village 
Democracy and the Course of Chinese Politics), 21st Century, 1996:6, Issue No. 35, 
p.26; 
339
  Hu Rong, Village Committee Autonomy and Its Relationship to the 
‘Xiangzhen’ Government, 21st Century, No. 50, Dec 1998, p.133; 
340
   For the empowerment, see Lianjiang Li, the Empowering Effect of Village 
Elections in China, Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Jul. – Aug., 2003), pp.648-662; for 
the claim of village democracy promotes the democratization of China, see Zheng 
Yongnian, Xiangcun Minzhu he Zhongguo Zhengzhi Jincheng (Village Democracy 
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Village Self-Government in Rural China341’ presented his belief that as the villagers 
and the reformers at the centres both become empowered, the two sides are joining 
together to resist the antidemocratic forces (the conservatives) and realize the 
democratic transition. His optimism was criticized by Edward Friedman, who asserted 
that the authoritarian regime is solidly in place; only a major struggle from the centre 
and not from the lowest level of the hierarchy could possibly bring about a successful 
democratization342.  
 
The major empirical work has been focused on three aspects.343 Firstly, how village 
elections may contribute to the regime change, for instance, the research done by 
Minxin Pei344 and Sylvia Chan345 are amongst those most fruitful. Secondly, what 
role that elections play in raising popular rights consciousness, Tianjian Shi346 has 
done some important work for this aspect. Last but not least, how village elections 
affect rural governance and the village power structure, a close reading into Allen 
                                                                                                                                            
and the Course of Chinese Politics), 21st Century, 1996:6, Issue No. 35, pp. 24-33; 
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  Minxin Pei, ‘Creeping Democratization in China,’ Journal of Democracy 6:4 
(October 1995), pp. 65-79; 
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  Sylvia Chan, ‘Research Notes on Villagers’ Committee Election: Chinese 
Style Democracy’, Journal of Contemporary China 7:19 (1998), pp. 507-21; cited by 
Lianjiang Li, the Empowering Effect of Village Elections in China, Asian Survey, Vol. 
43, No. 4 (Jul. – Aug., 2003), p. 649 
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Choate’s work offers some thoughtful insights.347  
 
In this chapter, an analysis of the growth of the grassroots democracy will be 
presented in terms of the incremental model; it will include, the evolutionary change 
that has taken place in the village electoral system; the strengthening of the village 
self-government and its autonomy; what implications the rural democratic practice 
has for China’s political development and the state and society relations.   
 
5.1 The Evolution of the Village Electoral System 
 
The villagers’ committees were firstly created by peasants in rural China. In early 
1980s, peasants of Yishan County and Luocheng County of Guangxi Province 
spontaneously organized villagers’ committees to fill in the vacuum that was created 
after the collapse of the people’s communes348.  The villagers’ committees were 
self-government in nature, which provided functions as maintenance of the public 
security, settlements to local disputes, managing public facilities and providing social 
welfare. This system was copied by many other places all over the country to improve 
the anarchies in rural area.  
 
The 1982 constitution confirmed the legal status of villagers’  committees as 
self-governments in villages. However, there was no mention about the electoral 
                                                 
347
  Allen C. Choate, ‘Local Governance in China: An Assessment of Villager’s 
Committees’, Working Paper no.1 (San Francisco: Asia Foundation, 1997); cited by 
Lianjiang Li, the Empowering Effect of Village Elections in China, Asian Survey, Vol. 
43, No. 4 (Jul. – Aug., 2003), p. 649 
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system through which the committees should be formed.  
 
The 1988 ‘Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees (Trial)’ firstly gave the 
opportunity for Chinese villagers to practice direct election. Although unevenly 
distributed, in some places, the villagers started to participate in the competitive 
mechanism introduced recently through which the wills of the electorates can be 
expressed. Since then, the truly democratic practice has been implemented in 
numerous villages in rural China.  
 
In the 1988 organic law (trial), it prescribed the principle of direct election for village 
committees; however, there were no concrete regulations or rules on how to practice 
the direct election which was actually decided locally. Generally speaking, before the 
1990s, the most popular way of election is to nominate through recommendation and 
arrangements.  
 
It followed the way of how the delegates to the people’s congress are elected and was 
adopted by most of the villages. At the beginning of each election, there will be 
candidates recommended by the party and candidates that are nominated by ordinary 
villagers. However, at this stage, the list of candidates is not the final list. The official 
candidates are to be chosen amongst these names by the electorates. It used to be only 
one candidate for each position. The situation has been changed after the initiation of 
the Reform. Normally, the number of candidates should be more than the number of 
positions (later, this principle of contested election – cha’e is codified into the 
Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees in 1998). During this process, the party 
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authority will try to impose influence upon villagers’ decision in order to keep the 
candidates recommended by the party on the list; or to persuade candidates 
recommended by other ordinary villagers to give up and quit the election. Once the 
official list of candidates is completed, the voters may start to vote. Principally the 
candidate who receives the majority votes wins. However, the authority can intervene 
or revise the unfavourable result through many ways, one of which was mentioned 
before (to impose influence upon villagers to keep the party’s candidates), or they can 
simply appoint the committee members and claim it to be the will of majority 
electorates.  
 
The flaws of this type are obvious – the authority can easily influence the process and 
revise the result of the election – which means the democratic principle designed to 
protect villagers’ right to vote is always violated. After years of practice, firstly in a 
small number of villages, new ways of election were invented by villagers and later 
gradually adopted by more and more places. In 1998, the Standing Committee of NPC 
modified the ‘Organic Law of Villager’s Committees’ to replace the trial version. 
In the 13th provision, it states that the election of villagers’ committee should be run 
by the villagers’ election committee whose members are chosen by all villagers. In 
the 14th provision, it confirms that candidates of villagers’ committee should be 
nominated directly by villagers, and the number of candidates should be more than 
the number of positions available; election with over half of the votes of all villagers 
can be seen as valid; candidates who have received over half of the votes become 
members of the committee; the balloting be secret. In fact, before the enforcement of 
organic law, there have already been a number of similar practices; the way through 
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recommendation to nominate candidates has been gradually abandoned by local 
villages; new mechanisms which ensure more open and fair elections have already 
been adopted by a few villages.  
 
New inventions include the ‘sea election’, which means that the electorates are free 
to choose their own candidates. Each electorate is given one ticket to fill the names 
chosen by him; later all the tickets are collected to call out the names voted; the 
official candidates are the ones who have received the most votes. During this process, 
it is very difficult for the authority to intervene (secret ballot and openly singing 
names); also it would be more difficult to alter the result of the voting as it represents 
the will of most electorates. It was firstly invented by Lishu County in Jilin Province 
in 1993349. Villagers in the first round directly elected candidates for villagers’ 
committee and in the second round voting for members of the committee and the 
director and deputy director of the committee. In 1995 general election, sea election 
was implemented in all villages of Lishu County. While during 1998 general election, 
the first round of voting to choose candidates was abandoned, the committee members 
were voted directly by all electorates. The nominees who received over half of the 
votes in the first round win out and become committee members directly. Encouraged 
by this new incentive, in the 1998 general election, 98% of the villagers (village 
population over 400,000) attended the balloting, about one third of the present village 
committee directors (Cunweihui Zhuren) lost in the election350.  
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Competitive elections are also encouraged. The candidates, who are keen to get the 
support from the electorates, use many ways to express their policy objectives. They 
give speeches to convince electorates, talk with villagers, answer questions and 
criticize their opponents. For instance, in the Lishu County which we mentioned 
before, all candidates for committee directors delivered a speech in the 1998 general 
election.  In Zhejiang Province, the 16th provision of the ‘Electoral Method of 
Villagers’ Committees in Zhejiang Province’ of 1999 reads, ‘the village election 
committee should introduce the candidates to the electorates based on the principles 
of equality, impersonality, and impartiality; the official candidates may give speeches 
on village governance and answer questions raised by villagers’. The electoral 
speeches are very important in communicating with electorates, which has become a 
battle field for candidates. For instance, in the first round of the 1995 general election 
in Wangjiayuanzi Village(of Lishu County), Liu Shifeng received 550 votes and 
Wang Hongshan received 464 votes respectively in the competition for the position of 
committee director; both of them became the official candidates and delivered a 
speech; Wang’s speech was well-prepared and pragmatic which impressed the 
electorates, therefore in the second round of voting, Wang, defeated in the first round, 
turned out to be the winner of this round with 751 votes, which was much higher than 
the votes Liu received351.   
 
In the Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees, the party organization stays at the 
leading position in villages, which means the status of village party branch is higher 
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than the village committee, albeit the latter was elected democratically352 . The 
secretary of the party branch has more power than the committee director. The 
secretary is always appointed by higher levels party committee. Although nominally 
elected by party members, the final decision is made by higher level party committee 
as to choose the members of the party branch and appoint the secretary. Along with 
the reform in the electoral system of villagers’ committees, there have been some 
incremental changes taking place in the voting process for party branches.  
 
‘Two Votes’ was produced by Hequ County in Shanxi Province, which aimed at 
transforming the electoral system of the village party branches. Firstly all villagers 
give a vote of confidence for all party members to elect candidates for party branch 
members and the party secretary353; in the second round, all party members vote for 
party branch members and secretary. Despite the unofficial nature of the vote of 
confidence, the result is open which also has some sort of power as to impose some 
restricting influence on the deed of the party members.  
 
The new electoral systems are more open and fair than the previous type; however, as 
many observers pointed out, it is very limited improvement because. Firstly, the 
village committee places at the lowest level of the hierarchy which is of little political 
influence to the higher levels especially to influence the power centre, even at this 
lowest level, the party branch has more power over the village committee, and the 
party secretary has more authority than the committee director. Secondly, as some 
                                                 
352
  See for instance, Shazhou Bai, Re-evaluate the Rural Election and Grassroots 
Democracy, Modern China Studies, 2000: 4, No.71, p107;  
353
 A vote of confidence stands for villagers’ trust on the party members 
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theorists stated, this autonomy is given by the authority354, which can easily be 
deprived of, it took a long course for the legal recognition of village committees to be 
settled which demonstrated the vulnerability of this autonomy. Thirdly, the 
democratic practice itself is unevenly carried out by the large number of China’s rural 
villages. For instance, in some places, villagers are not interested in participating in 
the election, while in other places, the candidates buy votes from villagers to win the 
position as the director. Also, clans and lineage groups would grab the authority 
positions as to protect their vested interests.  
 
5.2 The Village Committee as Self-government 
 
The reports of the Fifteenth Party Congress called for the enlargement of grassroots 
democracy. The Organic Law of Villagers’  Committees, passed by the Fifth 
Standing Committee of NPC, also reads that the villagers’ committee is mass 
self-government organization in rural China. As defined by law, the relationship 
between villagers’ committees and the higher level town and county governments is 
not the relationship of superiors and subordinates. The committee does not take orders 
from the county government, or under the command of it. The county government 
gives guidelines and committee cooperates.  However, in practice, the village 
autonomy was not realized from the very beginning. Before the implementation of the 
democratic election, the county government exercises the de facto power to appoint or 
recall members of the party branches and the villagers’ committees. Moreover, the 
county government always regarded the villagers’ committees as its subordinates and 
                                                 
354
  See, for instance, Shazhou Bai, Re-evaluate the Rural Election and Grassroots 
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intervened into the operation of committees.  
 
After the change in the electoral system, especially the provision of the Organic Law 
about the non-interference of county government in the affairs which belong to the 
autonomy of villagers’ committees, the villagers started to resist the wrongful 
policies that were imposed by county governments. The village committee is in 
charge of the public affairs, commonweal affairs, settling local disputes, maintaining 
social security, and administrating the use of land and other property that belongs to 
the village; which means it can exercise autonomy within these issues.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the village party branch is appointed by higher level party 
committee, while the village committee is elected directly after the electoral reform. 
As the autonomy of the village committee is strengthened, the status of the party 
branch at village level is becoming increasingly important because of the need of the 
higher authority to continue its control and influence at the grassroots. Theoretically, 
the party secretary stands for the highest authority in the village, when there is 
divergence between party branch and the committee, the decision of the party 
secretary can always find supports from the higher authority while the committee 
director always has to concede.  
 
After the democratic elections were launched, the committee director, whose power is 
legitimated by majority votes, actually enjoys more legitimacy than the party 
secretary. More incidents occurred as the villagers become more consciously in 
safeguarding their rights of self-government. For instance, in 1999, the committee 
                                                                                                                                            
Democracy, Modern China Studies, 2000: 4, No.71, p103; 
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director of Jinzhai village, Li Huanming was dismissed by the party committee of 
Dingjunshan County due to the conflicts of the villager’s committee with the village 
party branch. The villagers of Jinzhai village became outraged and appealed to the 
Standing Committee of the People’s Congress (of Hanzhong City) citing the 
provision of the Organic Law. They asserted that, the power of appointing and 
recalling members of the village committees should be exercised by all villagers, and 
the Party committee’s decision to replace Li Huanming with another person is 
exceeding its authority and should be regarded as illegitimate. Their appeal was 
supported by the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress, and the party 
committee of Dingjunshan County had to declare the decision of the appointment and 
removal as null and void355.  
 
At least one theorist has noticed this so-called ‘ legitimacy downwards ’ 
phenomenon356. In the traditional system, the village officers are the instruments for 
implementing the orders from the superiors who are chosen by the superior authority. 
Because the members of the villagers’  committees are elected by villagers 
themselves and this process is carried out regularly (every three years), they stand for 
the will of the majority. The higher authority, such as the Party committees at the 
county level, finds it more difficult to replace the members of the villagers’ 
committee who are chosen through the direct election process, which would always 
result in the resistance from the villagers. As mentioned in the case of Jinzhai village. 
                                                 
355
  ‘Yifa Weiquan Dikang Cuowu, Cunmin Weiyuanhui Zuzhifa zai Jinzhai’ 
(Protecting Rights According to the Law and Resisting the Mistake, Organic Law of 
Villagers’ Committee in Jinzhai), People’s Daily, 26-05-1999;  
356
  Zheng Yongnian, Xiangcun Minzhu he Zhongguo Zhengzhi Jincheng (Village 
Democracy and the Course of Chinese Politics), 21st Century, 1996:6, Issue No. 35, 
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Despite the highly hierarchical regime system, the organization of the lowest level 
now has more legitimacy than the higher levels which has brought in tension within 
the hierarchical structure. For instance, the decision of the higher county authority 
was revised by the struggle of the lower level villagers in the case of Jinzhai.  
 
The democratically elected villagers’ committee also tend to be more careful about 
protecting the rights and interests of electorates, because according to the Organic 
Law, the general election is carried out every three years. In order to win votes from 
the electorates and not to be voted out in the next election, villagers’ committees are 
more concerned about protecting the rights of regular villagers other than following 
the orders from the above. This has also provided incentives for the villagers to take 
part in the voting. After two rounds of the general election, in a survey of 1994 about 
the attitude towards election, villagers gave more positive answers357.  
 
When asked whether the villagers’ committees should be elected through direct 
election, 80.4% answered yes; 10.8% answered, ‘no need, they can be appointed by 
the county party committee or village Party branches’; 6.7% answered, ‘indifferent, 
it is none of my business’. When asked about whether the election is just a procedure 
or it really works, 62.6% answered, ‘it is not just a procedure, it is very effective’; 
22.3% answered, ‘although it is just a procedure, it still works’; 11% answered, ‘it 
                                                                                                                                            
p.32 
357
  Zhongguo Nongcun Cunmin Weiyuanhui Huanjie Xuanju Zhidu, (General 
Election System of Villagers’ Committees in Rural China), Beijing: Zhongguo 
Shehui Chubanshe, 1994, pp. 9-10; cited in Zheng Yongnian, Xiangcun Minzhu he 
Zhongguo Zhengzhi Jincheng (Village Democracy and the Course of Chinese 
Politics), 21st Century, 1996:6, Issue No. 35, p.31; 
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is just a procedure and it doesn’t work at all’. These figures showed that majority of 
the villagers realized the necessity of election to the legitimacy of villagers’ 
committees and the positive effects of the election.  
 
The self-government system is different from the previous people’s commune system. 
Through the people’s commune, which is part of the state administrative hierarchy, 
the state and society become one organization with each cell of the society is under 
the control of the state. The village self-government system redefined the state and 
society relations. The administrative power pulled back to the town and county level 
(xiangzhen), which left some space for village autonomy and self-governing. The 
villagers’ committee, which filled within the vacuum left by the collapsed people’s 
communes, is in charge of the public governance of the village. These committees are 
elected by villagers and run by villagers. This new system draws a clear line between 
state and rural society, in which the villagers now enjoy certain autonomy.  
 
The town and county local governments have in fact become the administrative 
branches through which the policies of the central government are carried out and 
through in rural areas. These policies were used to be realized by people’s communes. 
Due to the large population of each town and county, it is unmanageable for the local 
government to fulfil the tasks alone. They have to rely on the organizations in the 
villages to accomplish the centre’s agenda for grain deliveries, population control, 
and tax collection.  The Organic Law also stated in its provisions that the villager’s 
committees should assist local government in their work.  
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As defined by the Organic Law, the villagers’ committees are self-government 
organizations which are not part of the state organ; members of the committee work 
for the community and are not civil servants paid by the state. As one observer 
pointed out, villagers’ committees are playing the role of agents for government to 
handle the tasks assigned by the town and county governments358.  
 
‘Transferring power to a lower level359’ is to give some incentives to the villagers. 
The villagers’ committee system is a demonstration of this principle. On the one 
hand, the committee plays the agency role for local governments and in charge of 
grain collection, tax collection, and birth control (the family-planning policy) of the 
village. On the other hand, the committee members’ allowance is from the village; 
they are elected by villagers and their authority also comes from the service they 
provide to the villagers. Thus, they also play the role of masters in the village as an 
integrated community360.   
 
Here, as Xu Yong observes, the village committee plays the double roles of state 
agent and village master due to the changing status of village in the state-society 
relations; the powers of the two roles come from different sources, (one is official 
authority, the other is grassroots democratic power); therefore, the committee receives 
different (sometimes contradictory) expectations as it plays the double roles.  
                                                 
358
  Xu Yong, The Double Role of the Village Cadre: Agent and Master, 21st Century, 
No. 42, Aug 1997, p152;  
359
  Deng Xiaoping, when talking about rural reforms, said, the reason why rural 
reforms are effective is because more autonomy is given to the peasants, Deng 
Xiaoping Wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping) Beijing: People’s Publishing 
Company, Volume 3, 1993, p 242;  
360
  Xu Yong, The Double Role of the Village Cadre: Agent and Master, 21st Century, 
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Firstly, the government places more and more pressure upon the committee system as 
agents. One of the CCP leaders, Peng Zhen, had warned that there would be two risks 
in implementing the village autonomy, one of them is that the government would 
assign too many tasks to village self-government organization. He used the metaphor 
of ‘thousands of thread above one single needle’ to describe the danger of this 
situation; the committees (the needle carrying too much thread) will be crushed under 
such pressure361. As Shen Yansheng pointed out, the tasks of collecting grains, 
collecting tax and carrying out family planning 362 , obviously are not the 
self-governing affairs. At the beginning of the implementation of self-government 
(during 1980s), the situation was not too bad. There were fewer government 
assignments and the village self-governments enjoyed more independence. However, 
as Xu Yong and others have noticed, during the eco-social transformation, there has 
been a dramatic increase in the tasks assigned by the local government. For example, 
more strict policies on family planning, which asked for a tighter control of the rural 
population; more taxes set up for various items which the committees have to collect 
from peasants. These tasks added more burden to the self-government organization 
while no supports, either financial or personnel, were received from the local 
government363. 
                                                                                                                                            
No. 42, Aug 1997, p152; 
361
  Peng Zhen, ‘Tongguo Qunzhong Zizhi Shixing Jiceng Zhijie Minzhu’ 
(Implementing Grassroots Direct Democracy through Mass Autonomy), Peng Zhen 
Wenxuan (Selected Works of Peng Zhen), Beijing: People’s Publishing Company, 
1996, p 611; cited by Shen Yansheng, Review and Comments on Village Autonomy 
and Studies of Village Autonomy, Modern China Studies, 2003:2, Issue No. 81, p110;  
362
 Family Planning is recognized as one of the basic state policy of China, since the 
early 1970s, it is implemented to control the growth of population 
363
  Xu Yong, The Double Role of the Village Cadre: Agent and Master, 21st Century, 
No. 42, Aug 1997, p153; 
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Other pressures come from the huge changes taking place in the economy and society. 
The urbanization of big cities attracted a great number of peasants, some of them have 
lost the farm land due to the expansion of urban construction, and others have come to 
cities to seek their fortune as they used to live in poor rural villages. Most of the 
young people went out to work in the cities, only old ones and children were left in 
the village. In some parts of rural China, especially those that are closed to the big 
cities, the village population has become less and less. For instance, in a town with a 
population of 24,000 in Zhejiang Province, over 6,000 were registered as working or 
doing business outside, in many villages, only the old, the weak, the disabled, the 
females and young children were left, and the committee members had to be chosen 
amongst these people364.  
 
Meanwhile, village committees are expected by the peasants of the village to provide 
good service and improve public welfare. Especially after the Reform, more villagers 
desire to enrich themselves with the help of the master-villagers’ committee. How to 
keep the balance between ‘agent’ and ‘master’ is the major question for villagers’ 
committee system.  
 
5.3 Incremental Mutual-Empowerment   
 
The debate on the influence of village autonomy in state-society relations covered a 
                                                 
364
  Wang Zhongren et al. ‘Lilun Xuzhihua: Cunmin Zizhi Shenhua de Beihou’ 
(Void Theory: Behind the Apotheosis of Villagers’ Autonomy), Shehui Kexue 
Luntan (Forum of Social Science), 2002:3, pp. 57-60; cited in Shen Yansheng, 
Review and Comments on Village Autonomy and Studies of Village Autonomy, 
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lot of questions and involved many scholars, Chinese researchers within China and 
the Western experts. A lot of empirical field work has been done, in some villages 
where the election was more democratic in nature, and in places where it was not so 
successful. This unevenly distributed and developed feature of the electoral practice 
seems to be agreed by all theorists working in the field. The support from the local 
government in the implementation of the direct election is very important. In places 
where the experiment is regarded as comparatively more successful, the recognition 
and supports of local (party) leaders played a significant role365. On the contrary, 
places that have failed to establish the electoral system, the negative attitude of local 
authority toward the grassroots autonomy can always be found.  
 
Because of this uneven development, it is actually very difficult to evaluate the whole 
implementation. The data of the year 1997 described 740,000 villages, 55,000 towns 
(xiangzhen) and 2,135 counties all over China. Other researchers have also realized 
that a lack of access to information makes impossible any realistic assessment of the 
conditions of village elections today.366  
 
However, a few insights can still be gained through researches done on a small scale. 
Some positive (probably democratic) influence of the village autonomy in 
transforming the state-society relationships can still be verified despite its problems 
and limits. A summarization of these insights is presented in the following 
paragraphs.  
                                                                                                                                            
Modern China Studies, 2003:2, Issue No. 81, pp.118-9;  
365
  Wang Xu, Grassroots Democracy in Rural Areas of China: Mutual 
Empowerment of State and Society, 21st Century, No. 40, April 1997, p152; 
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  Xu Wang, Mutual Empowerment of State and Peasantry: Village 
Self-Government in Rural China; New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p94; 
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Firstly, the grassroots democracy is regarded as the first step of initiating a democratic 
transition from bottom up. 367  The villagers’  committees were spontaneously 
formed by peasants and later recognized by the authority. After the makings of 
Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees, this system is encouraged by the centre 
government and pushed by the state to be implemented nationwide. The direct 
electoral principles and process are legalized by law; committee’s activities and the 
rights of villagers’ are protected; self-government and autonomy is realized in rural 
villages. 
 
The higher level – township level direct elections have already taken place in a 
number of places. Since 1998, electoral reforms have been experimented within some 
township governments and county governments in Sichuan, Shanxi, Guangdong, and 
Henan provinces. These experimental reforms were reported by the media, for 
instance, the direct election of the township Mayor in Suining was reported by 
Chengdu Shangbao (Chengdu Business Newspaper of Sichuan Province) on 29th, 
December, 1998; Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend of Guangdong Province) of 
15th January, 1999, reported on direct election for township Mayor; Yangchen 
Evening News reported the first direct election of County Mayor in Dapeng County 
on 28th April 1999; Xinhua Daily on 2nd April, 2000 also reported the election reform 
in Henan Province368.  
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As mentioned before, the ‘legitimacy downwards’ means that the direct elected 
village committees have more legitimacy than the township and county level 
government. This has resulted in tension in the structure. As exposed in the media, the 
corrupted township and county governments and party committees continually 
undermine this reform initiative at the grassroots level, various forms of resistance 
(violent as the extreme form) from the peasants happens now and then in order to 
counter the corrupted powers. This also demonstrates the urgent need for accelerating 
the reforms369.  
 
In Huang Weiping et al’s research paper, five different models of direct election for 
township mayor were investigated in comparison. The first such election took place in 
Buyun Town of Sichuan Province in 1998. According to the rules that have been 
announced before the voting, recommendation by any 30 electorates collectively is 
enough for nominating a candidate for township mayor. A list of 15 candidates was 
confirmed at this stage. At the second stage, first round voting was taken by a group 
of 162 people consisted of village cadres, villagers’ representatives, delegates to 
township people’s congress and cadres of township party committee and council. 
Two official candidates were confirmed (Zhou Xingyi and Cai Ronghui) together 
with another one recommended by the Party (Tang Xiaoqiu); these three candidates 
were taking part in the final round of voting. 6,236 electorates voted and Tang won 
with 50.19% of the votes. During the time, three candidates delivered altogether 13 
policy speeches, to talk about their political ambitions and answer questions. This 
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showed the principle of the competitive election370.  
 
Although there have been some experimental reforms at the higher level, it is declared 
by the centre that township election is illegal, as according to the laws that are 
relevant, the township electorates can only vote for delegates to the township people’
s congress, and the people’s congress elect township mayors. Thus it is not legally 
recognized under the present institution.  
 
Secondly, some theorists asserted that this initiative to improve administration in the 
countryside has realized a mutual empowerment of state and village371. The new 
institutional incentives of the village committee system have succeeded in 
strengthening the capacity of the state and empowering the villagers at the same time. 
Village autonomy is totally different from the political mobilization under the 
previous totalitarian regime. Some theorists have optimistically declared that, it is 
contradictory to the highly undemocratic politics of the state, and may facilitate 
China’s democratization in the long run.  
 
Local elections as ‘seeds of democracy372’ and grassroots reform as ‘a democratic 
breakthrough373’ are advocated by some optimists. However, for some researchers 
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  The details of the election, see Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend), 15th of 
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who are more realistic, they regarded village autonomy as the growth point of 
socialist democracy which is not a form of full modern democracy but may create an 
atmosphere for democracy374. However, the intention of the party centre to create 
these new institutional incentives is to achieve an effective compliance with it policies. 
It remains entrenched in its position of control which would not tolerate any kind of 
challenge, as the sceptics claim. They are more concerned about the efficiency of the 
authoritarian rule other than local democratic experiments.  
 
Other sceptics have come back to the meaning of democracy. The holding of elections 
alone can not be regarded as an indicator of democracy. It requires more institutions 
and restraints on ruling elites. As one sceptic stated, ‘if an election does not give to 
the popularly chosen leaders the power over taxes, budgets, appointments and general 
policy, it is not really part of a democratic process’375.  
 
Other problems include: first, most villages have not yet had free and fair elections, 
although the experiments have been carried out for over a decade. Second, in areas 
where elections have been regarded as relatively fair and successful, various forms of 
election irregularities still exists at almost every stage of the electoral process. Third, 
the challenge of the party apparatus in the village, as mentioned before, the village 
committee is the secondary authority in village, the state still invariably privileges its 
local party bases when there is conflicts between committee and party apparatus. It is 
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the party organ and party-state being empowered other than the villagers376. Fourth, 
the intervention of the higher township and county party committees and councils, the 
empowerment of peasants was seen as threat to their vested interests and authority. 
Fifth, the burden of tax collection, grain delivery and population control could be too 
much for the committees. Last but not least, the clashing role of the village 
committees as state agency and village master stays unsolved.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
The reform taking place in 80s and 90s in Chinese rural villages has attracted many 
China specialist and scholars to investigate, discuss and debate. Most of these 
researchers have tried to put this topic in the democratic literature. The optimists were 
encouraged by its democratic implications. The autonomous villager’s committee is a 
self-government organization which stands for the part of society as opposed to the 
state; while the sceptics emphasized the irregularities of the elections and challenges 
to this new born autonomy. However, after a careful comparison between the 
situations a decade ago and the present, a number of incremental progressive 
developments can be found.  
 
The spontaneously formed organization of peasants has provided a buffering zone 
between state and village community which may help to smooth the conflicts between 
state and society. The decentralization reform has increased the autonomy of peasants 
as a class, enhanced its organizational capacity, which resulted in the class solidarity. 
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These build the bases for collective action of the class. 377 Therefore, the priority of 
the democratic practice in rural China will deeply influence the future prospects of 
China’s political development.  
 
The village elections are also seen as ‘seeds of democracy378’ which stand for ‘a 
democratic breakthrough 379 ’. Despite its limits and problems, it increases the 
possibility of a democratized future for china.  
 
So far, we have investigated the two levels of the incremental model, the next chapter 
will be focused on the changes that have been taken place at the society level, the 
rising civil forces, especially press media. And a case study into the most authoritative 
newspaper—People’s Daily will be presented.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE PRESS MEDIA AS AN EMERGING CIVIL FORCE 
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6.0 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters, the incremental regime change and the grassroots democratic 
practice have been explored as part of the incremental model which is useful in 
understanding the changing nature of China’s state-society relationships. The regime 
has changed from a totalitarian Leninist party-state to a mixed (post-) authoritarian 
regime, ideologically still claimed to be communist, which has been modified by new 
slogans such as ‘three represents’; while economically developing capitalism 
(market economy in name) mixed with some remains of the old planned system. The 
domination of one party-the CCP is still unchallenged and entrenched; nonetheless 
three decades of reforms and opening up have brought some significant changes such 
as the strengthening of peasantry autonomy and the emerging civil society forces. 
Some China specialists have shown enthusiasm in investigating these trends in 
transforming the state and society relations and analysing the possible prospects for 
democracy and democratization in China. While according to some critics, the 
process of democratization is far from beginning, only a fundamental regime 
transformation (for instance, the party voluntarily gives up its power and allows for 
multi-party competitive elections), can be regarded as the starting of such a process.  
 
In this chapter, we will be looking into the literature concerning civil society and 
democracy. The press media as the one of the civil society forces in China will be 
fully investigated. The recent decade saw the emergence and expansion of 
Shiminbaos (civil newspaper), which provide abundant information to the ordinary 
Chinese, in turn, enlarged their right to know. While the authoritative newspapers, 
such as the newspapers issued by the Party and local government, have decreased in 
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terms of circulation and influence. Meanwhile, these newspapers started to change 
from a purely propaganda tool to more professionalized media. In the second part of 
this chapter, a case study in People’s Daily will demonstrate these changes over the 
last three decades.  
 
A lot of discussion has been taken on the debate about Chinese democratization in 
chapter 2 and 3. Amongst the democracy schools, there is one rich literature which 
can not be ignored when talking about democratization as a process; that is the 
literature on civil society.  
 
6.1 On Civil Society 
 
The concept of civil society can be traced to Aristotle and includes the contributions 
of such diverse political philosophers as Paine, Hegel, Ferguson, Marx, de 
Tocqueville and Gramsci. As one scholar concludes:  
 
Since the seventeenth century, the notion of civil society has evolved, 
migrated, been submerged, and re-emerged in diverse guises. The 
Anglo-Saxon tradition associated it with contract theory and individualism. 
The Scottish Enlightenment linked it to the rise of commercial society. In the 
German tradition, it was historicized and raised to a higher level of abstraction 
by Hegel and Marx. For Hobbes, civil society is the response to the perils of 
the state of nature, and for Hegel it reflects the growth of commerce as a 
sphere supposedly independent of politics. In Tocqueville, it fills the void left 
by the absence of an aristocracy. For Hegel, religion pertained to the higher 
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realm of state action, while for Tocqueville it was the voluntary expression of 
local self-organization. For Marx the association of workers into unions was a 
fundamental reality, while for Tocqueville it was the local newspaper which 
brought scattered American settlers into closer association with each other380. 
 
This huge diversity embodied in the literature of civil society presents researchers 
with difficulties in conceptualizing the term. Broadly speaking, civil society refers to 
the space between the individual and the state and consists of various organization s 
and institutions (independent and parastatal). Its definition could be:  
 
The aggregate of networks and institutions that either exist and act 
independently of the state or are official organizations capable of developing 
their own spontaneous views on national or local issues and then impressing 
these views on their members, on small groups and, finally, on the 
authorities381.  
 
For Michael Walzer, civil society is ‘the space of uncovered human association’382; 
whose members are free to enter or leave, to engage with or remain passive, as they 
please. This definition excludes such primary associations as the household or (in 
traditional societies) the church, whose membership is predetermined; also excludes 
                                                 
380
  Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience, 2001, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.70-1 
381
  Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation, 
1988, p.80; cited in John D. Nagle and Alison Mahr, Democracy and 
Democratization, 1999, p.64 
382
  Michael Walzer, ‘The Idea of Civil Society’, Dissent (Spring 1991), p.293; 
quoted in Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience, 2001, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.68 
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hierarchical institutions, such as conscripted armies and state bureaucracies, which 
impose vertical discipline on their members. Between these extremes, there may be an 
independent sphere of voluntary association where interactions are governed by some 
minimum principles of autonomy and mutual respect (civility). 383 
 
However, the definition of civil society is still ambiguous on the issues of whether 
trade unions occupy a central or a marginal role, or whether the media are to be 
viewed as internal or external384.  
 
In this thesis, the media is regarded as part of the civil society forces because: media 
plays an irreplaceable role in the formation of a modern society; media as forming 
public sphere which mediates between society and state, in which the pubic organises 
itself as the bearer of public opinion385.  
 
6.2 China’s Emerging Civil Society 
 
A great volume of discussion has been done on this topic. Generally speaking, 
researchers who believe that a civil society is gradually forming in China point to the 
phenomena such as the growth of the new middle class, the proliferation of NGOs and 
various social organizations, and the increased autonomy of the media.  
One of the main features of civil society is that there must be a considerable middle 
                                                 
383
  Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience, 2001, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), pp.68-9 
384
  Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience, 2001, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), p.71 
385
  Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An 
Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, translated by Thomas Burger and 
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class which is thought to be the bases of the democratic politics. This middle class or 
middle ranking of society is supposed to provide dynamics for democratization of 
domestic politics and foundations for implementation and consolidation of the 
democratic politics afterwards. Members of this middle class should have received 
high education, possess professional skills in their speciality, and should be 
economically independent. By virtue of the development of the Chinese economy, the 
China’s middle class has undergone significant growth in the recent years. 
One of the most important conditions for the growth of middle class is the increase of 
earnings of the people. The higher level of income can provide people with the 
opportunities to improve their status in society, change to a better way of living and 
therefore change their perceptions about individual self and the society, the viewpoint 
about what’s valuable, etc. Since the Chinese government launched the economic 
reform, China’s national economy has been under high development. This high speed 
of economic growth is demonstrated mostly by the growth rate of GDP.  
 During 1978-2000, the annual growth rate of GDP averaged as high as 9.51%, the 
GDP growth rate per person is about 8.13%. In 2000, China’s GDP is 7220 yuan per 
person, which is 4 times more than that of the year 1978 before the reform. The 
growth of wealth gives rise to a middle level class of people, who have received 
higher education, work in professional careers and have an annual income of above 
the middle level of the average Chinese families in urban cities. Along with the 
Reform and Opening-up, people have more liberty and they take part in forming 
numerous non-governmental organizations, guilds, and social associations. These 
organizations are providing some of the functions that used to be offered by the 
totalitarian party-state. The party-state has pulled back from some of the domains of 
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the society, a lot more in the economic activities, less in the political domain; which 
left some space for the operation of newly emerging civil society forces.  
 
6.3 The Press Media – Fourth Estate386 or Not? 
 
In the civil society literature, the media is one of the subjects which researchers are 
very keen to investigate. Therefore, when talking about the democratization process in 
China, it is a subject which can not easily be overlooked. As discussed in the 
introductory chapter, the starting point of my empirical research is the initiation of the 
Reform (around the late 1970s), in the following chapter, we will be looking into the 
evolution of China’s media during the reform era – how the media has changed from 
the pure ‘mouthpiece’ into taking some supervision responsibility as the ‘fourth 
power’.  
 
China’s mass media belongs to the category of Public Service Institutions (shiye 
danwei), which is different from the other category of Enterprises (qiye danwei). 
‘Shiye danwei’ and ‘qiye danwei’ both are units in the socialist system. The 
former is non-profit while the latter can be state-own, collective-own or private.  
Along with the other Public Service Institutions, the press, radio and TV stations 
receive subsidies from the central or corresponding local council. These subsidies 
were used for the everyday operation of the media and to pay the staffs who work in 
the press, radio and TV stations. Local media were under the supervision of the 
Propaganda Department of the local Party Committee. Not only the finance, the 
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personnel were controlled by the organs of the Party Committee; what issue can or 
cannot be covered in the report, who can or cannot be interviewed, all are decided 
according to the rules set up by the Party. As the same as in other Socialist states, the 
media serves as the ‘mouthpiece’, merely an instrument for political propaganda.  
 
After 1970s, the Reform gradually wave to mass media. In the 1980s, it took place 
firstly in the financial management in the press, radio stations and TV stations. The 
principle is to run a public service institution as a private enterprise, using business 
management as guidance for media management. This is the beginning of media 
marketization. Later in the 1990s, as the government keeps reducing the subsidies and 
allowances to the media, more fundamental change has occurred in this terrain as a 
large number of newspapers, magazines and broadcasting stations now have their own 
independent accounting system and have to assume sole responsibility for its profits 
or losses (zi fu ying kui). 
 
It would be unmanageable to investigate all the mass media, which consists of the 
press, radio stations, TV stations and the Internet. I will choose newspaper as the 
illustrative instance to demonstrate what effect the reform has had upon the mass 
media; and what implications one can draw from the trends that are taking place in 
China’s media.  
 
Generally speaking, there are changes from the following aspects, 
 
As the newspaper becomes more and more financially independent, the control of the 
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Propaganda Department over the personnel and the reporting activities is not as strong 
and direct as before.  
Independent accounting system means that the newspaper has to make profit in order 
to survive in the market; therefore, the consumers – readers’ demand becomes more 
important as it affects the circulation of the newspaper, which in term affects the 
profits made mainly from advertising.  
Meanwhile, the major group of consumers – readers have changed. Before the 1980s, 
the majority of the readers are from organs of government, public service units, 
schools, etc; most of them are cadres or intellectuals; most of them have the privilege 
of free subscription.  However, this has been changed and ordinary citizens now 
become the major consumers. Newspapers have to adapt to the changing needs of its 
new targeted market and compete fiercely with other newspapers in the market.  
Readers from various backgrounds created demands for various types of information, 
which stimulated the growth of the market. Not only had the circulation of the 
existing newspaper grown significantly, the number of the types of newspaper also 
increased considerably.  
During this process, newspapers which are adaptable and successful in attracting 
ordinary urban citizens grow tremendously quantitatively; while those which are run 
by organs of the Party Committees – those have not been quite reformed – have 
suffered steep decrease in circulation.  
The Press Industry in China has grown significantly.  
The marketization of the press does not necessarily mean that there has been more 
freedom in the press. However, to satisfy the demand of their readers, amongst whom 
there are more and more better-educated, and relatively wealthier people (middle 
class), newspapers have tried to provide the information that these people are 
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interested in, such as reporting some controversial/sensitive issues which were used to 
be tabooed topics, initiating investigative journalism, etc. 
 
6.3.1 The Reduction of Dangbaos and the Increase of Shiminbaos 
 
The types of newspapers have increased considerably since the late 1970s. In terms of 
the different issuer, it can be divided into two categories, the papers that are issued by 
organs of the Party and government, and ones that are not.  
 
6.3.1.1 Dangbaos 
 
Newspapers issued by organs of the Party and government. Generally people call 
them dangbao (party newspaper).  
 
This category includes newspapers that are issued and published by central or local 
Party Committees, local councils, other administrative organs, research institutions, 
and community groups. Most of these newspapers are sold to the lower levels down 
the power structure through free subscription.  For example, People’s Daily (renmin 
ribao), issued by the Central Party; Liberation Daily (jiefang ribao), issued by the 
Shanghai City Council; belong to this category. The readers of free subscription 
account for 90% and 83.3% of all circulation respectively387.  
 
                                                 
387
  ‘Touguo Yanwu Kan Shizhi’(To See the Substance Through the Smoke), Zhong 
Guo Ji Zhe (Chinese Journalist), 1997, 4th issue; cited by Tang Liang, Jianjin, 
Minzhu: Biange Zhong De Zhongguo Zhengzhi (Gradual democracy: Chinese Politics 
in transformation), 2004, p114 
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Dangbaos, especially those are issued by the Central or local Party Committees, are 
supposed to be the ‘mouthpiece’ of the Party. The circulation of dangbaos, therefore, 
depends upon the Party committees of all levels. Party organs and governments of all 
levels are required to subscribe to dangbaos as a political task; also party members are 
requested to subscribe, in order to ‘get informed of the party routes, guidelines and 
policies388’, and to carry them through the daily practice and work. This principle is 
to guarantee the circulation and the influence of dangbaos in party cells and all level 
administrative organs.  
 
However, during the Reform period, dangbaos have suffered a big decrease. For 
example, the circulation of Beijing Daily, issued by Party Committee of Beijing 
Municipality, has been cut down from 730,000 in 1981, a less of 558,000 in 1995, to a 
even less circulation of 360,000 in 1998; its circulation shrink more than half with 
less than two decades. Sichuan Daily, dangbao of Sichuan Province, also reduced 
from 780,000 in 1981 to less than 400,000 in 1998; also a reduction of more than 50%. 
Dangbaos of other provinces, such as Zhejiang and Guangdong, have not been 
influenced so dramatically by the market. The following table shows how the 
provincial-level party newspapers have decreased between 1981 and 1998.  
 
Table1 1: the Circulation Figures of Party Newspapers in Some Provinces and 
Municipalities (10,000)389 
                                                 
388
  Li Liangrong, Lin Hui, Shixi Shuangchong Yali Xia Dangbao Mianlin De 
Kunnan Jiqi Duice(Under the Double Pressures, the Difficulties that Party 
Newspapers are Facing and the Countermeasures), 
http://academic_old.mediachina.net/academic_zjlt_lw_view.jsp?id=3958, 31st, Dec. 
2005; translated by author herself.  
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  Tang Liang, Jianjin, Minzhu: Biange Zhong De Zhongguo Zhengzhi (Gradual 
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Year 
Beijing 
Daily 
(Beijing) 
Liberation 
Daily 
(Shanghai) 
Xinhua 
Daily 
(Jiangsu) 
Zhejiang 
Daily 
(Zhe 
jiang) 
Nanfang 
Daily 
(Guang 
dong) 
Sichuan 
Daily 
(Si 
chuan) 
Hubei 
Daily 
(Hubei) 
1981 73.1 91.9 70.0 48.6 66.0 78.0 42.0 
1985 58.6 84.1 71.9 55.4 63.6 71.71 48.5 
1990 55.8 60.7 53.6 42.5 78.1 62.6 35.6 
1995 44.3 60.9 38.0 37.0 85.1 40.3 30.0 
1998 36.0 49.7 40.1 40.8 65.4 33.9 26.1 
 
   
Or as shown in the graph below,  
Graph 1: 
the Circulation Figures of Party Newspapers in 
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democracy: Chinese Politics in transformation), 2004, p131; translated by author 
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Along with the provincial-level party newspapers, the central party newspapers are 
also downsizing. The following table demonstrates the circulation figures of some of 
the major central party newspapers during the period of 1981 and 2001, from which 
one can easily find the evidence of reduction. 
 
Table1 2: the Circulation Figures of Major Central Party Newspapers (10,000)390 
Year Renmin 
Daily 
(People’
s Daily) 
Guang 
ming  
Daily 
(Luminosity 
Daily ) 
Jingji  
Daily 
(Economic 
Daily) 
Jiefangjun 
Bao 
(Liberation 
Army  
News) 
Fazhi 
Daily 
(Legal 
Daily) 
Zhong 
guo 
Qing 
nian  
Bao 
(China 
Youth) 
Gongren 
Daily 
(Worker
s’ Daily) 
1981 500.0 105.7 90.0 150.0 53.0 290.0 182.1 
1985 500.0 101.2 170.0 110.0 143.6 230.9 229.9 
1990 309.0 43.5 84.3 62.1 151.0 138.7 169.0 
1995 217.1 31.2 35.0 49.5 115.0 103.0 106.0 
1998 200.1 30.3 57.8 47.0 68.4 64.3 68.5 
2001  27.6 50.0 47.3  54.0 39.0 
 
 
Graph 2: 
                                                                                                                                            
herself 
390
  Tang Liang, Jianjin, Minzhu: Biange Zhong De Zhongguo Zhengzhi 
(Incremental Democracy: Chinese Politics in transition), 2004, p132; translated by 
author herself 
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The People’s Daily, issued by the CPC Central Committee, is the most authoritative, 
influential daily newspaper of China, also, the daily with the largest circulation. It 
reduced significantly from 5000,000 in 1981 to only 2,001,000 in 1998, accounted for 
only 40% of the circulation figure two decades ago.  Guangming Daily, the national 
Party Newspaper, has decreased almost 3 quarters during the two decades. Jingji 
Daily (Economic Daily), issued by the State Council, although had been increased 
from 900,000 in 1981 to 1,700,000 in 1985, later was reduced notably to as less as 
350,000 in the middle 1990s; it recovered a bit in the next 6 years but the newest 
figure still shows reduction of more than two thirds of the peak. Fazhi Daily (Legal 
Daily), as the same as Economic Daily, firstly increased from 530,000 in 1981 to 
1,510,000 in 1990, but later decreased dramatically to 684,000 in 1998. Fazhi Daily is 
the only central party newspaper, whose circulation figure has actually grown after 
the Reform as compared to 1981, all of the others’ circulation declined steeply.  
 
The reduction in circulation of the party newspapers is due to various reasons, which 
can be concluded in the follows, 
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• The change of the readership.  
 
The majority of party newspaper readers are party members in all levels of party 
organs, cadres of the state council and local councils, officials in the state and 
government organs, intellectuals in universities and other academic institutions, 
management in all levels of enterprises. These people belong to the elite rank in China 
society. What these readers are interested is to capture the policy and guideline 
change of the Party, to get access to the information about the influential events both 
internationally and domestically.  
 
With the Reform and Opening-up, the ordinary urban citizens now make up the 
majority of the readership. These people are from different backgrounds and may 
have different demands for the news. Not only news in politics or the changing lines 
in the Party, but also local and community news, entertainment news, news about the 
dark side such as corruption and environmental pollutions; would be the pursuit of 
these new urban middle class. They do not enjoy free subscription by administrative 
provision, but spontaneously purchase the newspapers that they would like to read. 
The various evening news, metros and other city newspaper therefore provide these 
people with more choices.  
 
• The competition in the press market 
 
Between the mid-1950s to the late 1970s, China’s press system followed those in 
former Soviet Union and Eastern European states, which were set up in terms of 
Leninist theory on freedom of the press. Press is regarded as a tool of political 
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expression and education in socialist state system. After the planned economic system 
has been established nationwide, the press was operated under the model of planned 
economy. Like other Public Service institutions (shiye danwei), the outlay of the press 
was from the budget of the department in charge; often local councils. The cost of 
operation, staff salaries and equipment expenses are all included in the budget; while 
the post offices took the responsibility for subscription and circulation. Thus the press 
had no need to worry about financial profits or losses. The only income the press 
made was through the issuance as there was basically no advertisement. The press 
was financially dependent on the state.  
 
In the late 1970s, with the launch of the Reform, there was huge financial pressure 
upon the state, which called for an urgent transformation in the press system. In 1978, 
Ministry of Finance approved a report on implementation of enterprise management 
in People’s Daily and other seven press units, according to which, these newspapers 
could take a certain portion from the profits they make, and use it to improve staff 
salaries and welfare, or to reinvest in the newspaper. This is a big step from previous 
planned-operation into press marketization. On the 28th of January, 1979, Jiefang 
Daily (Liberation Daily) of Shanghai published two advertisements at the first time, 
which signalled the beginning of press market.  
 
Since then, the competition on the press market has become fiercer, which can be 
shown in the following aspects:  
 
The number of new press is growing. 
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Before the Reform, the major issuers of party newspapers are central and 
provincial-level party committees. After the Reform, most municipal-level and some 
county-level party committees started to issue party newspapers; the government of 
all levels also started to issue government news; the organs of central and local 
governments, especially those in charge of economy-related management, began to 
issue their own specialized newspapers; however, the most quantity of the type are the 
series newspapers that are created by the large and influential newspaper offices; for 
instance, People’s Daily created Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), Jinghua Shibao 
(Beijing Times), Guojijinrong Bao (International Finance News), Jiangnan Shibao 
(Jiangnan Times), Shichang Bao (Market Report), Jiangkang Shibao (Health Times), 
Huadong Xinwen (Huadong News), Huanan Xinwen (Huanan News), etc.  
 
The table below shows how many new types of newspapers have come out during the 
years between 1970 and 1998.  
 
Table 3: the Increase of types of Newspapers 391 
Year 1970 1978 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 
Types 42 186 361 1,246 1,446 2,089 2,053 
 
 
Graph 3: 
                                                 
391
  Tang Liang, Jianjin, Minzhu: Biange Zhong De Zhongguo Zhengzhi (Gradual 
democracy: Chinese Politics in transformation), 2004, p107; translated by author 
herself 
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Comparing the figure of 1970 with that of 1998, we can see a tremendous increase of 
50 times and more, which demonstrates how much the press market has grown during 
these years. 
 
The number of the circulation of the whole press is increasing. 
 
Along with the increase in the number of new papers, the circulation of the press as a 
whole has increased as well. The table below listed out the figures of the circulation 
between 1970 and 1998.  
 
Table 4: Figures of the Newspapers Circulation (10,000)392 
Year 1970 1978 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 
Circulation 1,301 4,280 7,050 14,811 13,986 17,230 18,211 
 
 
                                                 
392
  Tang Liang, Jianjin, Minzhu: Biange Zhong De Zhongguo Zhengzhi (Gradual 
democracy: Chinese Politics in transformation), 2004, p121; translated by author 
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As we can see in Table 1 and 2, the party newspapers have suffered major reduction 
during the same period of time; but the whole circulation has been increasing. One 
may easily draw a conclusion that, although the whole press market has grown bigger, 
but the share of party newspapers has shrank a lot, while the share of the new Shimin 
Bao (including evening news, metro and other city newspapers) has been enlarging 
along with the growth of the market cake.  
  
The revenue of advertising is increasing.  
 
Before the Reform, the major income of the press is from the subscription and from 
the administrative subsidies. However, as the market was introduced into the planned 
system, the newspapers started to rely on advertising revenue in order to survive in 
the competition. Nowadays, the advertising has become the major source of profits of 
most press, and also a driving force for the press marketization and industrialization. 
The table below shows the increase in the profits made from newspaper advertising.  
                                                                                                                                            
herself 
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Table 5: Growth of Advertising Profits in China’s Press Industry (100 Million 
Yuan)393 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Sum  6.80 9.60 16.20 37.70 50.50 64.70 77.69 99.83 104.35 
 
 
Graph 5: 
Growth of Advertising Profits in China’s Press Industry (100 
Million Yuan)
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The profits of newspapers advertising was only 680 million Yuan in 1990, eight years 
later, it increased to 10,435 million Yuan, nearly 15 times as much as that of the 1990. 
As the press industry become more market-oriented, newspapers compete with one 
another with the advertising market. In order to make more profits, the newspapers 
are trying to attract more readers the majority of whom are now the ordinary urban 
                                                 
393
  Cheng Hongmei, ‘Wo Guo Baozhi Guanggao Jingying Xianzhuang Fenxi’ 
(The Analysis of the Current Situation of Domestic Newspapers Advertising 
Management), Xinwen Zhanxian (News Battlefront), the 11th issue, 1999; cited in 
Tang Liang, Jianjin, Minzhu: Biange Zhong De Zhongguo Zhengzhi (Gradual 
democracy: Chinese Politics in transformation), 2004, p121; translated by author 
herself 
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people instead of the political and economic elites. The party newspapers, because of 
the political guidelines they have to obey, have less space for innovation and 
transformation. While the other newspapers, which are not so ideology-binding, such 
as those run by the large newspaper offices, are able to seize the opportunity of the 
Reform and adapt to the changing taste of targeted readership, which in turn bring 
incremental evolution into the reporting and journalism.  
 
6.3.1.2 Shiminbaos 
 
Evening News, Metros, and other urban newspapers. Generally, these newspapers as a 
whole are called shimin bao (civil newspapers). 
 
One of the most significant changes that have been taking place in the China’s press 
media since the Reform is the prevalence of various evening news, metros, and other 
urban newspapers which are providing ordinary urban dwellers information of all 
kinds:  
 
• The legal news; 
• The market and investment news; 
• The culture and entertainment news; 
• The sports news; 
• The local social and community news. 
 
Most of these newspapers were originally created by large newspapers offices which 
are main-stream party newspapers. These main-stream party newspapers are regarded 
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as the ‘mouthpiece’ and under the direct leadership and control of Propaganda 
Department of Party Committee. Their function is to guide the public opinion in 
political mobilization. When these newspaper offices started to issue shimin baos, the 
original intention was to make shimin baos the complementary part of party 
newspapers; in a word, to provide readers with other information and service which 
the party newspaper was unable to supply, such as entertainment and financial news. 
The control over shimin baos was therefore not as strict as that upon the party 
newspapers in the first place, which in fact created a relatively more open space for 
the reporters and journalists.  
 
During these years of continuous reform, there is significant revolution taking place in 
press industry, these changes at the same time have influence in the state-society 
relations of China, and push the Reform into a more deep and irreversible degree. 
These changes are:  
 
Firstly, the press provides more information to ordinary people, which enlarges 
people’s right to know.  
 
The news about the international community increased accompanies the embedded 
opening up. Before the Reform, the information from outside China is blocked by the 
CCP propaganda apparatus. Only the information such as the success of international 
proletariat movements would be broadcast as to glorify the great Marxism-Leninism. 
After the opening-up, the readers of the press media require more information from 
the outside world, and the integration of China’s economy into the world also 
demands for information from all over the globe.  
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People’s Daily, the largest Party newspaper outlet, started to increase the amount of 
international reports. One page is used to report some of the most influential 
international events, and the space of another two pages is used to cover other news of 
the international community. However, it still cannot fulfil the increase of the 
demands for information. Thus in 1993, the Global Times is issued by People’s Daily 
(out on Tuesdays and Fridays) to meet the growing desire for international news. 
Other newspaper offices, seen the success of Global Times, started to launch their 
own newspapers on international reports. Twenty-First Century Global Reports (21 
Shiji Huanqiu Baodao) was created by the Southern Daily News Group (Nanfang 
Baoye Jituan) in 2002.  
 
Since the Reform, the content of the international reports has been enlarged to cover 
many issues such as international political economy, information of other countries on 
political, economical, social and cultural aspects. The party newspapers are more 
focused on China’s diplomatic events and are more ideologically sensitive in the 
reports; while shiminbaos (citizen newspapers) covers more information and can be 
more flexible in its reporting style to attract readers. These newspapers sometimes 
cover events that could be politically sensitive. For instance, the Twenty-First Century 
Global Reports used space of two pages to report in detail the divergence on the issue 
of human rights between China and the US in 2002 after the 13th round of Sino-US 
human rights dialogue394.  
 
Secondly, the press becomes more professional in its reporting. The investigative 
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journalism is practised, which act as the surveillance of the authority. Its reports on 
the dark side, such as issues of corruption and environmental degradation; sometimes 
are allowed or even encouraged by the central or local authority. As we discussed 
before, the problems that the government have to tackle with are so difficult that the 
decentralized central government can not solve. The exposure of these problems may 
help the authority to deal with them; at the same time, these reports provoked 
discussion between specialists and experts as well as between ordinary people. In this 
sense, it enlarged people’s political participation.  
 
All newspapers were required to release the news provided by the New China News 
Agency before the Reform. After decades of Reform, especially after the press 
marketization, newspaper outlets started to produce exclusive reports on some 
important events. They would send out own report team to the spots of events. Also, 
critical reports towards the corrupted party carders and leaders and reports on 
disclosure of the dark side of the society are now taking more space on the pages. For 
instance, the Xinkuaibao (News Express) reported exclusively on the frauds of the 
College Entrance Examination in Guangdong Province, which resulted in 
considerable social uproars395.  
 
Last but not least, the press reports can create and guide the public opinion on the 
Reform. For example, before the Reforms, the newspapers report emphasize the 
benefits of the Reforms, which can help with the smooth implementation of the 
Reforms.  
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  21 Shiji Huanqiu Baodao (Twenty-First Century Global Reports), 23-12-2002;  
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As we discussed before, the figures demonstrated in the tables also provide evidence 
that, shimin baos are taking the place of party newspapers as the main-stream paper 
both in their influence and popularity. Once the freedom of press is enlarged, it seems 
impossible to reverse the trend. Although there is still a long way to reach the 
complete freedom of press, Chinese journalists will be inspired by the prospect of 
rights of free reporting and investigation, at the moment, they will keep pushing the 
borderline within the existing system in order to get more freedom. This will add to 
the incremental democratization that is taking place in China.  
 
Due to the censorship by the authority, Chinese media did not provide sufficient 
information about the spreading of SARS before 20th April, 2003. International 
criticism towards China’s blocking information raised a new round of debate on the 
relationship between autonomous media and authoritarian party-state. In fact, some 
newspapers did report on SARS according to the clue provided by readers396.   
 
As discussed in this chapter, the changes taking place in press media can be regarded 
as a good sign for the growth of a more autonomous press. Although the changes are 
very limited and the counter-force (from the authoritarian state) is very powerful. The 
discourse is following the incremental and progressive model.  
 
6.4 Case study: the incremental evolution in People’s Daily  
 
After examining the change of the whole press media in the past 30 years, it is 
                                                                                                                                            
395
  Xinkuaibao (News Express) reports, from 9th July to 17th July in 2000;   
396
  For instance, Yangcheng Evening News, (electronic edition), 3-1-2003;  
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necessary to do a case study into one specific newspaper which can better illustrate 
the theme of this thesis.  People’s Daily, which was established on 15, June, 1948, is 
one of the prime print media in China; it is the most important Dangbao (Party 
newspaper). It has status as separate government ministry and it director is member of 
the party’s Central Committee.  
 
The People’s Daily is a daily newspaper; it is the organ of the Central Committee of 
the CCP. It has a circulation of 2,053,100 in 2007 domestically, together with its 
overseas edition of 165,000; altogether its circulation in 2007 is 2,218,100397. In 
addition to the Chinese edition, it has editions in other languages such as English, 
French, Spanish, Japanese, Russian and Arabic.  
 
People’s Daily provides information on points of views of the Party. The editorials of 
People’s Daily publicize the decisions and guidance in the policies made by the Party. 
Its legitimacy is not challenged as it expresses the views of the highest level. Some of 
the editorials even in some way influenced or changed the history. Especially after 
1949, the beginning of an era is often marked by the publication of editorial articles 
from People’s Daily, such as Cultural Revolution, the Reform and Opening-up. These 
editorials are considered as the authoritative statement of the government, and they 
are always accompanied by a series of political changes later in the nationwide. Apart 
from propaganda on government policy, the rising or falling of a political figure, 
always the most paramount ones, is clearly shown in People’s Daily, especially on 
the front page. The name of a new political figure appears in the title of the first 
                                                 
397
  China Journalism Yearbook (2008), p 600; ISSN1002-0012 
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article on the front page always means this person is becoming the leader or one of the 
leaders; while the sudden disappearance of the name of a person, who used to have a 
high coverage in People’s Daily shows that this politician either died or has fallen 
from his paramount position, in most situations, purged by other power. The appraisal 
towards a passed political leader is also publicized by People’s Daily and other 
newspaper has to follow its tone. People’s Daily provides one of the few windows 
through which others could make conjectures about the internal power struggles of 
the Party. There are also commentaries engaged by a special arrangement, which 
transfer the viewpoints of the officials towards domestic or international affairs. 
Commentaries are different from editorials as the later contains more authoritative 
statement, however, they all must be approved by the officials. Political observers, 
both domestically or internationally, try to find the real significations of the Party 
through the words of the articles on People’s Daily.  
 
The placement of an article is usually more important than the content of it. 
Especially on the front page, most of the articles are devoted to government activities, 
such as Party conference, official visits from another country, or leader’s speeches. 
The content is considered as authoritative and dry, while the placement of the articles 
indicates more information.398 The activities of the paramount leader always take the 
most noticeable places on the front page.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, since mid 1990s, the government has reduce 
the subsidies to Dangbaos, People’s Daily is also facing this financial difficulty along 
                                                 
398
 will be elaborated in the following content 
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with the fierce competition with other international press and domestic newspaper. It 
created an online edition and web bulletin forums in 1997; the most well-known 
forum is Strong Nation Forum. These progressive changes demonstrate the effort of 
People’s Daily to maintain its paramount status in China’s media in the internet era.  
 
During the trip of the author to China, she visited Shanxi Provincial Library, where 
she was able to get access to the copies of People’s Daily published in former years. 
The original issues of People’s Daily, especially those before 2000, are kept as 
archives in the library. The original issues are not allowed to be removed from the 
library and there is also a fee to pay to have a view. The procedure is like this, one 
tells one of the staff which issue he/she needs to read, after the payment, this staff will 
go in and take that issue out, and then one can read it in the special reading room of 
the library under the supervision of the staff, when finish, the staff will take the issue 
back to the archive room immediately. Normally, photocopy is not allowed. However, 
after the author explained that it is for research use, the staff agreed to photocopy the 
front page only. The front page of randomly picked 32 issues, one from each year 
(1976 – 2008), was photocopies. These randomly picked 32 front pages are all in 
Chinese. A study into these copies will better illustrate the reforms and evolution in 
China’s press media.  
 
6.4.1 Diversified Content  
 
One of the most significant progresses in the media reform is that the content of the 
newspaper has become more and more diverse and autonomous. The content of the 
articles of People’s Daily covers more aspects of the society than before. Issues such 
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as ideological propaganda, government policies, official activities, progress on 
reforms in agriculture, industry, coal supply, are the most frequently reported content. 
However, stories of regular people, debates on some social or political issues which 
are not yet settled by the authority, can also be found in the front page in the recent 
years. Instead of one whole front page devoted to one huge article about some 
ideological discussions, which are more commonly found in the issues of 1970s and 
the early 1980s; more articles, short commentaries, photo news, critical reports, make 
the front page more interesting and more readable in the 1990s and after 2000. 
Commercial advertisement also appears on the Front page, which is not imaginable 
just a decade ago. From the following discussions, we can see how much the front 
page of People’s Daily has evolved from a pure ideological platform to a more 
diversified and professionalized newspaper.  
Table 6: Content 
Date 
Number 
of 
articles399 
Editorials/ 
Commenta-
ries 
Political 
articles
400
 
Economic 
articles401 
Photo 
news
402
 
Name of the leader(s) 
1-11-1976 3403 2 0 1 0 Mao Zedong Hua Guofeng 
1-11-1977 1404 1 0 0 0 Mao Zedong Hua Guofeng 
1-11-1978 7 1 0 6 0  
3-10-1979 4 1 3 0 2 
Hua Guofeng 
Ye Jianying 
Deng Xiaoping 
Li Xiannian 
1-11-1980 11 1 4 6 2 Li Xiannian 
                                                 
399
 Including all articles on the front page, however, slogans, advertisement, or index 
are not included 
400
 Including all articles on political events, such as Party conferences, government 
policies, official’s activities, foreign visits, etc 
401
 Including all articles on economic reforms, agricultural and industrial progress, 
stories of regular people, sports news and so on 
402
 Articles with photos 
403
 Plus one slogan box on the upper right, which contains Mao’s words 
404
 Plus one slogan box on the upper right, which contains some words from Hua’s 
Political Report to the 11th Party’s Congress 
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1-10-1981 5 0 4 1 1 Ye Jianying Zhao Ziyang 
1-11-1982 6405 1 2 3 1 Hu Yaobang Wan Li 
1-9-1983 12 1 5 6406 3 Chen Pixian Deng Xiaoping 
7-9-1984 8 1 3 4 1 Li Xiannian Peng Zhen 
1-10-1985 10 1 6 3 1 
Zhao Ziyang 
Wang Zhen 
Peng Zhen 
2-11-1986 12 2 5 5 1 
Deng Xiaoping 
Hu Yaobang 
Zhao Ziyang 
1-11-1987 9407 1 4 4 1 Zhao Ziyang 
2-2-1988 15408 1 8 6 2 Zhao Ziyang 
3-1-1989 12 2 0 10409 2  
2-4-1990 8 1 6 1 1 
Jiang Zemin 
Yang Shangkun 
Li Peng 
Wan Li 
2-5-1991 8 2 5 1 1 
Jiang Zemin 
Li Peng 
Wang Zhen 
2-1-1992 10 1 1 8 2 
Jiang Zemin 
Li Peng 
Qiao Shi 
1-1-1993 12 2 2 8 2 Jiang Zemin Yang Shangkun 
2-2-1994 7 2 5 0 1 Hu Jintao 
4-2-1995 13 1 1 11 2 Jiang Zemin 
5-1-1996 14 1 5 8 1 Jiang Zemin 
2-7-1997
410
 
4 0 4 0 3 Jiang Zemin Li Peng 
18-1-1998 11 1 5 5 2 Li Lanqing 
18-1-2000 9411 1 6 2 1 
Jiang Zemin 
Li Peng 
Zhu Rongji 
3-1-2001 8 2 5 1 1  
                                                 
405
 There is an index box on the lower left, which contains the headlines of the 
Capital newspapers on that day 
406
 One of the 6 articles is sports news, this is the first time sports news has appeared 
on the front page in the samples collected 
407
 Including 2 articles on international news 
408
 Including 1 articles on international news 
409
 Including one report on accident 
410
 The first day after Hong Kong came back to China’s sovereignty 
411
 Plus one small piece of advitisement 
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17-1-2002 14412 0 5 9 2 
Jiang Zemin 
Li Peng 
Zhu Rongji 
17-1-2003 10 1 0 9 4  
2-7-2004 11413 0 5 6 2 Zeng Qinghong 
6-4-2005 10414 0 6 4 3 
Wen Jiabao 
Huang Ju 
Jia Qinglin 
9-1-2006 11415 3 6 2 1 Wen Jiabao 
27-1-2007 12416 1 8 3 1 Wu Bangguo Wen Jiabao 
7-1-2008 9417 0 0 9 3  
 
 
For the change of the total number of articles on the front page can be seen from the 
following graph, 
Graph 6 
total number of all articles
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6.4.2 Figures of the articles  
                                                 
412
 Plus one small piece of advitisement and Index 
413
 Plus one small piece of advitisement and Index 
414
 Plus one small piece of advitisement and Index 
415
 Plus one small piece of advitisement and Index 
416
 Plus two small pieces of advitisement and Index 
417
 Plus two small pieces of advitisement and Index 
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Generally speaking, there is an increase in the figure of the total amount of the articles 
through these decades. The line fluctuates more in the years before mid 1990s. During 
which years, People’s Daily is very much closed to the core of the power struggling 
between the Reformers and the Conservatives; which group is taking the lead can also 
be shown from the names that appeared on the front page. While noticeably after the 
year 2000, the figures become more stabilized, which shows the page settings have 
followed one style which is a more fragmented style compared to before.  
  
From Table 6 and Graph 6, the lowest figure is 1, which is in the year 1977, while the 
highest figure is 15, which is in the year 1988. This has to be explained with the 
events of the year. 1977 marked an ideological peak and 1988 sees the rising of the 
democratic movements.  
 
Mao Zedong died on the 9th of September, 1976. The Cultural Revolution, which was 
initiated by him, was brought to an end after his death. The Gang of Four418 were 
arrested. Hua Guofeng became the Chairman of CCP. However, he stands for the 
people in the Party who want to stick to Mao’s doctrine of class struggle and 
proletarian revolution. In 1977, he asked people to continue to study Mao’s theories. 
On the front page of People’s Daily on the 1st, November, 1977, the whole page was 
devoted to one huge article. The title is Chairman Mao’s Theory on the Division of 
                                                 
418
 The Gang of Four refers to a politial group formed during the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976), they are Jiang Qing (Mao’s wife), Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and 
Wang Hongwen. 
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Three Worlds is the Great Contribution to Marx-Leninism419, and the author is the 
Newsroom of People’s Daily. On the right, next to the masthead, there is a box which 
contains quotation from Chairman Hua’s political report submitted to the 11th 
National Congress of CCP. It says, Mao’s theory of the division of three worlds 
points to the great direction of the current international battle, as it tells us who is the 
main revolutionary force, who is the main enemy, who is the middle force that can 
become alignment; therefore the international proletariats can form the more 
extensive unified battlefront to oppose its main enemy. The whole front page of this 
newspaper thus becomes the platform for pure ideological propaganda.   
 
1988 is the year before 1989, when the student movements rose and cracked down. As 
discussed in the previous chapters, the dissents such as Fang Lizhi and others who 
were inspired by the Beijing Spring Liberalization movement of late 1970s, and the 
student movements of 1986420, became more active in 1988. Their criticism and 
dissatisfaction toward the government was expressed implicitly or boldly in their 
speeches, seminars and colloquiums in the universities of Beijing. Most of them are 
well-known intellectuals. For instance, Fang Lizhi, the former vice president of 
Chinese Science and Technology University, he was removed from office in the name 
of ‘bourgeoisie liberalization’ in 1987. However, the dismissal did not make him 
less well-known. He, together with other intellectuals who were purged in the 
anti-bourgeoisie liberation movement, were considered as the conscience of the 
society.  At that time, Zhao Ziyang, who is considered as a reform figure, was the 
general secretary of CCP, (although Deng was the de facto head), whilst Li Peng, 
                                                 
419
  Mao Zhuxi Guangyu San Ge Shijie Huafen de Lilun shi dui Makesi Lienin Zhuyi 
de Zhongda Gongxian; 1th of November, 1977, People’s Daily, issue no. 10707 
 267 
 
 
together with other seniors are seen as the opposing conservative figures. The 
intellectuals criticize the existing economic system, which is supported by the 
conservatives. The reformers also want to change the existing system; therefore, in the 
sense, the intellectual movements helped the reformers to gain power over the 
conservatives. The reformers easily become the sympathizers of the movements. 
However, the reformers would not agree much with the ideas of a pure liberal 
democracy raised by the dissidents. When it is considered as going too far over the 
boundary, the authority will take actions, which resulted in the 1989 incidents.  
 
On the front page of People’s Daily of February the 2nd, 1988, there are 15 articles, 
including 1 piece of commentary, 8 pieces on political news, 6 on economical news, 
and two photos. Compared to the front page of 1st, November, 1977, the content on 
this front page is more diversified and the set up is more fragmented. The place where 
the quotation box used to be is used for a small piece of news, which is about the head 
of the State Bureau of Statistics asking the statisticians to dedicate to their profession, 
not according to the wills of their superiors, and the violation of Statistic Law will not 
be tolerated.  After the revelation of the falsification in the statistics of Yan Chuan 
County’s annual report, the head of the State Bureau of Statistics gave this speech, as 
he has noticed that in some other places, the local authority interferes in the work of 
the statisticians and asks them to make reports not according to the facts. He considers 
this as the deviation from the rules of ‘seek truth from facts’421 and violation of the 
Statistic Law. ‘Seek truth from facts’ is the Party slogan supported by Deng and his 
                                                                                                                                            
420
  See Chapter 3 
421
  In the discussion of ‘the criterion of truth’ initiated by Hu Yaobang as to 
oppose to Hua Guofeng’s two whatever doctrine, ‘free the thought and seek truth 
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followers. After the discussion of ‘the criterion of truth ’in which Deng successfully 
purged Hua Guofeng, ‘free the thought’ and ‘seek truth from facts’ appears more 
and more frequently on newspapers replacing Chairman Mao’s words. The first two 
reports are about Zhao Ziyang’s activities. The first one is him praising Zhang 
Xingrang’s creation of ‘Work Full Load’ Method, which Zhao thinks should be 
recommended to other factories and enterprises. At the time, Zhao was in name the 
highest figure in CCP although de facto Deng was the most powerful leader. Deng’s 
name is not appearing on the front page of this issue whilst Zhao’s name takes the 
most important positions of this page, however, it doesn’t mean that Zhao is taking 
place of Deng. Because in the coming year, when the student movement arise, Zhao 
was quickly removed by the elders of the party, and his name never appears in the 
front page until his death422.  
 
There is a noticeable sudden drop in the year 1997 from the above graph. The front 
page of People’s Daily on 2nd of July, 1997 contains only 4 articles and all of them 
are political. This is because it is the day after 1st of July, 1997, on which day the 
sovereignty of Hong Kong was transferred from the United Kingdom to the PRC and 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was established. All the articles on the 
front page are to celebrate the returning of Hong Kong and the establishment of the 
Special Administrative Region. No other news is more important and that’s why the 
whole front page is devoted to this event. The names of Jiang Zemin and Li Peng 
appear in all the titles of the articles. Deng died on 19th February, 1997. His passing 
                                                                                                                                            
from facts’ later became the doctrine of the Party 
422
  When Zhao died in 2005, his death was reported by the Xinhua News Agency  
 269 
 
 
away has made Jiang and Li, two of the most powerful political figures. Jiang Zemin’
s titles include, the General Secretary of the CCP, the President of the PRC and the 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission, he was appointed by Deng as the 
General Secretary in 1989, replacing Zhao Ziyang. However, Deng’s death has 
finally made him the real leader of the Party. 
 
From the graph that’s above, it is also noticeable that the after 1997, the fluctuation is 
less than those years before, which means the page settings on the front page has 
become more of a stabilised style with a certain quantity of articles. The time when a 
huge ideological thesis dominates the whole front page has become history and once 
the evolution takes place and becomes more stabilized, it is impossible to reverse the 
direction.  
 
6.4.3 Editorials and commentaries 
 
The editorials and commentaries of People’s Daily, especially those on the front page 
have always been of great importance both politically and economically. Some of the 
editorials are so important that they were recorded as the division of a new era, or 
beginning of a major political/economical event, or a change of ideological stands of 
the Party. It is worth investigating into each important editorial to see what change 
has taken place in People’s Daily.  
 
There are quite a few types of commentaries with different names of the columns. An 
                                                                                                                                            
briefly 
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editorial is usually the formal statement or the official stand of People’s Daily and the 
Party. There are other commentaries or pieces of viewpoints which are not so formal 
but also influential. In the years before the Reform, the commentaries are always 
published for propaganda use, for instance, to initiate people’s movement and to 
mobilize some social groups; they can also be used in the power struggle between 
different political groups, for instance, as discussed in the previous chapters, between 
the reformers and the conservatives. It is noticeable that there is fierce debate in the 
early stage of the Reform era between more conservative ideas and the new, 
reforming ones which can be found in the commentaries of People’s Daily. However, 
after the initiation of the Reform, especially after the late 1990s, the importance of 
editorials or commentaries is not seen as the same as before. That explains why on the 
front pages of People’s Daily after late 1990s which are collected for this research, 
one can not always find a place for formal editorials or not-so-formal 
commentaries423.  
 
In the issues before the Reform (starting in 1978), one can easily find that the 
editorials or commentaries are full of ideological slogans and expressions. For 
example, the title of the short commentary on the front page of People’s Daily, 1st, 11, 
1976, is to Grab back the Loss in Production Caused by the Gang of Four (Ba 
Sirenbang Pohuai Shengchang de Sunshi Duo Huilai). As discussed before, 1976 saw 
the death of Mao and the end of the Cultural Revolution. This issue was published 
after the Gang of Four were arrested and Hua Guofeng became the Chairman of the 
Party. The whole front page contains two pieces of news, one commentary, one index 
                                                 
423
  As shown in Table 6, for the issues collected from the years 1997, 2002, 2004, 
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box of the Red Flag Magazine, and one quotation box with Mao’s words. At the time 
when this paper was issued, Hua Guofeng was seen as the supreme leader replacing 
Mao, thus all three articles were praising his victory and criticizing the Gang of Four. 
Words with strong ideological colour appear the most, such as, revolution, people’s 
army, socialism, proletariat, and bourgeois, and so on. It is interesting that in the 
second article, it reports the productivity of the Chemical Industry Bureau of Beijing 
has been improved, and this is all due to the break of the plot of Gang of Four. For 
instance, a deputy chief, who is over 60 years old, was about to get retirement, 
however, upon hearing the good news (arrest of the Gang of Four), he changed his 
decision and was willing to ‘work hard for another one or two decades’. Mao’s 
words are also quoted several times in the articles.  
 
Another feature for the issues before the Reform years is that the editorials are always 
longer than those issued after 1978. For example, as discussed previously, the People’
s Daily on 1st, 11, 1977, the whole front page was occupied by one huge editorial, 
Chairman Mao’s Theory on the Division of Three Worlds is the Great Contribution 
to Marx-Leninism424. At the end of this page, it says, continues in Page 2, which 
means even the whole page is not enough for this lengthy article written by the 
Newsroom of the People’s Daily. In this article, Mao is called as the great leader and 
guide; and armed with his thought, Chinese people can overcome any difficulty and 
reach the victory of the great revolution. Although Hua’s name is not mentioned 
anywhere in the whole article, his words appear in the quotation box where Mao’s 
                                                                                                                                            
2005 and 2008, there are no editorials or commentaries on the front page.  
424
  Mao Zhuxi Guangyu San Ge Shijie Huafen de Lilun shi dui Makesi Lienin Zhuyi 
de Zhongda Gongxian; 1th of November, 1977, People’s Dail, issue no. 10707 
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words used to be425. Hua was appointed as the successor by Mao when he was alive. 
By showing his loyalty to Mao’s doctrine in some way justifies Hua’s status as the 
supreme leader. That’s why Hua threw out Two Whatevers as opposed to the ideas of 
reform by Deng and others. However, in 1978, at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh 
Party Congress, CCP has changed its goal from class struggle to economic 
construction. Change can also be found in the Party’s newspaper, for example, in the 
commentary of People’s Daily on 1, 11, 1978, the economic construction and 
modernization become the theme of this article. Its title is ‘to eliminate the tailed 
project’  (Xiaomie Weiba Gongcheng). Weiba Gongcheng is an expression in 
Chinese, which means the projects which are not completed within the planned time 
and delayed for a few years. This article is written by the commentator of the People’
s Daily. It criticises the slow construction in the New Huangpu Port (in Guangzhou), 
and asks for support from both the central and local authorities to speed up the 
construction. It says that infrastructure construction is crucial in the task of 
modernization and asks for effective and efficient solutions to these projects.  
 
The commentaries and the editorials on the People’s Daily also indicate the power 
struggle between different groups within the Party. From 1978 to 1981, the battle is 
between the reformers (Deng and his followers Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang) and 
the Two Whateverers (Hua Guofeng and others known as whatever faction). Hu 
initiated the discussion of ‘the criterion of truth ’in 1978, which aims to criticize the 
Two Whatevers doctrine. As the Party newspaper, People’s Daily was one of the 
main battlefields where the articles involved in the discussion of the ‘criterion of 
                                                 
425
  As seen on the front page of People’s Daily on 1, 11, 1976 
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truth’ were published. For example, on the front page of People’s Daily, on 3rd 
October, 1979426, the first article is a commentary written by the commentator of 
People’s Daily. The title is ‘Duanzheng dui Makesi Zhuyi de Taidu’ (to Treat 
Marxism with a Right Attitude). It says that the discussion of practise as the sole 
criterion of truth has been on for over a year, and it is going deeply in a wider scale. It 
asks what the right attitude towards Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought should be, or 
AKA, how to continue to stick to Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought. It asks for 
freeing the thought. It says that Mao Zedong himself is a believer in the principle of 
‘seeking truth from facts’. It also makes an important judgement which seems bold 
in the years when Mao’s influence still hugely exists that, Mao is a great Marxist but 
he is not a ‘prophet’, or ‘god’. Here, it makes a wise division between Mao’s 
Thought and Mao himself, as opposed to Hua’s ‘whatever policy decisions 
Chairman Mao made we will resolutely uphold, whatever instructions Chairman Mao 
gave we will unswervingly follow’427. It demonstrates that to stick to Two Whatevers 
doctrine is against Mao himself as Mao is a believer in ‘seeking truth from facts’. In 
the commentary, any name of whatever faction is not mentioned at all. It is because, 
at that time, Hua is still in name the supreme leader of the Party. It also explains why 
in the other two articles below the commentary on the same page, Hua’s name 
appears before Deng and others. After the success of the discussion of the ‘criterion 
of truth’, Hua was denounced for promoting the Two Whatevers policy, and Deng’s 
supporters, Zhao Ziyang took his place as Premier in 1980, Hu Yaobang as Party 
                                                 
426
  Issue no, 11408 
427
  This statement appears in a editorial, entitled ‘Study the Documents Well and 
Grasp the Key Link’, on 7th February, 1977 on People’s Daily 
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Chairman in 1981; that explains why Hua’s name was replaced by Zhao and Hu in 
the issues collected in 1980 and 1981.  
 
The editorial on the front page of People’s Daily of 1st, November, 1980, is about 
how to strengthen the production responsibility system in agriculture. It is one of the 
most important editorials in the Reform era with regard to the agricultural reform. It 
praised one form of agricultural production created by the farmers themselves. The 
farmland, which is owned by the state, is divided into portions and each farmer is 
responsible for their own piece of land. Farmland is not their property, but they have 
the right to use and cultivate. Their earnings from the land is divided into three parts, 
one for the state, one for the collectivity, the rest belongs to individuals. In the 
editorial, it confirms that this new system helps to increase their enthusiasm, and 
improves the productivity, because the portions to be given to the state and the 
collectivity are more or less fixed, the more they harvest from the farmland, the more 
the farmers can take home and save. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, due to the 
devastating effect of the Cultural Revolution, the national economy worsened, as the 
editorial says, nearly 100 million people are living in a very poor state, most of them 
are farmers who live in remote rural area. This new system is spontaneously 
supported by some of these farmers. However, it also says that this new form of 
production responsibility system in agriculture is different from capitalism and it is 
dependent upon the socialist economy. Here, it makes clear that reform is not the 
abandonment of socialism and embrace of capitalism. This is to verify the correct 
political stand which would avoid some criticism from the people who want to stick 
to the old system (planned economy), and to pave the way to wider and deeper 
reforms in other areas as well. This kind of statements (put on socialist label) appear 
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all the time at the early stage of the Reform, however, it gradually becomes less in the 
late 1990s as the debate over the path of socialism and capitalism becomes less 
intensive. 
 
The commentaries and editorials I collected between 1982 to the early 1989 have the 
similar tone set by the editorial on the front page of People’s Daily of 1st, November, 
1980, which is reforming the old system. That would involve, advocating the Reform, 
setting out the goals and the principles, criticizing the old mechanism together with 
the old bureaucratic effects and deficiency, pointing out the advantages of the new 
ones and its improved productivity and efficiency, etc. It also involves criticizing the 
conservative political figures but certainly without telling the names. However, as 
mentioned in the previous chapters, during these years, there is a rival between the 
reformers and conservatives. When the conservatives think the reform is happening 
too quickly, they would be against the pace of the Reform using slogans such as 
‘anti-bourgeoisie-liberalization’ (1981), ‘eliminate spiritual pollution’ (1983), 
‘ building a socialist spiritual civilization ’  (1985-1986) and ‘ anti 
peaceful-evolution’(1988).  
 
For example, the commentary written by Hu Yaobang, one of the Reform figures, 
entitled Jianchi Liangfen Fa Geng Shang Yiceng Lou (adhere to the dichotomy 
method and reach a higher level), is published on the front page of People’s Daily on 
1st, November, 1982. It takes over half of the front page and continues on Page 4 of 
the issue. Hu mentioned the criticism towards Bai Hua’s film ‘Bitter Love’ (Ku 
Lian), which was back in 1981.  The film expressed the discontent towards the 
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current political reality. The New China News Agency broadcasted the commentator 
article, ‘The Four Cardinal Principles Must Not Be Violated – Review Screenplay 
‘Bitter Love’’ (Sixiang Jiben Yuanze Burong Weifan – Ping Dianying Wenxue 
Juben Kulian) in which the author of the screenplay was regarded as acting against 
the Four Cardinal Principles. Here, Hu agrees with the critics towards Bai Hua, 
however, he further pointed out that Bai Hua is a member of the CCP, and he has 
already made self-criticism. Hu encouraged Bai Hua to write more good works in the 
future. Hu’s real purpose is to push reform forward as he asks party members to strive 
harder to improve people’s living standards.  
 
The column of ‘Today’s Talk’ on the front page of People’s Daily on the 7th 
September, 1984 is about something else. It is not about a political issue, it is about 
how a hotel in Beijing changed its registered phone number to an easy memorable 
number in order to help provide better service to its customers. It puts forward a point 
of view that in modern life, information and service become increasingly important, 
therefore, to attract more customers, small things such as change of a phone number 
can be necessary for modern service providers or retailers. This small piece of 
viewpoint shows that People’s Daily’s evolution begins as it also tries to attract more 
readers and provide more information for the new coming market economy. 
 
The editorial on the front page of People’s Daily on the 1st October, 1985 is about 
‘building a socialist spiritual civilization’, entitled ‘the Advantages of China’ 
(Zhongguo de Youshi) . 1st of October is the National Day of PRC, therefore, the 
editorial is dedicated to this special occasion. It reviews the history of the foundation 
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of PRC and especially how CCP has strived to build a new independent country. It 
also mentioned the contribution of the Reform of the recent years as it helped to 
improve Chinese people’s living standards. However, it says, the ‘major task we are 
facing now is to build and strengthen a socialist spiritual civilization’. Words of Chen 
Yun, one of the conservative figures, are quoted here. The ‘advantages of China’ 
refer to this socialist spiritual civilization.  
 
There are two commentaries on the front page of People’s Daily on 2nd November, 
1986. One is written by the commentator of People’s Daily, continues to emphasize 
the importance of two civilizations (the socialist material and spiritual civilizations). 
As the Reform is focused on the economic area, the material civilization is being 
constructed. The spiritual civilization is equally important to the material civilization, 
thus it should be paid attention to as well. The other piece is in the Weekly Forum 
column, entitiled Chuli he Yuewei (contributing and offside). This is an interesting 
piece of commentator article. Yuewei (offside) is a word used in football game, which 
means a break of the game rule (illegally ahead of the ball); even the ball is kicked 
into the goal eventually, it would be called invalid. The commentator writes in his 
article, some old comrades, after they are retired (due to their age), they are still trying 
to play in the game, and it can be ‘a break of the rule’.  Their position has 
transformed from the front line to the back line, according to the author, there is a 
huge change in the way how they should continue to do their work. It would result in 
chaos should the retired comrade continue to give orders. The leading role should be 
played by the new successor. The role the elders would play is a consultant and 
adviser. Basically, to provide information to the new leaders and not to make 
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decisions by themselves; to respect and stick to the decisions of the new leaders. 
However, criticising new leaders in lack of experience or lack of respect for the elders 
should be avoided. After all, new cadres can not grow up into experienced cadres if 
their jobs are taken cared of by the old cadres. The background of this commentary 
piece is the reform Deng launched in order to select and promote younger and more 
specialized cadres. After the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in 1978, there is 
an increasing recognition of the poor capability of the bureaucratic system consists of 
elderly, non-professional cadres. Thus since the early 1980s, Deng has instructed 
senior Party leaders to undertake a ‘four-way transformation’ (sihua) of the cadre 
corps by finding and promoting cadres around the age of 40 who were ‘revolutionary, 
younger, more educated, and more technically specialized’ (geminghua, nianqinghua, 
zhishihua, zhuanyehua)428. At the same time, the retirement system has been set up 
requiring cadres who reached a certain age to leave their positions which was not used 
to be so. At the time when this article is published, it is the first time in the history of 
CCP and PRC, old cadres are advised to retire and give positions to the new and 
younger one. It is almost certain that this process would take some time as some old 
cadres, who are used to the decision-makers, have to (reluctantly) leave the power and 
follow the command of the new cadres, who used to be their subordinates. In the 
article, the author required the old retired cadres to play the role of a consultant and an 
adviser. In one of the other articles on the same page, which is about Deng talking 
about the goal of the political reform when meeting the Premier of Italy, Deng is 
referred to as the Director of the Central Consultation Committee of CCP. It offers 
another explanation, which means Deng himself should also stick to his consultation 
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  Andrew J. Nathan, ‘Authoritarian Resilience’, Journal of Democracy 14.1 
(2003) 6-17 
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role as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang are the new leaders at that time429.  
 
The commentary on the front page of People’s Daily on 1st November, 1987 is a 
more encouraging article, as it praised the live TV broadcasting on the opening of the 
13th Party Congress. It is also in the Weekly Forum column; entitled Lingdao Jiguan 
Huodong Kaifang Hao (Opening-up of the activities of the leading department is 
good). In the article, it says that not only the opening ceremony is shown on TV live, 
but also sees over 400 journalists or reporters, both domestically and from abroad 
coming to the meetings to interview and report. A large quantity of news and 
messages are been sending out everyday. It is the first time in the history of CCP that 
a Party Congress of such a high level is reported to the public and to the whole world. 
Media conferences are held during the period of the Congress, in which some 
directors are invited to answer questions raised by both national and foreign 
journalists. It says this new way – a more open way of dealing with the media, is 
praised nationwide and worldwide. It is conformed with the request put forward by 
Zhao Ziyang in his report submitted to the 13th Party Congress, which is ‘the 
activities of the leading institutions should be more open’. The commentator further 
pointed out that the more opening-up of the leading institutions is included in the 
socialist democratic politics. He also criticized two different points of view. One is 
that the activities of the leaders should be confidential as the top secret; the other is 
that the opening-up of institutions will result in the decay of their authority. However, 
the author asks for a change in these old, conservative views, and points out that this 
change takes time and the importance of the institutionalisation of the opening-up of 
                                                 
429
  Whilst in fact, Deng, although not entitled as the supreme leader, was actually 
the paramount leader before his death in 1997.  
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the leaders activities. There are one commentary article on the front page of People’s 
Daily on 2nd, February, 1988 and two on the front page of People’s Daily on 3rd, 
March 1989, all in the ‘Today’s Talk’ column. All these three are dealing with the 
issues in the Reform. However, the one in 1988 is about problems in the economic 
reform, and the two of 1989 are about political issues, honouring ceremony 
(biaozhanghui) and corruption in a city of Hubei Province. As discussed before, these 
articles were published right before the Tiananmen Incidence of June, 1989. At this 
time, after over a decade of reform, the national economy has recovered and the living 
of the nationals improved; but also, the problems with the economic reform and the 
neglected political transformation, such as corruption, social injustice, gap between 
poor and rich, are gradually emerging. However, it is difficult for the reformers to 
tackle these problems. The student movement of the 1989 can be seen as a response to 
these problems.  
 
To conclude, what I can see from examining these commentary articles collected 
between 1982 and 1989 is a clear debate over the reform issue. They can be divided 
into pro-reform and anti-reform commentary article. In the pro-reform commentary 
articles, there are more reformist ideas on the necessity of change and how the reform 
should proceed, whilst in the other pieces, the conservatives try to put an end to the 
reform by initiating ideological campaigns just as those took place in Maoist years. In 
general, the articles of the pro-reform category are more than those in the anti- 
category. However, right after the1989 student movements, especially after the death 
of Hu Yaobang and the dismissal of Zhao Ziyang, Jiang Zeming was chosen by Deng 
as the new leader of the CCP, and the conservatives became more active than before. 
Their activities, ideas and comments were recorded and published by the People’s 
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Daily. More ideological slogans, such as propaganda, socialist revolution, spiritual 
civilization, working class, and so on, have re-emerged and been repeated in the 
commentary articles collected from this time.  
 
For example, in the commentary article on the front page of People’s Daily on 2nd of 
April, entitled Duo Xuanchuan Women de Minzhu Tizhi (to propagandize our 
democratic system), the author criticised the zichang jieji Ziyouhua (bourgeois 
liberalization), which refers to the ideas of adopting western democracy, the 
separation of three powers and the multiparty system. These are the requests by the 
students and intellectuals who are involved in the democratic movement. The author 
claims that socialist democratic system, which includes the system of the multi-party 
cooperation and political consultation led by CCP, and the people’s congress system, 
has its own advantages as it is rooted in Chinese revolutions compared to the western 
democracy. He admits that this socialist democratic system is not perfect and needs to 
be advanced; however, it is still more suitable for China. The youth of today are not 
familiar with this system, thus, we should promote it and let people, especially the 
young people to know what its advantages are. This article is published almost a year 
after the Tiananmen Square Incident, although the incident is not mentioned in the 
content, the standpoint of the author is quite clear.  
 
In another commentary article published on the front page of People’s Daily on 2nd 
May, 1991, entitled ‘The Role Model of the Intellectuals’ (Zhishi Fenzi de 
Bangyang), the author also asserts that the only way for the intellectuals, especially 
the young ones, to make use of their knowledge, is to unite with the working class and 
the peasantry and to devote to the construction of socialism. At the end of the article, 
 282 
 
 
the author further claims that, the deeds of the role models proves once again that, 
Chinese intellectuals, as the important consisting part of the working class, can be 
totally trusted. As discussed in the previous chapters, during the 1989 democratic 
movement, some well-known intellectuals, such as Fang Lizhi, were seen as playing 
the leading role, and the students who are involved in the demonstrations, are students 
from the universities of Beijing. In Chinese political term, they all belong to the 
intellectual group which is part of the working class. After the crackdown, some 
intellectuals and students are arrested, some are removed from their posts. It is under 
this background, the author would reaffirm that the intellectuals can be politically 
trusted.  
 
The commentaries collected from these two years also demonstrated that there was a 
growing conservative faction opposed to Deng’s reforms within the Party. To change 
this situation and resume the economic agenda, Deng made a visit to the southern area 
of China, including Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai, which is known as 
the Southern Tour in the spring of 1992. At that time, Deng has officially retired, but 
his influence still exists as paramount. During the Southern Tour, he made speeches 
which were about the importance of continuing the economic reform policy, and 
received local supports from the places he visited. He also made criticism to those 
who are against the further reform and opening-up in his speeches. Jiang Zemin, 
although officially the paramount leader, was also criticized as not pushing forward 
the economic reform agenda. The national media started to report on Deng’s 
Southern Tour a few months later. And in the 14th National Party Congress, Deng’s 
idea of establishing a socialist market economy has been recognized and the 
adherence to the so-call ‘basic route’ (Jiben Luxian) will last for one hundred years.  
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The commentary articles collected from 1992 and 1993 demonstrate these changes. 
The commentary article on the front page of People’s Daily on 2nd January, 1992, is 
the speech of Jiang Zemin in the New Year meeting with the members of the National 
Committee of CPPCC (Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference). He 
mentioned that in the coming New Year (1992), the goal of the economic reform is to 
establish the planned commodity economy (Shangpin Jingji), which combines the 
planned economy and market regulations. The term of ‘planned economy’ comes 
before ‘market regulation’, which means the former is more important than the latter. 
While in the other two commentaries articles published on the front page of the 
People’s Daily on 1st January, 1993, the terms of planned economy or planned 
product economy totally disappeared. These two articles, one is the editorial, the other 
is the New Year speech given by Chairman Yang Shangkun. In Yang’s speech, Deng 
was referred to as ‘The chief architect of China’s economic reforms and China’s 
socialist modernisation’, the title officially recognized after Deng’s resignation430. 
Yang also mentioned Deng’s famous Southern Tour and his speeches on ‘deepening 
the reform, broadening the opening-up and accelerating the economic development’
431
. In both articles, the 14th National Party Congress in the last year was mentioned, 
in which the goal of the economic reform was established. In the editorial, it says that 
on the 14th National Party Congress, the theory of ‘building socialism with Chinese 
                                                 
430
  Officially, Deng stepped down as Chairman of the Central Military Commission 
in 1989 which is his last post and he is referred to as Comrade Deng Xiaopin. 
However, China is still in Deng’s era until his death in 1997  
431
  From Yang’s speech published in People’s Daily, 1st of January, 1993, issue no. 
16246 
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characteristics’ by Deng has been recognized, the goal of the economic reform as to 
‘build a socialist market economy’ has been verified, and a new core of the CCP 
with Jiang Zemin as the leader has been elected. As Jiang showed his support to 
Deng’s carrying on reform agenda, his status as the successor has been consolidated. 
‘In this year, China’s reform and opening-up enters a new era’432. This sentence 
from this editorial piece asserted that after the 1989 incidence, the liberalization of the 
economy resumed and is carried on into a new era, which means reform and 
opening-up at an even faster pace than the years before 1989.  
 
From the figures in Graph 6, it is noticeable that the quantity of the commentary 
articles are not evenly distributed on the front page of People’s Daily in the issues 
collected from 1994 to 2008 as those collected from 1978 to 1993. In some years 
between 1994 and 2008, there are one or two commentary articles, while in the others, 
there are none. For those issues published in the years of 1978 to 1993, commentary 
piece is seldom missing from the front page. Also the lengthy commentary and 
editorials are always found in the earlier year category. For example, the commentary 
article on the front page of the 1977 issue takes up the whole page and the other 
commentary on the front page of the 1979 issue also covers up almost two thirds of 
the page.  
 
In the later years, these long commentaries or editorial have disappeared. The 
commentary articles are becoming shorter and the content has also changed from sole 
ideological propaganda to problems or ideas that people really care about. From the 
                                                 
432
  From the editorial, entitled ‘Tuanjie Fenjing’ (To unite and strive forward), on 
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issues of People’s Daily collected from 1994 to 2008, there are still a few 
commentary articles that are of great importance which should not be ignored. The 
commentary on the front page of People’s Daily on 18th January, 2000, which is 
written by its own commentator, is about reporting the products with quality problems 
and helping the consumers to identify good from bad. The commentator mentioned 
that the list of the products that failed to pass the national test will be exposed every 
Tuesday on People’s Daily, urging the producers to improve their production.  
 
To sum up, the author asserts that through these reports and listings, the rights of the 
consumers and the service users can be protected, creating a market economy with the 
principle of ‘fair competition, survival of the fittest’. This shows People’s Daily has 
evolved from a pure ideological platform into a monitoring role in the market 
economy.  
 
Another commentary piece that is worth noticing is the one on the front page of 
People’s Daily on 9th January, 2006, entitled Zhuoli Tigao Yufang he Chuzhi Tufa 
Gonggong Shijian de Nengli (to improve the capability of preventing and handling 
sudden public emergency) and written by its own commentator. It is about the 
publication of the ‘Guojia Tufa Gonggong Shijian Zongti Yingji Yu’an’ (Master 
State Plan for Rapid Response to Public Emergencies) on the 8th January, 2006 by 
Chinese State Council. Chinese government was criticised as incompetent in the 
SARS epidemic emerged in China in November 2002 and spread to 26 countries. This 
Master State Plan for Rapid Response to Public Emergencies is made as to help the 
                                                                                                                                            
People’s Daily, 1st of January, 1993, issue no. 16246 
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government to tackle all major public emergencies in the future. It also helps to 
improve the capability of the government to prevent and deal with all major public 
incidences such as natural disaster, public health accidents and social security 
incidence; it is supposed to prevent and reduce these incidences and their loss. Thus, 
the author asserts that it is very important in protection of the public lives and 
property, in social security and in promoting the sustainable development of the 
economy and society.  
 
After examining all the commentary articles on the front pages of the collected issues, 
I will continue to explore how much the content on the front page has changed and 
evolved during the last three decades.  
 
6.4.4 The change of content 
 
All the articles on the front page are divided into three categories, the commentary 
articles, the political and the economical. The political articles are those written about 
a political event, such as the official visits, party conferences, activities of the leaders, 
exposure of the political corruptions, etc. The economical category includes articles 
about economy, such as reports on agriculture, progress in industry, supplement of 
coal and other energy, stories of regular people who take part in the economic reform, 
industrial accidents, etc. In the examination of the category of commentary articles, it 
is noticeable that the commentary articles are becoming less in the content of the 
newer issues and also getting shorter in length. From Graph 6, we can find that not 
only the number of all the articles is changing, but also the percentages of the 
different categories are also changing.  
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For instance, from the issues collected in late 1970s and early 1980s, commentary 
articles are always taking up most of the space on the front page. There are a couple 
pieces of political news and economical news in some issues, but they can be all 
removed from the front page when a huge editorial article is published. On the front 
page of the People’s Daily, published on 1st November, 1977, there is only one 
editorial article, as shown in the following pie chart,  
Chart 1-11-1977 
1977
editorial
100%
political
0%
economical
0%
 
 
For the issues collected from the middle 1980s to 1990s, which is the Reform era, the 
page set of People’s Daily is more or less in a stable style. On the front page, there is 
always one piece of commentary article (sometimes two), and a few pieces of political 
news and economical news. The coverage on political news and economical news is 
always the same. In another word, they are evenly reported and published on the front 
page of People’s Daily, which can be shown in the following two pie charts, the 
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issues collected on 1st November, 1987433 and 18th January, 1998434.  
 
Chart 1-11-1987 
1987
editorial
11%
political
45%
economical
44%
 
Chart 18-1-1998 
1998
editorial
9%
political
46%
economical
45%
 
 
As discussed previously, from late 1990s into the new millennium, editorials or 
                                                 
433
  There is 1 commentary article, 4 pieces of political news and 4 articles on 
economy, on the front page of the Peoples’ Daily of 1st November,1987  
434
  There is 1 commentary article, 5 articles on political news and 5 articles on 
economical news, on the front page of People’s Daily of 18th January,1998, issue no. 
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commentary articles are gradually losing their predominant status on the front page of 
People’s Daily. More spaces are devoted to domestic news and international news, 
and to the news photos and even advertisement. News on economy, marketing are 
reported more frequently, taking the vacuum left by editorials and political news.   
The latest collection of all is the issue published on 7th January, 2008, on the front 
page of which, there is no commentary or political articles, but with 9 articles on 
economy, including three photos, two small pieces of advertisement and one reading 
index. The content is shown in the following pie chart. 
Chart 7-1-2008 
 
2008
editorial
0%
political
0%
economical
100%
 
 
Since the 1980s, along with the introduction of the new technology into the printing, 
the page settings of People’s Daily are more professional, for example, the use of 
photos in the articles. There is also evolution in the profession of journalism. The 
reports are not limited to domestic politics. The journalists started to report on 
international news, sports news, stories of regular people, etc. From late 1990s, there 
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is also a tendency of commercialisation in the newspaper. With the fierce competition 
in the market and the lower budget from the government, People’s Daily started to 
get advertising. Small pieces of advertisement even appear on the front page, on the 
front page of the issues collected on 17th January, 2002; 2nd July, 2004; 6th April 2005, 
and 9th January, 2006, there is one small advertisement, and on the front page of the 
issues published on 27th January, 2007 and 7th January, 2008, it increases to two 
pieces.  
 
6.4.5 Names of the leaders on the front page: the appearance and disappearance 
 
Investigating the names of the leaders on the front page of People’s Daily is an 
important way of understanding Chinese politics. The appearance of a new name and 
its repeating on the front page, especially in the headlines of the articles that are 
occupying the dominant places on the page, always shows the rising of a new political 
figure. Whilst the sudden disappearance of a familiar name on the front page often 
means the loss of power of this figure, due to his political oust or physical death, most 
of the times, the political reason other than the physical reason.  For example, Mao 
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping have both passed away, but their political legacy, referred 
to as Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory remained in CCP’s history, 
which will keep coming back in the articles on the front page, although not so much 
in the titles.  
 
The dominance of different names on the front page of People’s Daily actually 
divides China’s last three decades into different eras. The years between 1976 and 
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2008 can be divided into four periods, which are Pre-Reform period, the starting of 
Reform, the democratic movement years and the Resume and Reform All Around 
period.  
 
The Pre-Reform period refers to the years between 1976 and 1979, when there is a 
power struggle between the Reformists and the Whatever Faction. At this time, the 
names of the leaders that make the most appearance on the front page of People’s 
Daily are Mao Zedong, Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping and Li Xiannian. 
1976 is the year when Mao died. As the supreme leader of PRC from its foundation in 
1949 to the day he died, Mao was regarded as the saviour and great leader for Chinese 
people. His influence was so overwhelming that the personal cult to him in his late 
years resulted in a disastrous Cultural Revolution. However, after his death, his name 
is still respected the most and the Gang of Four were seen as responsible for the 
wrongs in the Cultural Revolution. Hua Guofeng, as appointed by Mao as the 
legitimate successor, with the help of Ye Jianying, had the Gang of Four arrested and 
trial. Hua was later criticized for his Two Whatever Doctrine to carry on Mao’s class 
struggle mandate, which makes impossible for the rehabilitation of the people who 
were wrongfully treated in the Cultural Revolution and other campaigns mobilized by 
Mao. It is against the will of the most people at the time and also it is not good for the 
recovery of the economy. Deng saw the urgent need of change of the situation, and 
gradually he and other reformists gained the power over Hua through the Discussion 
of the Criterion of Truth (as elaborated in the previous session).  
 
The Starting of the Reform era refers to the years between 1980 and 1988, which is 
the first stage of the economic reform and opening-up. During this period, the 
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reformists, Deng Xiaoping, and his subordinates, Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang, 
makes the first steps into the economic liberation and first trial in political 
transformation (which failed and resulted in the democratic movement).  Their 
names make the most appearance on the front page of People’s Daily. It is noticeable 
that from the issue collected in the year 1980, Hua’s name suddenly disappeared, and 
is missing from all the other issues collected after 1980. It is because of his oust in 
1980 and 1981 as he gave his posts in CCP to Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang. Hua 
became low key after his ousting. He remained as an ordinary member of the Central 
Committee of CCP until the 16th Party Congress of November, 2002. Although he 
failed in the power struggle with Deng, he is not physically harmed or jailed, 
compared to the power struggles in Mao’s time, the political leaders who have lost 
their power were physically eliminated or jailed as during the Cultural Revolution.  
 
The third period is a break of the Reform era, between the years of 1989 and 1992, 
when the democratic movement rose and the Reform was interrupted for a few years. 
Both Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang are not mentioned in the People’s Daily. As 
discussed in previous chapters, in 1986, a series of student demonstrations took place. 
Hu Yaobang, at the time the holding the official title of General Secretary of the CPC, 
had to resign in 1987 due to his empathetic attitude towards the student activists and 
the liberal intelligentsia. This once again proved that Deng, although not the official 
top leader, is the de facto supreme leader. Hu was also asked to self-criticize, and he 
died at a Party Political Bureau meeting on 15 April, 1989 due to a heart attack.  
 
His death triggered a new round of student protests and later resulted in the 1989 
Tiananmen Square Incident. Since then, Hu’s name disappeared from the front page 
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of People’s Daily, and also other printed media. The 1989 Tiananmen Square 
Incident also brings end to Zhao’s political life. After the resignation of Hu, Zhao 
became the General Secretary of CPC in 1987. Zhao’s ideas are similar with those of 
Hu, for example, they both believe in the free-market reforms, both are advocates of 
the separation of the state and the party and both sympathetic towards the student 
movements. That’s why Zhao, after Hu, gradually loses the support of Deng, the 
paramount leader. Zhao’s post as the General Secretary ended in 1989 after the events, 
and he was under house arrest for the rest of his life. His name disappeared from 
People’s Daily, replaced by the name of Jiang Zemin, the successor General 
Secretary of CPC. During this third period, the names of Jiang Zemin and Li Peng 
made the most appearance on the front page. Li Peng, the Premier, also known as the 
one of the biggest hardliners, backed the use of force to crack down the student 
protests and declared martial law. The appearance of his name on the front page 
shows that during this period, the requirement of political stability overcomes the 
demand for the growth of the economy, and a more conservative policy was favoured 
by the leaders of the CPC.  
 
The fourth period is the Resume of the Reform, which is since 1993 to the current. 
After Deng’s Southern Tour, the economic reforms were resumed in 1993. Jiang 
Zemin’s name appears the most on the front page of People’s Daily in 1990s and 
early 2000s. He was the core of the third generation leaders of CPC. He became the 
General Secretary in the aftermath of the 1989 student protests and resigned in 2002, 
but he still held the post as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission until 
2004. (Just like Deng did after he resigned all other official posts, he still held the 
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Chairman of the Central Military Commission until retirement) Jiang was effectively 
the paramount leader in the 1990s due to Deng’s old age. During this period, Chinese 
economy experienced a significant and fast developmental growth, averagely nearly 
10% GDP growth annually.  
 
6.5 People’s Daily: Importance and Significance 
 
As discussed previously in this chapter, there has been an unprecedented growth in 
the new press media in the recent three decades. After a close analysis into the growth 
of the new press, there has been an actual decline of the Dangbaos (party newspaper) 
an expansion of the Shimingbaos (not a party newspaper) which includes all kinds of 
evening news, metros and other urban newspapers. Another major development in the 
recent years is the marketization in the press media. Newspaper offices which used to 
be part of the public service sectors are commercialized and re-established as limited 
liability companies. For example, the Yun Nan Press Media Group Limited Liability 
Company was founded on 18th December, 2009. To compete in the press market and 
compete with other media, especially the Internet, these press companies try to 
produce more news that would attract their readers.  
 
The emphasis upon the People’s Daily in this research is because of its importance 
and significance in China’s press media. It has its unique status as the most 
authoritative newspaper of CCP. Also, the evolution in the People’s Daily mirrors the 
incremental democratization in China.  
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Firstly, compared to other new press or other party newspaper, the circulation of the 
People’s Daily is not the largest in China, however, it is still one of the biggest and 
most influential newspapers. More importantly, the readership of the People’s Daily 
is mainly composed of the CCP leaders, government officials, intellectuals and others 
in the public service sectors. It is the organ of the Central Committee of CCP and it 
publishes the statements for the most powerful elites of China. The readership of 
other newspapers such as the evening news and metros is quite different from that of 
the People’s Daily.  
 
Secondly, after examining the front page of the People’s Daily in the last three 
decades, we can find the links between the changes in the People’s Daily and the 
social political processes in China. It is one of the most important sources for political 
observers and commentators to know about the political changes in China. Therefore, 
the indications of the evolution in the People’s Daily can help us to understand the 
changes in the press media as well as in the political realm.  
 
Thirdly, due to the time period of the analysis (from late 1970s to the present), the 
People’s Daily has a history that is long enough for us to fully investigate. As 
explained before, most the new press come out in the recent years did not exist from 
the beginning of the reform. They are new born newspaper from the beginning and 
most of them have a distinctive nature from the conventional party newspapers. It 
does not mean to deny their influence, however, compared to the People’s Daily, they 
do not have a history long enough for us to trace and analyse. 
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Fourthly, the People’s Daily fits into the incremental model. It stands for the most 
conservative part of the press media. However, a small or insignificant change in the 
People’s Daily, especially on the front page may indicate a big and significant 
transformation in the press media as well as in the political realm. And the changes in 
the People’s Daily are gradual and incremental while the changes that take place in 
the whole press media are quicker and faster. For example, the advertisement 
appeared on the front page of People’s Daily is very small and the content is only a 
few Chinese characters, from which we can indicate that bigger advertisement is 
allowed in the other newspapers. In the political realm, it is proved as so. For example, 
a slightly sequence change in the names on the front page may indicate the rise or fall 
of a political figure. The sudden disappearance of a name may demonstrate a 
politician’s eviction or resignation.  
 
Last but not least, most of the influential new press media are regional other than 
national. Due to the large territory of China and the localized feature of the urban 
newspapers, it is difficult to find a newspaper with a nation wide circulation and 
influence. It is manageable to collect the People’s Daily from all cities of China while 
the other newspapers which have equally large circulations are not so easy to collect.  
 
To sum up, it is because of the political importance, and the nation wide circulation 
and influence, the richness of its history, that the emphasis of this research is placed 
upon the People’s Daily. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
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This chapter is the last one of the three-level –analysis which includes changes at the 
state level, the grassroots level and the society level. However, it is not the least 
important one. The aim of this chapter is to verify (print) media as one of the rising 
civil society forces. The topic of civil society and China is no less controversial than 
the topic of democracy and China. Some theorists doubt that China has any civil 
society at all while other find the civil society of China is not exactly like those in the 
West. Since the founding of People’s Republic of China, the state is designed under 
the rules of Marxism-Leninist system in which individuals has very little space. The 
situation has been changed after the 1970s. Individuals gradually get more 
independence from the state and the public sphere is growing. The growth of media, 
the irreplaceable part of a modern society, is one of the most significant events since 
the late 1970s. The traditional media, the press, has expanded in terms of the total 
circulation and quantity of types of newspapers. These changes are significant in a 
number of ways.  
 
Firstly, people have more sources of information and they have more freedom in 
choosing the information they like to get, which helped enlarge their rights to know.  
 
Secondly, mass media mediates between state and society. It has changed from a pure 
ideology platform to a more professional ‘fourth power’. New values and ideas are 
introduced to people of China whose lives once used to be filled with ongoing 
political mobilization. It helped to shift people’s old values and believes, which could 
be essential in the transition to democracy.  
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Last but not least, the competition in the market has resulted in the change in the 
authoritative newspapers (Dangbaos), which accerlarates the wethering of old 
ideology. People’s Daily, as the most authoritative newspaper of the Party, has also 
undergone some significant changes during the last three decades.  
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CONCLUSION 
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7.1 Democracy and Democratization Revisited 
 
The word ‘democracy’ has given inspirations to Chinese people since the introduction 
of it into China in the middle 19th Century. Although in traditional Chinese 
philosophic thought, some values such as the monarch should serve the interests of 
ordinary people435, could be regarded as sharing similarities with democratic values. 
The Confucianism based Chinese feudal political system has its distinctive features 
from the Western liberal democracies.  
 
On the 4th of May, 1919, when thousands of students went on parade in the name of 
seeking for ‘democracy’, to express their discontent towards the corrupted Republic 
government and its weakness in confronting the imperial presence, they did not 
realize that their actions have become an influential historical landmark, May Fourth 
Movement, which was about to change the whole state in the next 30 years. People’s 
Republic of China was founded in 1949 as an independent nation state.  
 
70 years after the May Fourth Movement, on the 4th of June, 1989, another generation 
of young students, following their precedents of 70 years ago, went on parade in 
Tiananmen Square which resulted in bloodshed. It is also named by the date it took 
place, June Fourth. Indeed, it is after June fourth, that most Chinese scholars started to 
realize the democratization process is not as smooth as they originally thought it 
would be.  
 
                                                 
435
 See, for example, Mencius, Jin Xin Xia, (the Analects of Mencius, With One’s 
Heart, the second half) 
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In fact, the theorists from the West have long time realized the complex nature of 
democratization process. The first problem comes with identifying a democratization 
process lies on the disagreement upon the definition of democracy itself.  
 
Rousseau’s ideas of unmediated popular government are no longer feasible in the 
modern nation-state by the 18th century, liberal/representative democracy became the 
choice for new democrats. Especially after 1945, with the end of WWII and the onset 
of Cold War, democracy is regarded to imply a particular form of government and 
more importantly, the empirical ‘reality’ of the West. However, the over determing 
nature of the empirical theorizing and its focus on the government while neglecting 
other factors such as culture and society were often criticized. The development of 
empirical democracy also gave rise to modernization literature on democratization, 
which later became one of the most influencial schools within the literature. 
Modernization theorists sought to find the causal nexus between economic 
development and democratization because at that time, regimes that belonged to the 
West camp tend to be more economically advanced and prosperous than those 
belonged to the Soviet bloc.  
 
Democratization literature was further enriched in the 1990s after a series of regime 
change took place in the former Eastern European Communist countries, which is 
described as the ‘Third Wave’ by some commentators.436 After the end of Cold War, 
comparative politicians have been given a truly global task in its study for democratic 
political development for the first time437. The Transition Literature quickly expanded 
                                                 
436
 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century 1991, 
437
 John D. Nagle and Alison Mahr, Democracy and Democratization, 1999, p1 
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in the 1990s as it tries to grasp the recent political change in the international relations. 
Different from modernization school and the comparative historical sociologists who 
place emphasis upon the structural change, (for instance, some modernizationists 
concern about how economic development gives rise to civil society and shifting 
people’s values to more democratic ones, while comparative historical sociologists 
think that only through the revolution led by bourgeois can capitalism and democracy 
be realized), transition literature focus on the initiatives of human action. Indeed, for 
structurists, the communist regimes in the Eastern European countries do not inhabit a 
structure that provides all the pre-conditions for a democracy. Therefore, the 
transition theorists agree that the only condition for democracy is unified national 
state.  
 
Whether democracy is a reality that exists in the real world or it is just something we 
believe that exists, the process that brings it about is not a simple one. Modernization 
school, comparative historical sociologists and the transition theorists all give 
explanations for the creation of a democracy through different perspectives, what they 
seem to agree on is that the path through which democracy is established can be very 
complex and lengthy. For example, the transition theorists divide this dynamic 
process into several stages. 438  Some other theorists define the features of 
democratization as ‘complex’, ‘long-term’, ‘dynamic’, and ‘open-endedness’439.  
 
Recalling the constructivists’ view of democracy, it has its core values and ideals 
                                                 
438
 Dankwart A. Rustow, ‘Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model’, 
Comparative Politics 2, 3, April 1970, pp. 337-363 
439
 Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience, 2001, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), pp.27, 246 
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which will remain as they are because of its deontological pressures440, while its 
applicability to a specific country should have historical, social and cultural context.  
 
Out of all three schools, modernization scholars have done most fruitful works on the 
topic of China’s democratization. Here, democratization has a broader meaning. As 
the meanings of democracy should not be only about government (state), the 
meanings of democratization should not be only about the forming of a democratic 
government. It should include more factors and variables. A broader meaning of 
democratization can be understood as, a process through which the authoritarian 
regime evolves into a democratic regime.  
 
7.2 Incremental Democratization 
 
On 5th, December, 1978, Wei Jingsheng put up a poster for ‘The Fifth Modernization 
– Democracy and so on’, he may not be the first one to ask for Chinese 
democratization, but he is probably the first Chinese who related democracy with 
modernization in public. Wei’s perception of modernization and democracy may not 
be exactly the same as the modernization theorists who have been working on this 
topic on China, but they agree on that democracy is an important feature of a modern 
state and society.  
 
Modernization theorists are pleased to find what changes economic development has 
brought to China’s state-society relations. Some of them drew out very optimistic 
                                                 
440Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory, 1962 
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conclusions, expecting China to be free in a specific time in the future441. While this 
literature in a way helps with understanding the democratization in China, there is a 
total neglection of the intellectual debate within the Chinese academy.  
 
The Chinese incrementalists refer to the theorists who hold a middle ground within 
the debate (not as radical as the dissidents, also disagree the ideas of the New Left), 
they believe that democratization in China will follow a so-called incremental model. 
They also stand for the mainstream opinion.  
 
The starting point of the incremental model is very much closed to the 
modernizationists. Like the modernizationists’ enthusiasm in the economic 
development, incrementalists’ foundings are mostly based on the changes in the last 
three decades (after the initiation of the Reform when the nation economy started to 
take off.) 
 
The incremental model consists of three levels and shares the features with other 
democratization processes, identified as ‘complex’, ‘long-term’, ‘dynamic’, and 
‘open-endedness’.  
 
The three levels include the incremental changes took place at the state level, the 
grassroots level and the society level. These changes are verified into three levels, 
however, these levels are not totally separated from the other levels, in fact, there is 
also interation between them.  
 
                                                 
441
 Henry S.Rowen, ‘When Will the Chinese People Be Free?’, Journal of 
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Firstly, at the state level, it refers to the evolution of CCP and the strengthening of the 
legislature.  
 
In the last three decades, there is a decentralization of power within the Party, it 
started to accept a species of interest-based politics (even if most interests are pursued 
by and through agencies of the state) 442 . CCP has evolved out of a former 
revolutionary party to a reformed party. One of the most recent and significant 
reforms is the enlarged party membership. The Party is now taking in new members 
from the middle class (including private entrepreneurs443, who were classified as the 
bourgeois as opposed to proletariat). 
 
The legislature - People’s Congresses at all levels of the hierarchy, especially the 
National People’s Congress has been strengthened.  As constitutionally recognized 
as the highest organ of state power444, the NPC has become more assertive in 
exercising its power as a legislature, including law-making and supervising the works 
of local government and the court and the procuratorate. As a result of which, a legal 
reform has been launch to develop a legal system of the rule of law. NPC has also 
become more progressively autonomous. For instance, during the 1989 incidence, it 
even tried to call emergency meetings of the people’s delegates, in order to abolish 
                                                                                                                                            
Democracy 18.3 (2007) 38-52 
442
  Mickel Oksenberg, ‘Confronting a Classic Dilemma’, Journal of Democracy 
9.1 (1998) 27-34 
443
 The term ‘private entrepreneurs’ is taken from Jiang Zemin’s Speech on the 
Celebration for the Eightieth Anniversary of Establishment of CCP, published in 
People’s Daily, 02-07-2001, translated by the author 
444
 Article 57, Section 1, Chapter 3 of Constitutiom of People’s Republic of China, 
Adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress and promulgated 
for implementation by the Proclamation of the National People’s Congress on 
December 4, 1982, 1457 
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the martial law. However, it became result-less due to the intervention of the Party. 
Whether this tame legislative assembly will drive the political agenda in a 
democratising direction is not clear yet, but it has become more vocal and critical in 
the discussion of public policy.  
 
The second level where the changes are taking place is at the grassroots, which is 
regarded as the first step of initiating a democratic transition from bottom up. 445The 
reforms have accelerated urbanization in China and boost the economic growth in 
some big cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, however, the majority of Chinese 
population still live in the numerous villages in China’s suburban and rural areas. The 
democratic practice created in the Village Committee election in the 1980s has given 
numerous Chinese citizens an opportunity to exercise their political rights which in 
turn helped to nurish their democratic consciousness.  
 
The lowest level village election has been practised more than a decade. In recent 
years, there has already been some similar practice at the higher county and township 
level. Although it is still very limited and at the moment seems unlikely to be 
enlarged to the provincial or national level, the practice will continue. Some surveyors 
have already discovered the ‘legitimacy downwards’ phenomenon, in which truly 
democratically elected officers enjoy more legitimacy than those who are not, such as 
the township and county level government. This has resulted in tension in the 
structure which may anticipate the expansion of this democratic practice.  
 
The third level refers to the society level, the expansion and commercialization of 
                                                 
445
  Tang Liang, Jianjin, Minzhu: Biange Zhong De Zhongguo Zhengzhi 
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media, and the beginnings of investigative journalism.  
 
The media has become more commercialized and market-oriented.  Some central 
outlets are directly under the control of the Party’s Propaganda Department, such as 
the People’s Daily, the New China News Agency, China Central Television, Party 
newspapers, and army newspapers and so on. But these media together with other 
newspapers, magazines, radio and TV stations, now compete in the national media 
market. ‘In the political domain, they often push the envelope of what the regime 
considers off-limits by investigating stories about local corruption and abuses of 
power’446. The media are increasingly taking the role of tribunes of the people by 
exposing complaints against wrong-doing by local-level official447. 
 
The authoritative Dangbaos (Party Newspaper) has suffered a huge decline in the 
circulation and numbers, while the new Shiminbaos (Civil Newspapers) has quickly 
become prevalent and enjoyed an increasing readership of various social levels. To 
attracte more readers, Dangbaos have started to provide more diversed content as 
Shiminbaos which gradually blurs the distinction between these two. Citizens of 
China enjoy more information and more transparency which enlarged their right to 
know. Some urban newspapers are becoming more assertive when less censorship is 
placed upon them since the Reform. More professionalized journalists now enjoy a 
freer hand compared to prior to 1978. Whether the press will become truly 
independent as the fourth power is uncertain yet, but new space for criticism and 
                                                                                                                                            
(Incremental Democracy: Chinese Politics in transition), 2004, p230;  
446
  Andrew J. Nathan, ‘Authoritarian Resilience’, Journal of Democracy 14.1 
(2003) p.12 
447
  Andrew J. Nathan, ‘Authoritarian Resilience’, Journal of Democracy 14.1 
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investigative journalism is being created. 
 
The interations between these three levels are constant. For example, between the 
state level and the grassroots level, the interation can be identified when the authority 
recognized the spontaneously formed villager’s committees, especially after the 
makings of Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees, the central government 
actually encouraged this system which is pushed by the state to be implemented 
nationwide.  
 
There is also interaction between the grassroots level and the society level. The 
experimental reforms at township level to exercise direct elections were reported by 
the media, for instance, the direct election of the township Mayor in Suining was 
reported by Chengdu Shangbao (Chengdu Business Newspaper of Sichuan Province) 
on 29th, December, 1998. Xinhua Daily on 2nd April, 2000 also reported the election 
reform in Henan Province448. The media exposion of the corrupted township and 
county governments and party committees and the various forms of resistance (violent 
as the extreme form) from the peasants demonstrates the urgent need for accelerating 
the reforms449.  
 
The interaction between the society and the state since the Reform is also noticeable. 
Before the Reform, all newspapers were required to release the news provided by the 
New China News Agency. After decades of Reform, especially after the press 
                                                                                                                                            
(2003) p.12 
448
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marketization, critical reports towards the corrupted party carders and leaders and 
reports on disclosure of the dark side of the society are now taking more space on the 
pages. For instance, the Xinkuaibao (News Express) reported exclusively on the 
frauds of the College Entrance Examination in Guangdong Province, which resulted 
in considerable social uproars450.  
 
There are also some important features of the incremental model on Chinese 
democratization, which are described as ‘complex’, ‘long-term’, ‘dynamic’, and 
‘open-endedness’.  
 
‘Complex’ means that it is not a simple process. It is the reason why the three mini 
waves of democratization have failed to achieve the regime transition overnight. All 
the three mini waves, including Beijing Spring liberalization movement in 1978, 
students’ movements in 1986 and 1989, took place along with the international 
democratization waves. However, unlike the former East European communist 
countries where the democratic regime transition happened quickly, CCP was able to 
take control of the situation. It showed the resilience of the regime to transition, which 
means that the process will not be a simple one.  
 
‘Long-term’ actually means incremental or gradual. It means that it takes time to 
proceed. There can be a few years of consecutive liberalization followed by some 
years of stagnation or even a set back. For instance, during the late 1970s to the mid 
1980s, which is the initiation period of the economic reforms, the centralized 
economic system was reformed and the private sector began to grow. After the 1989 
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students’ movement, there were a few years of set-back when the reform was 
suspended until 1992 after Deng’s well-known Speech of the Southern Tour. 
However, it does not eliminate the possibility of a quick transformation in the future. 
The gradualism or the incrementalism of this model determined the discursiveness of 
this process.  
 
‘Dynamic’ refers to the dynamics related with the model. A few dynamics are 
identified here, for instance, the dynamics of the interaction between economic and 
politics. The operation and function of a modern market economy is incompatible 
with the Leninist requirement of comprehensive party and state control over society. 
For some observers, CCP has faced a dilemma which other authoritarian regimes have 
faced, to continue economic liberalization or to tough it out. Oksenberg cited Robert 
Dahl’s theory451 that we may anticipate that the leaders’ calculations will be 
governed by an assessment of the relative costs, benefits, and risks to them of each 
course of action. That is, the leaders would calculate that communist rule, political 
stability, and honest government would be enhanced rather than weakened by a 
process of democratization. 452 Other dynamics include the impact of globalization, 
the transformation inside the CCP, and the development of civil society forces.  
 
‘Open-endedness’ as opposed to the clear-cut regime change, the pace of 
democratization process is under control by elites. The authoritarian regime is able to 
conduct the strategy of firstly economic modernization and liberalization, then 
political openness. As earlier experience proved that a more radical liberal democracy 
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is associated with failure in performance. The regime then uses the priority of 
economic growth as an excuse to put off the political democratization. Later, the 
performance-based legitimacy of political authoritarianism allowed the regime to 
control the pace and limits of democratization, without clear-cut regime change. 
 
7.3 Chinese Characteristics 
 
The incremental model of Chinese democratization can not be fully established 
without the historical, social and cultural context. In this thesis, an attempt to verify 
these contexts has been made.  
 
Historical context. As in the debate on democratization, each school comes from a 
specific historical background or bases their foundings upon a historical approach. 
For instance, modernation school became influential after the onset of Cold War as 
theorists tried to justify liberal democracy as opposed to the Soviet bloc. The 
transition of East European Communist countries into democracies in the late 20th 
century gave rise to the transition literature. The historical sociologists based their 
foudings on the history of capitalism. The well-known wave theory seems simply 
describing the history since 1828453. The incremental model has its unique historical 
background. It appeared to be one of the four groups within Chinese academy in the 
discussion of Chinese democratization and became the most influencial one. The 
theorists of this group have seen the failure of the mini democratic waves in China 
and have experienced the fundamental changes in China in the Reform era. Their 
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research is mainly based on the changing state-society relations in the last 3 decades 
since the Reform started in 1978.  
 
Cultural context. Some modernization theorists have applied cultural specific 
variables such as ‘civic culture’ 454  and the rational and individualistic values 
embodied in European culture455 to explain the causality of democratization. The 
incremental model also tries to explain the distinctiveness of Chinese democratization 
with its long history the domination of Confucianism in the political culture. The 
values and ethical of Confucianism have been long rooted in Chinese culture and 
tradition which are distinctive from the western values. As Singaporean Prime 
Minister Lee outlined in official norms, these values are communitarianism, familism, 
decision making by consensus, and social and religious harmony456. While in the 
Western tradition, there are positive roles for individual citizens, and an autonomous 
civic culture which honours and sees virtue in social and moral pluralism. 
 
During the two thousand years of feudal society in China, Confucianism has 
maintained its all-important status as the basis of the rule of the dynasts. 
Confucianism, originally established by Confucius and Mencius, is mainly about the 
philosophy of forming a hierarchical state and society, by which people’s 
relationships are defined. The core element is called ‘Ren’ (benevolence). The basic 
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meaning of ‘Ren’, is to love people, as Confucius once answered his student Fan 
Chi457. It requires love for relatives and friends, but also to love all the people; 
sacrifice of one’s own interest to benefit the community; unselfishness, ethics and 
morals. In this way, the society can become a harmonious integral entity.  
 
For example, ‘to build a harmonious society’ was brought up in the 16th Party’s 
Congress458. Although it was not explicitly referring to Confucianism, it seems that 
Confucius’s ideas about maintaining the harmony in the state and society are 
experiencing a renascence.  
 
Social context. For example, some works of the modernizationists have paid attention 
to the relationship between economic development and the rise of civil society. While 
the historical sociologists are mostly concerned about the social structure and the 
roles different social classes have played on the way to democracy 459 . The 
incrementalists also pay a lot of attention to the social context relating with Chinese 
democratization. Chinese society is not evenly developed due to the vast size of it, the 
unevenly developed local economy, unevenly distributed population.  
 
China has the third largest territory of the world which inhabits the world’s largest 
population. Majority of the population live in or close to the south eastern coastal area 
where most of the urbanization and modernization projects and programmes take 
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place. Fewer people live in the north western inland area where the local economy is 
underdeveloped. It is thus very difficult to find a standard parameter when 
investigating social economical processes in different parts of China. Taking this into 
consideration, the incrementalists have paid attention to the rising civil society forces 
in big cities as well as the democratic practice in the rural villages.  
 
7.4 Possible Critiques 
 
The three-level analysis and emphasis on the historical, social, cultural factors of the 
incremental model may be criticized as being cultural or structural determinism. 
However, the initiatives of the agencies (especially some individuals or a group of 
individuals) were also acknowledged. An investigation into the influence of certain 
political figures has been done. For example, in the discussions on the evolution of 
CCP, the rival between the reformists and the conservative figures in the early reform 
period is analyzed. Deng, the paramount leader of the time when 1989 students’ 
movement took place, has played a decisive role in turning the democratic movement 
into a totally different direction as opposed to the other communist leaders such as 
Gorbachev. However, it was also him, in 1992, decided to continue with the economic 
liberalization and since, ordinary Chinese have actually enjoyed more freedom than 
before.  
 
Some theorists have also acknowleged that a sudden or big-bang transition toward 
democracy may occur, only if all or most within the ruling elite calculate that the 
advantages of a shift from slow liberalization to more rapid and fundamental 
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democratization outweigh the risks of maintaining authoritarian rule. 460 
 
7.5 The Importance of the Case Study 
 
Choosing People’s Daily as the object of case study is primarily because of its 
significant and unique status as the organ of the Central Committee of CCP. It 
provides a mirror for the political changes took place in China in the past three 
decades. As we can see from the study, People’s Daily, the most authoritative 
newspaper of CCP, has also undergone some important changes.  
 
In the pre-reform era (1976-1979), it serves as the ‘mouthpiece’ of the Party, praising 
the greatness of leaders (mostly, Mao), and condemning the political enemy (such as 
the Gang of Four). The front page was filled with ideological slogans and expressions.  
 
In the years 1979 to 1989, People’s Daily started to change in a subtle way. Names of 
the paramount leaders are still taking the most significant places on the front page and 
their activities (meetings, speeches, diplomatic visits) are reported in detail, the 
ideological slogans make less appearance, and the more reports on economic 
development are published on the front page.  
 
In the years 1989 to 1992, especially after Tiananmen, the ideological claims 
reappeared. However, after Deng’s Nanxun Speech in 1992, these claims are quickly 
replaced by more useful and interesting news and reports.  
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The content of the People’s Daily has become diversified, the lay-out is more 
professional and the appearance of advertisement on the front page showed its 
commercialization.  
 
People’s Daily is still one of the biggest and most influential newspapers. The 
readership of the People’s Daily is mainly composed of the CCP leaders, government 
officials, intellectuals and others in the public service sectors who are the most 
powerful elites of China. Therefore, it is still one of the most important sources for 
political observers and commentators to know about the political changes in China. 
More importantly, it has a rich history for the purpose of this thesis.  
 
7.6 2008 Olympics and After  
 
2008 is a year that a lot has happened and may have pushed China forward on the 
road to the incremental democratization. It is 30th anniversary of China’s Reform and 
Open-up policy. Despite the impact of the global financial crisis, China’s economy 
experienced 9% growth in 2008. China successfully hosted the 29th Olympic Games 
at the first time which was reported by all the major media in the world.  
 
It is also a year the most disastrous earthquake took place in the history of PRC. The 
government leaders went to organize the rescue in the first place. Thousands of 
volunteers, organized by NGOs or by themselves, came to Sichuan Province to help 
rescue and with the reconstruction afterward. Charities and social organizations 
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played an important role in collecting the donations and fundraising programmes. All 
the information and moving stories are reported by the media, press, broadcasting and 
on-line. It was described as a rehearsal for all the civil society forces in China.  
 
It is also a year when the Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Disclosure of Government Information was passed. Chinese government was 
criticized of hiding the information during the 2003 SARS epidemic. In an internet 
era, it is becoming more and more difficult to hide some important information, 
especially when it affects a lot of people. Chinese government was afraid that the 
release of some sensitive information, for instance, the information on accidents or 
problems, would cause panic and social unrest. It might be right in some cases, but in 
most of the time, get to know what is happening in the first place can prevent people 
from harm and also reduce the loss. One of the most important incidents in 2008 is the 
exposure of the problematic San Lu milk powder. The media coverage and people’s 
reaction helped to promote the ‘accountability storm’, during which the officials are 
held to their accountability and if misconduct is found, they would take the blame and 
resign or be dismissed.  
 
In 2009, when in other countries like United State, the recession has become severe; it 
has not made much influence in China as it did in other places. The economists are 
still expecting an 8% growth rate in China this year; while in some developed 
countries, it can be 0 or even minus. In a world where the globe has become a village 
and values such as democracy and liberty are accepted as universal, the optimism 
towards China’s path to incremental democratization will be appreciated one day.  
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